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ABSTRACT 
This thesis consists of three essays in monetary economics and international 
macroeconorrucs. 
Chapter one uses Canadian data to evaluate the performance of money 
growth targeting and inflation targeting policy rules, especially when they react to 
asset price changes. There are three important findings. First, estima tes of the policy 
rules consistent with both regimes provide evidence that the Bank of Canada has 
systematically reacted to stock price bubbles and exchange rate changes. Second, a 
counterfactual experiment reveals that, the high inflation of the 1970s and early 1980s 
could have been avoided if the Bank of Canada had responded more strongly to 
inflation and growth in aggregate demand. Third, simulation experiments yielded two 
important results: For both the money growth targeting and inflation targeting policy 
rules, it is always desirable to react to changes in exchange rates and stock price 
bubbles: Contrary to established findings, the results indicate that the money growth 
targeting policy rules are more efficient than the inflation targeting policy rules. 
Chapter two uses data on Ghana to test the validity of the intertemporal 
model of current account that allows for external shocks in the form of variable 
interest rates and exchange rates, and the existence of capital controls. We find that, 
irrespective of the degree of capital control, the basic model fails to predict the 
dynamics of the actual current account. However, we find that extending the model 
to capture variations in interest rates and exchange rates better explains the path of 
the actual current account balances only during the liberalized regime. When the 
model was adjusted to allow for credit constraints, there was sorne support for the 
proposition that the presence of capital controls prevented econOffilC agents ln 
Ghana to smooth their consumption path during the control regime. 
Chapter three investigates the effect of trading block on Tanzania's bilateral 
trade. Using a fixed effects estimation technique, the results revealed that the East 
African Community (EAC) and the European Union (EU) have had significant 
positive effects on Tanzania's bilateral trade. We also find that there is a significant 
intra-trade relationship between Tanzania and its major trading partners in the 
manufacturing sector. 
ABREGE 
Cette thèse comprend trois essaIS en économie monétaire et en macroéconomie 
internationale. 
Le premier chapitre utilise des données du Canada pour comparer la performance 
des règles ciblant la croissance monétaire et l'inflation dans un contexte où le prix des 
actifs financiers change. On obtient trois conclusions importantes. Tout d'abord, les 
estimés des règles consistants avec les deux régimes montrent que la Banque du Canada a 
systématiquement réagi face aux bulles des actions et aux fluctuations du taux de change. 
Deuxièmement, une expérience contrefactuelle démontre que, indépendamment des 
changements stochastiques dans la demande de monnaie, la période de forte inflation des 
années 70 et 80 aurait pu être evitée si la Banque du Canada avait réagi d'une manière 
ferme à l'inflation et la croissance de la demande agrégée. Enfin, deux résultats 
importants découlent des expériences de simulation. Les politques ciblant la croissance 
monétaire et l'inflation nécessitent une réaction face aux bulles des actifs. Les résultats 
indiquent que, contrairement au résultats existants, les politiques ciblant la croissance 
monétaire sont plus efficaces que celles ciblant l'inflation. 
Le deuxième chapitre utilise des donneés du Ghana pour tester la validité de 
l'approche intertemporelle du compte courant avec des chocs externes comme des taux 
d'intérêt et taux de change variables et l'existence du contrôle des capitaux. Nous 
trouvons que le modèle de base ne permet pas de prédire les dynamiques du compte 
courant et ce indépendamment du degré de contrôle des capitaux. C~pendant, une 
extension du modèle qui tient compte des fluctuations des taux d'intérêt et des taux de 
change nous permet de mieux expliquer le parcours du compte courant sous le régime 
libéralisé. Quand le modèle est ajusté pour tenir compte des contraintes sur le crédit, il 
corrobore la propostion selon laquelle la présence de contrôle des capitaux a empêché les 
agents économiques du Ghana de lisser leur consommation durant le regime des 
contrôles capitaux. 
Le troisième chapitre examine l'effet des blocs commerCiaux sur le commerce 
bilateral de la Tanzanie. En utilisant une technique d'estimation avec effets fixes, les 
résultants ont révélé que la Communauté de l'Afrique de l'est (CAE) et l'Union 
Européenne (UE) ont eu des effets positifs et significatifs sur les échanges bilatéraux de 
la Tanzanie. Nous avons aussi identifié une relation d'intra-commerce significative entre 
la Tanzanie et ses principaux partenaires dans le secteur des biens de manufacture. 
PREFACE 
This thesis contributes to three aspects of the current debate on the open 
economy macroeconomics literature, particularly on small open economies. First, the 
literature on the new Keynesian open-economy models with nominal rigidities has 
provided sorne fresh insights into the art of making monetary policies. For instance, 
the literature has laid out a framework where we can ask normative questions about 
how much a Central Bank should react to movements in exchange rates and other 
asset prices. Second, the literature has tended to reject optimizing models of the 
current account that formalize the consumption-smoothing hypothesis for open 
economies. One reason for the failure might be that the basic theoretical model does 
not allow for external shocks. AIso, for studies using data on developing economies, 
the model fails to capture the possible asymmetry in access to international financial 
market that these countries face due to the existence of measures of capital controls 
over a significant part of the study period. Third, the growth of regional trading 
blocks has been one of the major developments in international relations. As a result, 
most developing countries have turned to regionalization as a tool for development. 
This has generated numerous studies to determine the effect of trading blocks on 
bilateral trade. The current econometric approach has been criticized on the ground 
of model mis specification. Therefore, there is the need to empirically analyze the 
trading block effects with the appropriate econometric techniques. 
This thesis consists of three papers on the above three aspects of the small 
open economy macroeconomics. Chapter one uses a small empirical open economy 
model estimated on annual Canadian data to de termine whether it is optimal for the 
Central Bank to respond to changes in the exchange rate and stock priees. We also 
conduct sorne policy regimeanalysis, where we compare the performanee of inflation 
targeting and money targeting policy rules, esp~~lly when they react to changes in 
the ex change rate and stock priees. The choiee of Canada was motivated by our 
desire to conduct the analysis using a small open developed economy that has 
significant experienee in the two policy regimes. 
Chapter two tests the validity of the intertemporal model of the current 
account extended to allow for external shocks and asymmetry in aceess to the 
international financial market. Bergin and Sheffrin (2000) have used data on Canada 
to show that the basic intertemporal model extended to include external shocks yields 
optimal current account series that closely track the actual series. We used data on 
Ghana, a country that has experienced current account deficits since its independence 
in 1957. AIso, both the Ghanaian government and the international donor agencies 
are interested in fin ding permanent solutions to the current account deficits problem 
in that country. Ghana has also from time to time attempted to manage the 
international mobility of capital with measures of capital controls as part of the 
overall trade regime. By restricting economic agents from borrowing from abroad, 
even when capital could find its way out of the economy, these policies created 
asymmetric access to the international financial market. Hence, within the framework 
of the intertemporal model of the current account, Ghana is a candidate country for 
the test of asymmetry in access to international financial market. 
Chapter three uses the gravity equation and the fixed effects estimation 
technique to investigate the effect of trading blocks on bilateral trade in Tanzania.· 
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The chapter also u~es trade intensity indices to measure Tanzania's bilateral trade 
dependence. The choice of Tanzania was motivated by two important facts. First, 
Tanzania is one of the poorest countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 2003 the GDP per 
capita was $610 PPP, wruch is less than a third of the average in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The weil-known link between increased trade and growth seems to hold for 
Tanzania. Hence, the national government is interested in using exports of agriculture 
products (its traditional exports) to achieve growth, and reduce poverty especiaily 
when agriculture provides livelihood to about 80% of the households. Second, the 
national government has recently emphasized the need to be weil informed about the 
effects of trading blocks on bilateral trade. This is particularly important as members 
(including Tanzania) of the East African Community (EAC) are looking for ways to 
revive the community and move to the next level of integration, which involves 
development of regional infrastructure. 
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CHAPTERl 
MONETARY POLICY AND ASSET PRICES: 
A POLICY REGIME ANALYSIS OF THE CANADIAN ECONOMY 
1.1 Introduction 
Over the years many central banks have tried vanous policy regtmes that were 
supposed to deliver macroeconomic stability. After unsuccessfully adopting monetary 
targeting and nominal income targeting regimes in the 1970s and 1980s, some 
countries such as New Zealand, Canada, United Kingdom, and Australia adopted a 
more explicit inflation-targeting framework by the announcement of explicit targets 
or target ranges in the early 1990s. Following Taylor's (1993) policy rule proposaI, the 
literature has been filled with studies that address a number of issues related to the 
performance of different policy rules, and wh ether asset price changes belong in the 
policy rules. This paper is about these two issues. It uses a model estimated on 
Canadian data to compare the relative performance of money growth targeting and 
inflation targeting rules when they incorporate a reaction to asset prices. 
Studies by Poole (1970), Svensson (1997, 1999a), Clarida et al (1999) and Seitz 
and Todter (2000) have argued that the money growth targeting regime requires the 
use of the interest rate to respond to short-run fluctuations in money demand, which 
causes increased volatility in interest rates, output and inflation. Other researchers 
and central bankers have also referred to the high inflationary era of the 1970s and 
early 1980s as an evidence of the poor performance of money growth targeting as a 
policy framework. In spite of these criticisms, the European Central Bank follows a 
monetary strategy, which is a combination of a weak version of money growth 
1 
targeting and an implicit form of inflation targeting. This has ereated a debate on the 
ehoice between money growth targeting and in'flation targeting strategies. With regard 
to the debate on the role asset prices should play in the eonduet of monetary poliey, 
Gerder (1999a, 2001), Ceeehetti et al (2000), Sm et (1997), and Rigobon and Saek 
(2001) have eontributed signifieandy, though, their conclusions and poliey 
implications differ. 
This paper attempts to link the literature on the two issues, as weil as filling 
sorne gaps. First, studies that investigate the optimality of reaeting to asset price 
changes have paid litde or no attention to poliey rules derived from different poliey 
regimes. We in tend to show that poliey rules derived from money growth targeting 
and inflation targeting poliey frameworks require responding to as set price changes. 
We also compare their relative performance. The contribution of this paper is to 
demonstrate that if asset price changes ean proxy for shoeks to money demand (as 
implieidy implied by Keynes' speculative demand for money), then responding to 
as set priee changes within a money growth targeting framework will not necessarily 
produce inereased volatility in interest rates, inflation and output, as has often been 
alleged. 
Second, most studies that compare monetary poliey rules of different regimes 
have not paid partieular attention to the empirieal estimation of poliey rules with data 
sets that span aeross the relevant poliey regimes. For instance, Rudebuseh and 
Svensson (2002) estimate two different poliey rules over the same sample period, 
Orphanides (2003) nests various poliey rules in one estimated equation, and Taylor 
(1999a) uses the same poliey rule over different poliey regimes. We claim that since 
2 
the regresslOn technique determines average relationships, some important 
differenees across policy regimes may not be identified if the policy rules are not 
estimated using data corresponding to the relevant period. We, therefore, intend to 
estimate the regime-consistent policy rules using the relevant data. This becomes 
particularly important when the estimated policy rules are used to conduct simulation 
exerclses. 
This paper has three objectives. First, it determines if the Bank of Canada has 
systematically responded to asset priee changes during the two policy regimes it has 
followed in the reeent pasto Second, it determines if the cost-push inflation of the 
1970s and 1980s could have been avoided if the Bank of Canada had, instead, 
followed an inflation-targeting regime. Third, and most important, it determines the 
optimality of including asset priee changes in monetary policy rules. We use an 
estimated model of the Canadian economy to address these three issues. The key 
interesting findings of the paper are summarized below. 
First, estima tes of the· policy rules provide evidenee of reaction to as set priee 
changes in both regimes. It is important to note that this result does not suggest an 
independent role of asset priees in the conduct of monetary policy. Rather, it suggests 
that asset priee changes have significant effects on output and inflation, the two most 
important variables of coneern to the Bank of Canada. In addition, the estimated 
policy rules for monetary targeting and inflation-targeting regimes demonstrate the 
importanee of using relevant data to estimate policy rules used to describe policy 
actions over a particular regime. Second, counter to conventional wisdom, a 
counterfactual simulation experiment of the model economy reveals that irrespective 
3 
of the stochastic changes in money demand, the great inflation era of the 1970s and 
early 1980s could have been avoided if the Bank of Canada had followed a monetary 
targeting policy rule that responded more to inflation and growth in output. On the 
basis of a loss function, the result is superior to the inflation-targeting rules 
considered in the experiment. Third, results from deterministic and stochastic 
simulations experiments to determine the desirability and optimality of reacting to 
asset priee changes show that reacting to stock priee bubbles is always desirable in 
terms of insulating the economy from the inflationary pressure generated by the 
bubbles. The experiments also show that it is always optimal to respond to exchange 
rate changes irrespective of the nature of the shocks to the economy. Again, for both 
experiments, the monetary targeting policy rules are more efficient in terms of 
variability in the policy instrument and the target variables, when compared to the 
inflation targeting policy rules. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews four 
main arguments related to monetary policy and asset prices. Section 1.3 develops a 
small open economy model for the Canadian economy, and derives two policy rules 
consistent with inflation targeting and monetary targeting regimes. Section 1.4 
estima tes the model parameters and the two policy rules to determine the historical 
role asset prices have played in the conduct of monetary policy in Canada. It also 
demonstrates the importance of estimating a policy rule using data over the relevant 
period. Section 1.5 conducts simulation exercises to determine how the Canadiari 
economy would have evolved if different policy rules had been followed in the past. 
4 
It also determines the optimality of including asset priee changes in monetary policy 
rules. Section 1.6 concludes the paper. 
1.2 Monetary Poliey and Asset Priees: A Review of Arguments 
The issue of whether asset priees be10ng in monetary policy reaction functions has 
reeently reeeived increased attention both from eentral bankers and researchers. In a 
closed economy setting, we can identify three main arguments in the literature. 
Following Alchain and Klein (1973), Shibuya (1992) and Goodhart (1995), there are 
those who believe that asset priees should be included in a measure of the priee level. 
The second group believes as set priees should be used to forecast inflation. This view 
was first presented by Fisher (1911) who demonstrated that increases in the money 
supply will initially le ad to rising as set priees, before leading to increases in the priees 
of consumer goods1. The third stream of research identifies and uses a structural 
re1ationship between asset priees and economic activities based on either the wealth 
effect, 'Tobin's q' or the 'financial acce1erator' to investigate what asset priees add to 
other indicators that inform monetary policy2. FinalIy, sorne studies investigate how 
the optimal policy rule changes in an open economy setting. AlI four lines of research 
are not neeessary mutually exclusive and have important implications for the role that 
asset priees should play in monetary policy. 
1 Other supporters of this view are, Mitchell and Burns (1938), and Goodhart and Hofmann (2000, 2001). 
2 The [mancial accelerator as used by Bernanke and Gerder (1999) is a situation where the existence of 
credit market frictions creates a mechanism by which endogenous changes in entrepreneurs/borrowers' 
balance sheets enhance the effects of exogenous shocks: the value of assets held by 
entrepreneurs/borrowers will rise in good rimes, thereby amplifying the effects on net worth and 
investment, beyond the Tobin's q effects. 
5 
1.2.1 Including Asset Priees in the Measure of Inflation 
Alchain and Klein (1973), following Fisher (1909) and Samuelson (1961) argue for a 
general measure of inflation to capture changes in the monetary cost of a constant 
utility basket of current and future commodities. In other words, a complete measure 
of the co st of living should include prices of future goods. Since such future markets 
do not exist, Alchain-Klein recommend using asset prices as a proxy. Shibuya (1992) 
agrees with the argument and shows that, under certain conditions, the Alchain-Klein 
measure of inflation could be represented as a weighted sum of consumer goods 
price inflation and asset price inflation. Goodhart (1995) supports the ide a and has 
also recommended that central banks target a price index, which includes the prices 
of future commodities. He, therefore, argues for the prices of a broad range of as sets 
to be included in the price index of concern to central banks. Shiratsuka (1999), 
Goodhart and Hofmann (2000) and Shibuya (1992) have provided empirical 
estimates of the implied inflation consistent with the Alchain-Klein proposaI. The 
results seem surprising. For instanœ, Shibuya (1992) had attempted to operationalize 
Pollack's concept of an intertemporal cost of living index (ICOLI). He showed why 
the construction of ICOLI put a very large weight on future consumption in the 
constructed price index. For instance, ignoring the changes in consumption over time 
and assuming a discount factor of 3%, the weights on present consumption and 
future consumption were 3% and 97% respectively. Shiratsuka (1999) applied the 
weight to the J apanese case and compared the conventional definition of inflation to 
the ICOLI-constructed inflation. He showed that, according to the latter index, there 
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was much higher inflation during the period leading to the asset priee crash and 
much worse deflation in the periods after the crash. 
In general, the arguments against the inclusion of asset priees in the measure 
of inflation eenter on factors that determine those as set priees. In particular, Gilchrist 
and Leahy (2002), Filardo (2000) and Kent and Lowe (1997) have argued that 
housing and stock priee changes may not be related to future consumer priee 
inflation. For instanee, stock priees may change due to changes in future earnings, 
risk preferenees of investors and discount rates of future dividends. AIso, housing 
priees can vary for similar reasons. They, therefore, advise against basing the measure 
of inflation on changes in asset priees. 
1.2.2 Using Asset Priees to. Foreeast Inflation 
The second group of researchers has recommended a more flexible way of 
responding to asset priees. They propose that eentral banks should respond to 
unexpected changes in asset priees only when these changes affect expected inflation. 
This has led to studies seeking to identify the predictive power of various asset priees, 
particularly stock and housing priees. The results have not been very encouraging. 
Goodhart and Hofmann (2000) find that housing priees enter significantly into the 
CPI equation for 12 countries, though they did not find stock priees to be a strong 
predictor of inflation. Filardo (2000) does not find that the inclusion of stock and 
housing priees significantly improves the performanee of inflation forecasting, 
though they are correlated with future inflation. Stock and Watson (2001) present an 
extensive literature review on the predictive performanee of asset priees for inflation 
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and output. Using data on seven OECD countries, they concluded that while sorne 
asset priees predict either output and or inflation in sorne countries, the relationship 
is not stable over different periods. The results are not surprising sinee the predictive 
power of asset priees depends on the nature of the shock hitting the economy and 
the degree of the financial sector development differs across countries. 
Cecchetti et al (2000) offers a possible reason for the potential instability 
between asset priee changes and CPI inflation. They con tend that asset priees 
respond endogenously to disturbanees that also affect inflation with a lag. Depending 
on the souree of the underlying shock to the economy, the relationship between an 
increase in asset priee and future inflation can vary in both size and direction. Sinee 
econometric models measure average relationship over a particular historical period, 
the relationship between asset priees and inflation could appear to be unstable in 
simple redueed form models. 
1.2.3 Including Asset Prices in a Structural Model 
Studies that attempt to use structural models to investigate the role of asset priees in 
monetary policy have varied in their conclusions and policy implications. Bernanke 
and Gerder (1999a, 2001) incorporated a 'financial accelerator' into a dynamic new-
Keynesian general equilibrium model with Calvo-style priee rigidities to investigate 
the appropriate reaction of monetary policy to stock priee bubbles. They 
recommended that eentral banks should follow an aggressive inflation-targeting rule 
if they want to stabilize output and inflation even when asset priees are volatile .. 
Whether the asset priee volatility is due to bubbles or to technological shocks, they 
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found no significant marginal benefit in responding to asset prices. This view has 
been supported by Gilchrist and Leahy (2002). Cecchetti et al, (2000) using the 
Bernanke-Gertler model for simulations concludes differently. Their results cali on 
central banks to respond modestly to stock market bubbles over and above the 
reaction to inflation and output gap. The difference between the two results cornes 
from their assumptions on whether a central bank distinguishes between financial 
and technological shocks. Unlike Bernanke and Gertler (2001), Cecchetti et al (2000) 
do not make that distinction and assume that the policy maker knows with certainty 
if the observed stock price movements are non-fundamental in nature, and most 
importantly, when the exogenous bubble is going to burst. The central bank with this 
knowledge can improve macroeconomic performance by reacting to stock pnce 
movements. However, they cautioned central banks not to target asset prices. 
Buliard and Schaling (2002), concentrating on what standard macroeconomic 
models have to say about the asset market arbitrage relationship, have shown why 
reacting to asset price inflation would yield a policy rule of the same nature as the 
standard Taylor rule. However the difference is in the way central banks react to 
inflation deviations and the output gap. Compared to the standard Taylor rule, the 
more responsive policy rules are to asset price deviations, the less responsive the 
policy rule is to inflation deviations and the output gap, which in turn, degrades 
macroeconomic performance. In fact, they found that sorne parameters of policy 
reaction to asset price deviation create indeterminacy of the rational expectations 
equilibrium, where such indeterminacy does not exist in a policy rule that does not 
react to asset price deviations. On the contrary, Rigobon and Sack (2001) find that 
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the. Federal Reserve does in fa ct react to asset prices when adjusting its instruments. 
Their empirical results indicate that monetary policy reacts significantly to stock 
market movement, with a 5% rise (fail) in the S&P 500 index increasing the 
likelihood of a 25 basis point tightening (easing) by about 50%. Bordo and Jeanne 
(2001) have even gone beyond the idea of central banks reacting to asset prices and 
argued that central banks should pur sue a proactive monetary policy. Using a stylized 
dynamic new-Keynesian macroeconomic model, they derived a proactive non-linear 
policy instrument rule, which requires the central bank to respond to prospective 
developments'in asset markets, for which macroeconomic aggregates do not provide 
appropriate summary statistics. 
1.2.4 Open Economy Studies 
Sorne studies have sought to investigate how the simple Taylor and inflation targeting 
rules change in a smail open economy setting, where the ex change rate channel of the 
transmission mechanism is very significant and there is significant exchange rate pass-
through to domestic consumer prices. The main question posed is what, if any, 
attention should central banks pay to exchange rate movements when it sets interest 
rates. The results are mixed. Clarida et al, (2001 a) used a smail open economy model 
to investigate the role exchange rate changes play in interest rate setting. In their 
theoretical analysis, the smail open economy optimal interest rate feedback rule is 
qualitatively the same as that of a closed. economy, except that the degree of 
openness affects how aggressively a central bank should adjust the interest rate in 
response to inflationary pressures. Secondly, when there is perfect pass-through, they 
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recommend central banks should target domestic inflation and allow th'e exchange 
rate to float. Froyen and Guender (2000) have extended the basic Frankel and 
Chinn's (1995) standard open economy model to analyze the performance of four 
different targeting mIes: ex change rate targeting, nominal income targeting, price 
level targeting and money supply targeting. The results were inconclusive. In the 
analytical section, none of the policy mIes dominated the others and, in the empirical 
section, the preferred policy mIe depends on the source of uncertainty facing the 
policy maker as weIl as the values of relevant parameters. 
Clarida et ai, (1998) investigate whether the central banks of J apan and 
Germany have responded to international events when setting their short-term 
interest rates. They found that deviations from the purchasing power parity of the 
nominal exchange rate have had a significant but small effect on the settings of their 
respective interest rates. Taylor (1999b), examining a candidate mIe for the European 
Central Bank found a simple Taylor mIe extended to include reaction to the exchange 
rate changes to be optimal for the European Central Bank, when compared to the 
pure Taylor mIe. 
Ceccetti, et ai (2000), and Batini and Nelson (2000) investigated whether the 
central bank's interest rate reaction function in an open economy should include 
feedback from exchange rate changes. In their stochastic simulation experiments, 
they concluded that the answer depends on the nature of shocks hitting the 
economy. When only financial shocks hit the economy, it is optimal to react to 
exchange rate changes. On the other hand, when the shocks come from the demand 
side of the economy, reacting to exchange rate changes becomes counterproductive. 
Il 
Foilowing the popularization of the use of the monetary condition index 
(MC1), a weighted average of the exchange rate and the nominal interest rate, as 
monetary policy guide for many countries, sorne researchers have questioned what 
that means for the role of the exchange rate in monetary policy formulation3. Gerlach 
and Smets (2000) discuss a number of issues concerning the role of the exchange rate 
in the conduct of monetary policy in. smail open economies under flexible exchange 
rates. Using a variant of the Taylor role in their empirical analysis, they found that 
the Bank of Australia did not respond to exchange rate movements, while New 
Zealand and Canada, the two countries that use the MCI as an operating target, did 
respond strongly to exchange rate movements. Smet (1997) reported similar results 
for Australia and Canada. Bail (1999) contributes in a very important way to the 
recent interest in the role of MCIs in monetary policy formulation. He extends the 
Svensson-Bail model to an open economy and asks how the optimal monetary policy 
changes. He finds that both the inflation targeting and Taylor roles are sub-optimal in 
an open economy model. His optimal role, which can be seen as a modification of 
the Taylor role, supports the use of the MCI as the policy instrument because, as 
argued by him, the MCI measures the overail stance of policy. Besides feeding back 
to the output gap, the instrument role also feeds back to a measure of a long-ron 
inflation, which is measured as inflation fùtered of the transitory effect of exchange 
rate fluctuations. 
The above revlew of the literature has accounted for ail four arguments 
related to the role asset price changes should play in the conduct of monetary policy 
3 See Ericsson and Kerbeshian (1997) for a survey on the use of MCls. 
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in both closed and open economies. One important theme missing in the literature is 
a comprehensive analysis of the arguments within the framework of different poliey 
regimes. Though not surveyed in this study, the literature on the debate on alternative 
monetary poliey mIes also ignores the potential role of asset prices in monetary 
poliey. The study by Froyen and Guender (2000) cornes closer, but their eomparison 
of poliey mIes was solely based on different targeting regimes that may or may not 
feedbaek to asset price changes. Our study, therefore, attempts to merge the literature 
on how monetary poliey should reaet to asset prices with those on the performance 
of alternative monetary poliey mIes. We are of the view that asset price changes have 
signifieant dynamie effeets on output and inflation; hence, they should be part of the 
basis for ehoosing among various poliey mIes. 
1.3 An Empirical Model of the Canadian Economy 
This section develops a srnall open eeonomy model of the Canadian eeonomy to 
investigate the role asset prices should play in the conduet of rnonetary poliey and 
determine the relative performance of inflation targeting and monetary targeting 
mIes. For that purpose, we ex tend the Svensson (1997, 1999b) closed eeonomy 
model by including the external seetor and explieitly aeeounting for the effeet asset 
price changes have on output and inflation, two variables of signifieant importance to 
monetary authorities. This is a purely baekward-Iooking model based on aggregate 
demand, aggregate supply, exehange rate and an exogenous stock price bubble 
equations. The log-linear form of the model is assumed to be: 
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lit+1 = ao + allit + a?J!t+1 + a3 L1et + pt 
et+1 = 00 + Olet - 02&-1 + Xt 
ql+1 = (JO + (J1qt + Vt 
(1.1) 
(1.2) 
(1.3) 
(1.4) 
where Yt is the pereentage gap between actual and potential real GDP (the output 
gap), lit is the four-quarter inflation rate (in pereentage), & is the nominal interest 
rate, L1et is the pereentage change in the real exchange rate, and qt is the pereentage 
gap between the real aggregate stock priee and its potential (real stock priee inflation). 
Ail parameters are positive. 
Equation (1.1), the IS curve, is modeled as an open economy verSlOn of 
Svensson's model. It incorporates ail consumption and investment decisions as weil 
as the foreign sector. It expresses the output gap as a function of its own lag, the lag 
of the real interest rate, the lag of stock priee inflation and the fourth lag of the 
pereentage change in the exchange rate. 4 The lagged output gap in the IS equation 
captures the persistenee that characterizes cyclical movements in output in the data. 
The presenee of the real stock priee inflation can be motivated by the wealth effect 
and Tobin's q. Equation (1.2), which is the Phillips Curve and defines the supply side 
of the model, relates inflation to its lag, the contemporaneous output gap and the lag 
of the pereentage change in the exchange rate. The lagged inflation term in the 
Phillips curve could be motivated either by backward-Iooking expectations or by 
contracting-type rigidities similar to those of Fuhrer and Moore (1995). Changes in 
4 The real exchange rate is measured as units of home currency per unit of foreign currency, so that an 
increase in it is a real depreciation. We use the fourth lag of the change in exchange rate because we believe 
at least it takes a year for a change in exchange rate to impact on output. 
14 
the ex change rate affect priees because they are passed directly into import priees. 5 
Equation (1.3) is a pure backward-looking equation for exchange rate determination, 
which relates the exchange rate to its lag and the lag of the interest rate. We assume 
that the disturbanee term XI captures the rime varying risk premium. Finaily, equation 
(3.4) defines the exogenous bubble proeess of the real stock priee. 
In his smail open economy model for the Canadian economy, Smet (1997) 
used one arbitrage equation to describe the determination of ail types of asset priees. 
We specify each asset priee equation separately for two simple reasons. First, the two 
assets (stock priees and exchange rates) considered in this study have different 
dynamic effects on output and inflation. For instanee, while the real exchange rate 
affects the inflation rates directly and also indirectly through the IS equation, real 
stock priee inflation affects the inflation rate only indirectly through its effect on the 
IS equation. Second, we are interested in the distinct dynamic effect of stock priee 
bubbles. This requires us to explicitly incorporate stock priee bubbles in the model. 
On the other hand, sinee ail exchange rate changes affect the output gap and 
inflation, we explicitly incorporate the dynamics of ail changes in the ex change rate in 
i 
the model.6 
The purely backward-looking nature of both the IS equation and the Phillips 
curve could be controversial. Reeent studies have increasingly used a 'New 
Keynesian' Phillips curve in which expected future inflation replaees expected current 
5 See BaIl (1999) and Obstfeld (1996) for a similar set up. 
6 In addition, our specification of the exchange rate in the model and subsequently in the monetary policy 
instrument rule does not depend on a notion of an equilibrium exchange rate that may be difficult 
compared to equity priees. 
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inflation as a determinant of current inflation.7 Mishkin (1999) criticized that 
specification and argues that models from which forward-Iooking Phillips curves are 
derived have the implication that monetary authorities do not have to act pre-
emptively to control inflation. However, because of the lags in the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policies, eentral banks have in the past pursued pre-emptive 
policy actions to guide the path of policy control variables. Further, studies by Fuhrer 
and Moore (1995), Fuhrer (1997) and Fair (1993) show that estimates for the 
forward-Iooking expectations variable in the Phillips curve are not significandy 
different from zero. With regard to the IS curve, Goodhart and Hoffmann (2002) use 
the data on selected OECD countries to demonstrate that induding the expected 
future output gap in the IS equation introduees bias in the estimate of the real 
interest rate variable. In the case of Canada, they found that the real interest rate 
variable is significant but its coefficient has the wrong sign. When a purely backward-
looking IS equation augmented with asset priees variables is re-estimated for Canada, 
the real interest rate variable is significant and has the right sign. 
We next derive the optimal policy roles for both inflation targeting and 
monetary targeting regimes. Our main aim is to show that both optimal policy roles 
will require response to asset priee changes, albeit, for different reasons. 
1.3.1 Inflation Targeting Regime 
To understand how monetary policy should respond to asset priees, we need to first 
analyse the optimal policy in the inflation-targeting framework. Following much of 
7 See, for example, Bemanke and Gerder (1999, 2001), and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1999). 
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the literature, we assume that the central bank has an intertemporal loss function 
represented by 
1 ["". ] L = --- E L. j31 L .2 1 i=O 1+1 (1.5) 
Where (J is a discount factor. The period loss function is defined over the target 
variables Irt and yI and takes the form 
(1.6) 
where A is the relative weight on output gap stabilization.8 In any period t+i the 
central bank is faced with the policy problem of choosing the time path for the policy 
instrument Rt by maximizing equation (1.5) subject to equations (1.6), (1.1) and (1.2). 
We will focus on the case where the central bank optimizes without commitment. As 
argued in the literature, this assumption is realistic, since, in practice, no central bank 
makes such kind of binding commitment over the course of its future monetary 
policy. 
If the central bank follows an inflation-targeting regime un der discretion, the 
maximization can be divided into two stages. In the first stage, the central bank 
chooses 7r1 and yI to maximize equation (1.6) subject to equation (1.2). In the second 
stage, the results in the fl!st stage are used together with equation (1.1) to determine 
the optimal value of the policy instrument. The instrument rule takes the form: 
(1.7) 
where 
8 This objective function is what Svensson (1997, 1999b) refers to as flexible inflation targeting. According 
to his terminology, a strict inflation targeting is where Ais equal to zero. 
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Details of the derivation of the optimal policy rule are provided in Appendix Al. The 
optimal interest rate rule derived ab ove is the Taylor rule augmented with asset 
priees. Its eentral message is that given the structure of the economy, the eentral 
bank's policy of flexible inflation targeting requires that the policy instrument should 
be adjusted to offset the effect of stock priee inflation and exchange rate changes on 
the output gap and inflation. Henee, the coefficients g3, g4 and g5 must ail be positive. 
It is important to note that asset priees variables in the optimal policy rule do not 
play any role other than through their impact on the outlook for inflation and the 
output gap. The ration ale behind the reaction to asset priees is simple. From 
equations (1.1) and (1.2), as set priee changes either feed directly to priees or indirectly 
through their effect on the output gap. As monetary policy affects inflation through 
the effect of the interest rate on the output gap, it is optimal to change the interest 
rate whenever there is an asset priee shock to both the IS and the AS equations. In 
addition, reacting to equity priee inflation and changes in the exchange rate pushes 
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both the output gap and inflation in the same direction, helping the central bank to 
hit both inflation and output gap targets. This is consistent with the view of Cecchetti 
et al, (2002) on the role that asset prices should play in the conduct of monetary 
policy. However, the presence of these asset price variables in both the IS and the AS 
equations makes the monetary authority's task more difficult. Even if there is no cost 
push inflation, the interest rate adjustments required to hit the inflation target will be 
higher than if these asset price variables have no effect on both the IS and the AS 
equations. 
1.3.2 Monetary Growth Targeting Regime 
The optimal policy rule we derived for the inflation-targeting regime requires the 
central bank to react to asset price changes. For the purpose of comparison, we need 
to derive an optimal policy rule for the money growth-targeting regime that requires 
the monetary authority to react to asset price changes. For this purpose, we attempt 
to show theoretically that reacting to asset price changes in the money growth-
targeting regime is the same as using interest rates (the policy instrument) to respond 
to stochastic changes in money demand. To accomplish this, we need to reformulate 
Friedman's money growth targeting rule with the interest rate as the policy 
instrument. 
It is important to note that the monetary authority cannot use the monetary 
aggregate as an instrument due to the fact that the bank does not have perfect control 
over it.9 AIso, since the model in equations (1.1) - (1.4) does not allow for any direct 
9 See Goodhart (1994) for a more general discussion on central hank instruments. 
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role of money in the economy, it is sufficient to treat monetary policy as if the central 
bank con troIs the short-term interest rate directly, leaving the relationship between 
the short-term interest rate and the monetary aggregate in the background. This is 
made possible by using the quantity equation. 
Mv=Py (1.8) 
where Mis a given monetary aggregate, say M2, vis its velocity,y is the real in come 
and P is the price level. Log-linearizing equation (1.8) and taking its first difference 
yields the relationship 
et + Llvt = 1[t + Llyt (1.9) 
where e, is growth rate of the monetary aggregate, nt is the inflation rate, LlYt is the 
growth rate in real output and Llvt is the rate of change in the velo city of money. With 
the quantity equation and allowing for a change in potential output growth, the long-
run equilibrium relationship in terms of equation (1.9) is 
(1.10) 
where the superscript * indicafes the long-run values of the respective variables. Now 
let us assume that the central bank follows a money growth rule with the objective of 
achieving an inflation target 1[*, which equals its long-run value. Once agam, we 
assume that the inter-temporalloss function to be maximized in period t is 
1 [00. ] Max -- E L f31 L ' 2 t i=O t+l (1.11) 
and the fi is again a discount factor. The period loss function is 
L (()t+i) = ---21 re . - e * .12 ~ t+l t+d (1.12) 
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where f}t+i is the period money growth rate and f}t~i is the long-run money growth 
rate required to hit the long-run inflation target 1C*. The first order condition for 
maximization of equation (1.12) is satisfied by equating the period money growth rate 
to its long-run value. Equating equation (1.9) and (1.10) and re-arranging terms yield 
(1.13) 
To reformulate equation (1.13) in terms of an interest rate rule, we follow 
Orphanides (2003) in assuming a simple formulation of money demand as a log-
linear relationship between velo city deviations from its long run value and the rate of 
interest. The Orphanides specification in difference form is 
(1.14) 
Where bl > O. In his formulation, Orphanides avoided short-run dynamics in money 
demand by making b a constant. However, other researchers su ch as Poole (1970), 
Svensson (1997, 1999a), and Seitz and Todter (2000) have argued that the money 
growth targeting regime requires the use of the interest rate to respond to short-run 
fluctuations in money demand, which in tum causes increased volatility in the interest 
rate, output, and inflation. One of the primary objectives of this study is to 
empirically investigate the performance of monetary targeting rules when the policy 
instrument is used to respond to short-run dynamics to money demand. For such 
analysis, b cannot be a constant. In effect, we agree that if money growth targeting is 
to be successfui for policy purposes, the central bank must be able to control growth 
in money through the policy instruments at its disposaI. 
We therefore depart from Orphanides by explicitly modelling the sources of 
short-run dynamics in money demand through the specification of the determinants 
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of b. To start with, we argue that the financial sector of the economy is the main 
souree of short-run dynamics in money demand. According to Keynes (1936) and 
later Tobin's (1958) formalization, the speculative motive for holding money is 
mainly for securing profit from knowing better than the market so that as set priee 
changes and expectations of their future movements are the main souree of short-run 
dynamics in money demand. For instanee, if stock priees increase above their current 
fundamental values, then a speculator who expects priees to fail would seil their 
stocks now so as to avoid losses when priees actuaily fail. This willlead to a temporal 
increase in money demand. Within the very short run when inflation and real income 
are constant, equation (1.8) implies that an increase in money demand leads to a 
reduction in velo city. Given thatthe long-run velocity is constant in the short-run, 
there will be a negative deviation of velo city from its long-run value. By logical 
extension, foreign exchange specula tors in an open economy where currency 
speculation is significant will move into the domestic currency when it depreciates 
but speculators expect an appreciation in the future. This wiil le ad to a temporary 
increase in demand for domestic currency. Again, by equation (1.8), the temporary 
increase in money demand will le ad to a fail in short run velocity and a negative 
deviation of velo city from its long-run value. Consequently, equation (1.14) becomes, 
LlVt - LlVt* = 61Ll Rt - 62qt - 63Llet (1.15) 
where all the parameters are positive and qt and bet were defined earlier. Even if 
velo city changes in the short run equal their equilibrium value (LlVt = Llw*), changes 
in the short-term interest rate would lead to changes in asset priees in a direction that 
satisfies equation (1.15). For instanee, a decrease in the interest rate would lead to a 
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rise in equity priees ab ove their fundamental values as weil as depreciation in the 
domestic currency. These reaction of asset priees to interest rate changes would lead 
to an increase in money demand, establishing the downward sloping speculative 
money demand relationship as postulated by Keynes. Substituting equation (1.15) 
into equation (1.13) and re-arranging terms yields, 
(1.16) 
where {J1r' fly, {Jq, and {Je > 0 and {Jr = 1. Orphanides suggests that the optimal values 
of the coefficients on the inflation and output growth gap variables are 0.5 each.10 
The main difference between the monetary targeting policy rule (equation 1.16) and 
the inflation targeting policy rule (equation 1.7) is that the monetary targeting policy 
rule responds to pereeived imbalances between the growth of aggregate demand and 
aggregate supply and not the output gap. AIso, the lagged value of the interest rate 
instrument is explicitly used as a baseline for policy adjustments in the optimal 
monetary targeting rule. 
One of our main arguments is that if the interest rate were used to eliminate 
shocks that cause the deviation of money growth from its target, the policy rule 
would indude responses to asset priee changes. However, according to the 
conventional view, this will cause increased volatility in the interest rate. According to 
our model, this daim is not limited to only money growth targeting policy rules. 
Once the optimal instrument rule we derived for the inflation-targeting regime 
requires response to asset priee changes, there will also be increased interest rate 
!O We shaH experiment with these coefficients in our simulation experiments. 
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volatility. Consequently, money growth targeting strategy should be comparable to 
inflation targeting strategy, exeept for how they react to aggregate demand. 
In the next section, we estimate the model together with the two policy rules 
for Canada. We also empiricaliy demonstrate the importanee of estimating a specific 
policy rule using only the data over the relevant period. 
1.4 Estimation and Discussion of Results 
We now have a complete model of the determination of output, inflation, asset priees 
and the optimal interest rate rules for inflation targeting and monetary targeting 
regimes. In this section, we estimate the model together with the two policy rules so 
as to determine the historic role asset priees have played in the conduct of monetary 
policy in Canada. We use quarterly data spanning the period 1975:1-2003:3.11 Ali 
variables used for the estimation were obtained from the International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The interest rate variable 
is the quarterly bank rate expressed as an annual rate. 12 Our inflation measure is the 
four-quarter rate of change of the consumer priee index. The real stock priee 
inflation, which is supposed to measure non-fundamental changes in broad stock 
priees, is measured as the pereentage deviation of real stock priees from their 
potential. 13 Finaliy, the real exchange rate variable is the real bilateral Canadian-
Il The data period was chosen to correspond to the money growth targeting and the inflation targeting 
regimes as followed by the Bank of Canada. 
12 Results using the three-months Treasury bill rates were almost identical and are, therefore, not reported. 
13 We used a Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 1600 to calculate the potential values 
ofboth the real GDP and the aggregate stock priee. 
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United States exchange rate defined as units of the home currency per unit of the 
foreign currency so that an increase in it is a real depreciation. 14 
1.4.1 Model Parameter Estimates 
The estimated equations using the entire sample period are shown below. The 
standard error of the residual, the Durbin-Watson statistics and the adjusted-R2 are 
reported below the equations. 
(lS) Yt = 0.06 + 0.84 Yt-l - 0.08 (Rt-l - 1Ct-IJ + 0.02 qt + 0.06 .det-4 + &t 
(0.07) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
(78= 0.64 DW= 1.65 Adjusted-R2 = 0.82 
(AS) 1Ct = 0.07 + 0.96 1Ct-l + 0.19 Yt + 0.08 .det + Ilt 
(0.10) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
(7fl = 0.65 DW= 1.50 Adjusted-R2 = 0.96 
The equations were estimated separately by OLS15. Ail coefficients have the expected 
signs. The results for the IS curve suggest that the real interest rate, the real exchange 
rate and the real equity priee inflation ail have significant effect on the output gap. 
The fourth quarter lagged pereentage change in the real exchange rate has the 
strongest effect on the output gap among ail the asset priees. A ,depreciation of the 
real exchange rate makes domestic goods more competitive and increases net 
exports. Given that Canada is a smail open economy where net exports account for a 
significant pereentage of aggregate demand, it is not surprising that the real exchange 
14 We experirnented with other defmition of the real exchange rates such as the IFS defmition of real 
effective exchange rates (REER). Results were qualitatively and quantitatively the same as the one 
reported. 
15 Ail variables used in the regression are stationary. 
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rate is an important determinant of aggregate demand. The estimated coefficient for 
the real share priee inflation reflects the significant share of equity in private sector 
wealth and the wealth and Tobin q effects on aggregate demand. Overail, the 
estimated IS equation is comparable to that of Goodhart and Hofmann (2002), who 
also use quarterly Canadian data. 
The estimated Phillips curve indicates that ail the coefficients are significant at 
the 1 % level. The coefficient estimates suggest that an increase in the output gap by 
one percentage point leads to an increase in the inflation rate by 0.19-percentage 
point. The significanee of the real exchange rates variable suggests that besides 
affecting the output gap, the exchange rate has a greater and more immediate effect 
on inflation. Based on these dynamic effects of asset priees on output and inflation, 
we argue that the monetary authority should react to asset priee developments when 
deciding on the policy instruments. 
With a backward-Iooking model, the Lucas critique applies. One way of 
dealing with this situation is to test for the stability of the model over the relevant 
historical period. We, therefore, conducted a number of structural stability tests on 
both the IS and Phillips curve equations. Firsdy, we conducted Chow's breakpoint 
test for both equations, using 1990:4 as the date of the break sinee the shi ft to 
inflation targeting regime occurred at that particular period. The nuil hypothesis of a 
constant coefficient vector over the two periods could not be rejected. The p-values 
of the F-tests are 0.58 and 0.27 respectively. Secondly, we took a broader view of the 
stability of the model by conducting the Brown et al (1997) CUNSUM test which is 
based on the cumulated sum of the residuals. Again the tests did not indicate any 
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sub-sample instability in either of the two equations.16 The results of the tests are 
provided in Appendix A2. 
1.4.2 Estimated Poliey Rules 
Given the empirical model described above, we now estimate the monetary policy 
mIes (policy reaction function) to determine whether the central bank has 
systematically responded to as set price developments. In addition, we are also 
interested in determining whether the regime specific policy mIes differ significantly 
in their reaction to asset prices. Finally, we demonstrate the importance of estimating 
a specific policy mIe using data over the relevant period. 
Monry growth tar:geting mies 
Table 1.1 reports estimates of three specifications of the policy mIes consistent with 
the monetary targeting regime (coefficient standard errors are given in parentheses, 
and the standard errors of the residuals and the adjusted-R2 are reported). The 
Table 1.1: Estimated Money Growth Targeting Policy Rules 
80 8n 8t.y 8R-l 8t.e 8q see Adj-R2 
1. Baseline 1.06 0.18 0.25 0.78 1.43 0.75 
(1975:1-1990:4) (0.76) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) 
2. Adding asset priees 1.50 0.14 0.13 0.77 0.29 0.05 1.32 0.78 
(1975:1-1990:4) (0.59) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.02) 
3. Overall sample 0.43 0.16 0.20 0.84 0.16 0.02 1.10 0.91 
(1975:1-2003:4) (0.26) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.01) 
16 The results of the tests also imply that the recent historical shifts in monetary policy regime are not due 
to any significant change in the structure of the economy but are part of an on-going learning process of 
the central banking. 
27 
dependent variable is the bank rate and the first two estima tes were over the period 
1975:4 to 1990:4.n The first, which is the baseline specification, shows the response 
of the policy instrument to only inflation and the output growth gap. Ali of the 
coefficients are significant at the 5% significanee level. The estimated parameters for 
inflation and output growth gap are significantly lower than the optimal values 
suggested by Orphanides, implying that during the money targeting period, which 
includes the great inflation era of the 1970s and 1980s, the Bank of Canada 
responded much less to inflation and output growth gap than was required to fight 
inflation. The second specification adds to the policy rule the current value of stock 
priee inflation and the percentage change in the real exchange rate. The estimates 
indicate that during the monetary targeting regime, the Bank of Canada increased the 
bank rate significantly in response to depreciation in the bilateral real exchange rate 
and stock priee inflation. 
The result, especialiy with regard to exchange rates, should not come as a 
surprise. Being a smali open economy with a significant external sector, the monetary 
authority in Canada has to pay particular attention to developments in the foreign 
exchange market, more so when exchange rates have a direct effect on inflation. It is 
also optimal, because as Smet (1997) argues, during the 1980's and the fust part of 
the 1990's, nominal shocks became relatively the more important determinant of 
exchange rate changes than real shocks, justifying a policy response. Other parameter 
estima tes are almost unchanged from the baseline specification, with the exeeption of 
17 We have classified the period 1975:4 to 1990:4 as the rnonetary targecing period because, though, rnoney 
growth targeting strategy was officially abandoned in 1981, in practice various forrns of rnoney growth 
targecing and sorne nominal incorne targecing were pursued untill the sillft to inflation targecing regime in 
1991. 
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the output growth gap parameter, which decreased significantly. These results must 
be interpreted with caution. Given the dynamic structure of the model, the policy 
reaction to asset priees must be over and above their predictive pow~r for future 
output and inflation. Based on these estimate and our theoretical derivation of the 
final policy rule in section 1.2, we conclude that during the money growth-targeting 
regime, the eentral bank systematically adjusted its policy instrument to accommodate 
stochastic changes in money demand as proxied by asset priee changes. Simulation 
experiments undertaken in the next section examine whether this was desirable in 
terms of the performanee of the economy. 
In the final specification, we estimated the policy rule for the entire sample 
period in order to investigate if the Bank of Canada has followed the same policy rule 
despite the shift in the policy regime. Chow's break point test using 1990:4 as the 
break point rejected the null hypothesis of constant parameters at the 10% 
significanee level over the two periods. The p-value of the F-tests is 0.06. Henee the 
Bank of Canada has not followed the same policy rule over the entire period. Figures 
1.1 and 1.2 show the actual and the fitted values of the policy instrument (bank rates) 
for the monetary targeting era with and without asset priees respectively.18 A clear 
evidenee of policy reaction to asset priees emerges. Theactual and fitted values are 
closer for the policy rule specification that includes asset priees than for the one that 
does not include asset priees. Further, the in-sample forecast evaluation indicates that 
the root mean squared errors are respectively 1.92 and 2.24 for the policy rule with 
and without asset priees. 
18 The fitted values in aIl graphs assume that the inflation and the output growth gap are the realized ones. 
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Money Growth Targeting Regime 
Figure 11: Actual and FittedValues of the Bank Rate (WithAsset Priees) 
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Figure 1.2: Actual and Fitted Values of the Bank Rate (Without Asset Prices) 
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Inflation targeting rules 
We now estimate the inflation-targeting policy rules. Table 1.2 reports three 
estimated specifications of the policy rule. (Coefficient standard errors are given in 
parentheses, and the standard errors of the residuals and the adjusted-R2 are 
reported). As in the case of money growth targeting, the first two specifications use 
data over the inflation targeting period (1991:1-2003:4), and the last specification uses 
data over the whole sample period (1975:1-2003:4). The baseline rule indicates that, 
during the inflation-targeting regime, the Bank of Canada responded actively to both 
inflation and the output gap. Both parameter estimates are highly significant. In the 
second specification,· we allow for the possibility that the Bank of Canada 
systematically responded to both stock priee inflation and changes in exchange 
rates. 19 The overall fit, in terms of the adjusted R2, improves. 
The parameter estimates also exhibit some interesting patterns. First, the 
coefficients on the inflation and output gap suggest that during the inflation-targeting 
period, policy responded more heavily to inflation and to the output gap. In 
particular, the coefficients satisfy the stability criterion of policy response to changes 
in the inflation and output gap, proposed by Taylor.20 Second, the coefficient of the 
share priee inflation is negative and five times the size of the one obtained for the 
money growth-targeting regime. The significanee of the coefficient does not 
necessarily mean that, over the relevant period, the Bank of Canada attempted to 
raise stock priees over their fundamental values. It is possible that having been able 
19 In aIl the estimation we elitninated the three lagged percentage change in the exchange rate because it 
was consistently not significant and carried the wrong sign. This is also the case with the money growth 
targeting policy rules. 
20 According to Taylor (1993), policy stability requires that g" = 1.5 and gy = 0.5. 
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to bring inflation un der control, the bank has been less constrained to use its policy 
instrument to pur sue other objectives, which led to policy ease, and the stock market 
reflected that ease. AIso, as Smet (1997) argues, the negative coefficient on the share 
priee inflation variable may imply that both the Bank of Canada and the stock market 
respond to news about underlying inflation that is not captured by the variables in 
the estimated policy rule. Finally, the Bank of Canada has continued to respond 
strongly to changes in exchange rates due to the openness and the dependenee of the . 
economy on the external sector. 
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 plot actual and fitted values of the bank rate with and 
without asset priees in the policy rules respectively. It is obvious that the policy rule 
that reacts to asset priees broadly describes better the time path of the decisions with 
some relative degree of consistency. The sample forecast root mean square errors are 
1.86 and 2.15 for with and without asset priees, respectively. In the third 
specification, we estimate the inflation targeting policy rule using data for the en tire 
sample period. All coefficients exeept the constant decreased and the sign on the 
stock priee inflation coefficient became positive, though it is not statistically 
significant. 
Table 1.2: Estimated Inflation Targeting Policy Rules 
go gn gy g,le gq see Adj-R2 
1. Baseline 4.14 1.06 0.59 1.76 0.53 
(1991:1-2003:4) (0.47) (0.17) (0.20) 
2. Adcling asset priees 3.36 1.28 0.97 0.38 -0.11 1.40 0.70 
(1991 :1-2003:4) (0.43) (0.14) (0.18) (0.13) (0.02) 
3. Overall sample 4.54 0.79 0.63 0.19 0.02 1.53 0.61 
(1975:1-2003:4) (0.35) (0.07) (0.15) (0.09) (0.02) 
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Inflation Targeting Regime 
Figure 1.3: Aetual and Fitted Values of Bank Rate (With Asset Priees) 
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Figure. 1.4. Actual and Fitted Values of Bank Rates (Without Asset Priees) 
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Evaluation of the relevant estimates 
We now proceed to demonstrate the importance of using relevant poliey rules to 
deseribe poliey actions over a partieular regime. As mentioned earlier, most studies 
that seek to determine the performance ofvarious poliey rules have used different 
approaehes. Rudebuseh and Svensson (2002) estimate two different poliey rules 
separately over the same sample period. Taylor (1999a) uses the same rule over 
different poliey regimes, and Orphanides (2003) nests various poliey rules in one 
estimated equation. Our claim is that since the regression technique determines the 
average relationship, sorne important differences aeross different periods may not be 
identified if the relevant poliey rules are not estimated using data eorresponding to 
the regime period. We explore this by doing the following. In eaeh poliey regime, we 
use the third specifications to generate the fitted values of the bank rate for the 
relevant period (Figures A2.3 and A2.4 in Appendix A2 plot aetual and fitted values 
of the bank rate for the monetary targeting and inflation targeting regimes 
respeetively). We then compare them with Figures 1.1 and 1.3. It is obvious that, for 
both regimes, the fitted values generated by poliey rules estimated over the relevant 
regime period fit the data better than the one fitted with poliey rules estimated over 
the encire sample period. 
We have earefully estimated and analyzed the historieal poliey rules followed 
by the Bank of Canada during the two poliey regimes. The next section attempts to 
determine the path of the Canadian economy over the sample period if a given poliey 
rule had been followed in the pasto We also eonduet simulation experiments to 
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determine the relative performances of the policy rules and the optimality of reacting 
to asset price changes. 
1.5 Sorne Dynamic Simulations 
The fitted values of the bank rate calculated in the previous section simply show what 
the interest rate recommendations coming from the respective rules would have been 
at any point in time. The exercise does not show how the economy would have 
evolved if a particular policy rule had been followed over the whole sample period. It 
also does not provide the framework for determining if it is optimal for central banks 
to react to asset price changes when fixing its policy instrument. Lastly, the exercise 
does not provide a good yardstick to evaluate the relative performance of policy rules 
in the two regimes. In this section, we conduct three different simulation experiments 
to address these issues. First, we conduct counterfactual simulation experiments to 
determine how the economy would have evolved if a particular mle had been 
followed in the pasto Second, we conduct both deterministic and stochastic 
simulations to determine if it is optimal for the monetary authority to respond to 
asset prices over and above their direct effect on inflation and output. These two 
experiments are conducted within the framework of different policy regimes so as to 
determine their relative performance. 
1.5.1 Counterfactual Experiments 
We use simple counterfactual simulation techniques to illustrate the performances of 
the money growth targeting and inflation targeting policy rules. The purpose is to 
determine what path the economy would have taken if in some past period a specific 
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poliey mIe was followed. One important question we address is whether the 
inflationary era of the 1970s and 1980s eould have been avoided if another poliey mIe 
had been followed in the past.21 For this exercise, we experiment with our empirieal 
model and subjeet it to random shoeks of the magnitude experienced in the pasto The 
differences between the aetual and the estimated values of the endogenous variables 
in the model during the estimation period were assumed to be the estimated shoeks 
that hit the economy during the entire sample period. We used both of our estimated 
poliey mIes and two others suggested by Taylor (1993) and Orphanides (2003) to 
simulate values for inflation, output gap, output growth gap, and the interest rate for 
115 periods.22 We used 1974:4 as the initial condition. 
Table 1.3 below presents simulated and aetual summary statisties of seleeted 
variables that ean be used to measure the performance of various poliey mIes with 
and without reaetion to asset prices. For eaeh of the variables the flrst column is the 
average 
Table 1.3: Simulated and Actual Statistics 
Inflation Bank rate* Output gap Output growth gap 
A. Money growth targeting Avg. Var. Avg. Var. Avg. Var. Avg. Var. 
Our estimated rule without as set prices 5.14 6.23 8.45 0.13 0.02 2.14 -0.07 3.03 
Our estimated rule with asset prices 5.06 6.91 8.53 0.31 -0.03 2.18 -0.07 3.03 
Orphanides rule without asset priees 1.51 11.36 7.67 1.35 -0.76 4.35 -0.08 3.52 
Orphanides rule with as set priees 1.44 12.02 7.65 1.56 -0.79 4.42 -0.08 3.52 
B. Inflation targeting 
Our estimated rule without asset priees 4.06 6.73 8.31 1.96 -0.24 2.17 -0.08 3.09 
Our estimated rule with asset priees 4.08 6.99 8.28 2.82 -0.24 2.02 -0.07 2.87 
Taylor rule without asset prices 3.33 6.89 8.16 2.56 -0.39 2.49 -0.08 3.28 
Taylor rule with asset priees 3.35 7.15 8.13 3.24 -0.39 2.33 -0.07 3.04 
C. Actual Statistics 4.92 11.86 8.42 1.64 -0.05 2.31 -0.04 3.53 
*Note: To conform to standard practiee, the varianees reported are for the change in the interest rate. 
21 The estimated equations for the exogenous stock priee bubble proeess and the exchange rate used for 
these experiments are reported in Appendix Al. 
22 For this experiment. and other simulation exercises, the negative coefficient on the real stock price 
inflation variable was changed to positive. Results with the negative coefficient were clearly inferior. 
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and the seeond eolumn is the vananee. Interesting patterns emerge from the 
statisties. Irrespeetive of the poliey rule followed, reaeting to asset priees information 
over and above their effeets on inflation and output leads to inereased volatility of 
the poliey instrument and inflation. However, reaeting to asset priees leads to a 
deerease in volatility in both the output gap and the output growth gap in aIl 
inflation-targeting rules whereas the opposite is the ease for aIl money growth-
targeting rules. Contrary to establishéd results in the existing monetary theory 
literature (Svensson, 1997; Clarida et al 1999), our estimated money growth targeting 
poliey rules, if followed throughout the period un der study, would have aehieved 
lower variability in the poliey instrument and inflation when eompared to those under 
inflation targeting rules and the aetual historieal realization. However, they would 
have meant higher average values for both inflation and the bank rate. 
The most interesting results are those related to the question of whether the 
inflation era of the 1970s and 1980s eould have been avoided if a partieular poliey 
rule was followed. Our results indieate that if the Bank of Canada had followed the 
Orphanides rule, average inflation and the bank rate would have been mueh smaller 
than in aIl the other seenarios and the historieal values. For instanee, following the 
Orphanides rule, the average inflation would have been 1.51 with no reaetion to asset 
priees and 1.44 with reaetion to asset priees. These averages could have been 
aehieved with historieally comparable variability in both bank rate and inflation. 
Charts 1.1 and 1.2 plot the simulated values of seleeted variables against their 
historieal values. They show the simulated and aetual paths of the bank rate, inflation, 
output gap and output growth gap, for aIl inflation-targeting rules with and without 
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reaetion to asset priees respeetively. One signifieant result is that our estimated rule 
with or without asset priees traeks the inflation path of the inflation-targeting period 
mueh better than the Taylor poliey rule. In addition, for ail inflation-targeting rules, 
the simulated values of the bank rate were higher than the aetual values between 1981 
and 1987. However, during the latter part of the inflation~targeting period, the 
simulated values beeame higher than the aetual ones. 
Charts 1.3 and 1.4 also present the simulated and aetual values of the seleeted 
variables for the monetary targeting rules with and without asset priees respeetively. 
The results are rather dramatie and provide a good answer to the question of whether 
the high inflation era eould have been avoided foilowing any partieular poliey rule. 
The simulated values of the bank rate for our estimated poliey rule traeks weil the 
aetual values with some moderate deviations. However, the simulated values using 
the Orphanides rules differ very signifieantly from the aetual values, espeeiaily during 
the monetary targeting period. Whereas the simulated values are signifieantly higher 
for the first five years, they eonsistently yield lower values for the ten-year period 
between 1981 and 1991. In faet, for the five-year period 1983-1988, the simulated 
values beeame negative, indieating that there would have been a severe eonstraint on 
the economy if the bank rates were bounded at zero. This would have constrained a 
desirable expansionary monetary poliey during the period.23 Due to the signifieantly 
higher simulated values of the bank rate for the first five years, the simulated output 
gap for the Orphanides rules would have been signifieantly lower than the aetual 
value~ for the first eight years. Most importantly, the disinflation proeess that began 
23 See Orphanides and Wieland (1998) and Weymark (2004) for a discussion on priee stability and 
monetary poliey effeetiveness when nominal interest rates are bounded at zero. 
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in the mid 1970s would have continued till the late 1980s. There could also have even 
been a brief period of deflation. 
Chart 1.1: Actual and Simulated Values of Selected Variables: Inflation Targeting Rules without 
Asset Priees. 
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Chart 1.2: Actual and Simulated Values of Selected Variables: Inflation Targeting Rules with 
Asset Priees. 
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Chart 1.3: Actual and Simulated Values üfSelected Variables: Müney growth Targeting Rules 
withüut Asset Priees. 
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Chart 1.4: Actual and Simulated Values of Selected Variables: Money growth Targeting Rules 
with Asset Priees. 
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Sorne les sons ean be drawn from these results. First, we eannot be sure that 
the high inflation era of the 1970s and 1980s eould have been avoided if the inflation 
targeting poliey framework had been followed. Second, we have also seen that during 
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the money growth targeting regime period the Bank of Canada did not respond 
strongly enough to infhtion and the output growth gap. This indicates that if the 
Bank had followed the Orphanides rule, the economy would have performed better 
than it did during the period under study. 
1.5.2 Deterministic and Stochastic Simulations 
To render our results comparable to other studies (Bernanke and Gertler, 1999; 
Cecchetti et al, 2000), we conduct two more simulation experiments. First, we 
conduct a deterministic simulation in which we determine the desirability of the 
central bank's reaction to exogenous stock priee bubbles. Second, we conduct a 
stochastic simulation experiment to determine the optimality of reacting to exchange 
rate changes when there are demand and financial shocks. For both experiments, we 
analyze the performance of various policy rules corresponding to the two policy 
regimes.24 
1.5.2.1 Deterministic Simulations 
For the deterministiç stock price bubble simulation experiment, we followed 
Cecchetti et al by introducing a deterministic bubble proeess in equity prices, which 
lasts five periods and grows exponentially. This is based on the possibility that 
observed equity prices could differ persistently from their fundamental values.25 The 
24 Bernanke and Gerder (1999) and Cecchetti et al (2000) conduct similar experiments. However, they did 
not conduct policy regime analysis. 
25 The assumption is that the central bank knows with certainty if an observed stock priee movement is 
non-fundamental. 
43 
initial bubble is set equal to 1% of its steady state fundamental value. We then 
examine the responses of seleeted variables un der different poliey regimes. Chart 1.5 
Chart 1.5: Dynamic Response to Stock Priee Bubble: Inflation Targeting Rules with no Response 
to Stock Priees 
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illustrates the simulated responses over thirty periods (quarters) of selected variables 
to the bubble under the inflation targeting rules (our estimated and Taylor rules) 
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without reaction to asset priee bubbles.26 Through the wealth effect and Tobin's q, 
the bubble stimulates aggregate demand sufficient to overheat the economy. The 
level and growth of output, and inflation rise sharply. In response, the nominal 
interest rate increases. One distinctive feature between the two policy rules is that 
sinee our estimated rule reacts relatively more strongly to the output gap than the 
Taylor mIe, the effect of the bubble on output leads to a steep initial policy response, 
which eventually cools off the economy and controls inflation better over the entire 
response period. This observation also holds when the policy rules are allowed to 
respond to the stock priee bubbles, as shown in Chart 1.6. Interestingly, by reacting 
to the stock priee bubbles, the monetary authority is able to more effectively cool off 
the economy from the heat generated by the financial sector.27 As a result, inflation 
and the output gap are further redueed. The bank rate, therefore, ends up marginally 
higher. The dynamic responses when the monetary authority follows money growth 
targeting rules are presented in Charts 1.7 and 1.8 for without and with response to 
equity priee bubbles respectively. Again, the initial effect of the exogenous stock priee 
bubble is an increase in both output and inflation. In response, the short-term 
interest rate increases. Unlike the inflation targeting policy rule, money growth 
targeting rules are able to induee a reduction in inflation within the response period. 
The Orphanides rules, due to their higher response coefficients on both inflation and 
the output growth gap, do better in controlling both inflation and output, though 
with marginally higher levels of the bank rate. These results are quantitatively sharper 
in the case of reaction to asset priees. 
26 Ail simulations are reported as deviations from the steady state: 
27 The coefficient on the stock price bubble in ail policy mIes is the optimized value. 
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Chart 1.6: Dynamic Response to Stock Priee Bubble: Inflation Targeting Rules with Response to 
Stock Priees 
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Chart 1.7: Dynamic Response to Stock Priee Bubble: Money Growth Targeting Rules with no 
Response to Stock Priees 
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The lessons from the experiments are that monetary targeting policy rules do 
weil in eliminating the stock priee bubble effect on the economy, in terms of 
reducing the output gap, output growth gap and eventuaily, inflation. The results are 
even better when the eentral bank reacts to the stock priee bubble. It does so by 
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increasing the real interest rates enough to cool off the economy, even when the 
stock priee bubble increases exponentially. 
Chart 1.8: Dynamic Response to Stock Priee Bubble: Money Growth Targeting Rules with 
Response to Stock Priees 
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Our results in the case of reacting to asset priees differ significantly from 
those of Bernanke and Gertler. In their somewhat similar experiment, output, 
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inflation and the bank rate decrease after the stock priee bubble hits the economy. 
However, those variables increase in our experiment. This differenee is due to the 
different formation of expectations in the two models. In the Bernanke and Gertler 
forward 100king model, the expectation by the public that interest rates will rise due 
to the bubb1e actuaily 1eads to a reduction in the fundamenta1 component of stock 
priees. This more than outweighs the stimu1ating effect of the bubb1e, 1eading to a fail 
in output and inflation. This mechanism is missing in our model. In fact, with a 
purely backward-100king model, the public expectation of policy changes are solely 
based on what has happened in the past, so that the fundamenta1 component of as set 
priees may not change at ail. Henee, the stock priee bubb1e will have its fuil impact 
on the economy. We believe that our results depict a closer picture of the true 
dynamic effects of the bubb1e sinee it is based on a model that is a more realistic 
representation of the economy. As mentioned earlier, the resù1ts by Fuhrer and 
Moore (1995), Fuhrer (1997) and Goodhart and Hoffmann (2002) demonstrate that 
the dynamics of the economy do not rely on sophisticated forward-Iooking behaviour 
on the part of private-sector investors, as assumed by Bernanke and Gertler. 
1.5.2.2 Stochastic Simulations 
In this section, we conduct stochastic simulation experiments to determine the 
optimality of 1eaning against the exchange rate wind using a simplified 10ss function 
that fits ail policy regimes. It must be noted that whi1e we explicitly incorporated 
equity priee bubb1es into our model, we did not do that for theexchange rate. An 
observed exchange rate change might either be a purely financial shock or the 
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reaetion of the exehange rate to other shoeks, say, an aggregate demand shoek. The 
desirability of leaning against the exehange rate wind may depend on the nature of 
the shoek hitting the eeonomy. To study this, we use stoehastie simulations of our 
model economy to determine the performance of various poliey rules when there are 
purely financial shoeks on one hand (shoeks to the exehange rate equation) and when 
there are purely aggregate demand shoeks (shoeks to the IS equation). For this 
purpose, we assume the eeonomy is subjeet to shoeks drawn from a normal 
distribution with the variance of the shoeks we estimated from the data. We conduet 
the simulation based on 100 independent draws of shoeks. The length of eaeh draw 
is 500 quarters. The first 100 shoeks from eaeh draw were dropped to avoid the 
initialization problem. 
To specify a simple and eonvenient loss funetion that al10ws us to compare 
the performances of the two poliey regimes, we follow Rudebuseh and Svensson 
(2002) by specifying a generalloss funetion of the fonu, 
L = rp" var(1CJ + rpy var(yJ + rpLlyvar(LlyJ + rpLlivar{LJzi) (1.17) 
where rp", 'P.y, rpLly, and rpLli are the weights on inflation stabilization around the inflation 
target, output gap, output growth gap, and interest rate smoothing respeetively. The 
weights are normalized to sum to one. We further assume that the different targeting 
regimes are approximated as optimal minimization of the eorresponding loss 
funetions so that we ean define them as fol1ows: flexible inflation targeting: rp" = rpy = 
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0.4, rpLJi = 0.2, and rpLJy = 0; and money growth targeting regime: rp", = rpLJy = 0.4, rpLJi = 
0.2, and rpy = 0.28 
Tables 1.4 summarises the results of the simulation for financial shocks. It 
presents the variances of the relevant variables and the loss associated with a given 
policy mIe with and without leaning against the exchange rate wind. It shows that, for 
aU policy mIes, leaning against the exchange rate wind when there are shocks from 
the financial sector is optimal in terms of achieving a smaUer loss. But the marginal 
improvements in the loss function when the policy reacts to the ex change rate shocks 
are greater than for money growth targeting policy mIes. 
T hl 14 V . hl" a e .. ana Ilty 0 fR 1 e evant T arget V . hl ana es an dT IL ota oss-F . 1 Sh k InanCla oc 
Financial shock 
A. Inflation targeting Inflation Output gap Output growth gap Interest rate Loss 
Our estimated rule without asset prices 0.50 0.03 --- 0.15 0.24 
Our estimated rule with as set prices 0.46 0.03 --- 0.19 0.22 
Taylor rule without as set prices 0.45 0.03 --- 0.16 0.22 
Taylor rule with asset prices 0.40 0.03 --- 0.18 0.20 
B. Money growth targeting 
Our estimated rule without asset priees 0.85 --- 0.05 0.04 0.37 
Our estimated rule with as set priees 0.40 --- 0.04 0.16 0.21 
Orphanides rule without asset priees 0.53 --- 0.07 0.05 0.25 
Orphanides rule with as set prices 0.32 --- 0.04 0.17 0.18 
Tables 1.5 summanses the results of the simulation for demand shocks. With the 
exception of our estimated inflation-targeting mIe, the results of aU other mIes imply 
that it is optimal for the central bank to react to exchange rate changes that result 
from shocks to the demand side of the economy. These results contradict Cecchetti 
28 These are standard weights used in the literature. 
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et al (2000) who conduded that whether the central bank's poliey mIe should feed 
baek from the ex change rate depends on the nature of the shoek hitting the 
economy. However, our results support Batini and Nelson's (2000) daim that when 
the exehange rate equation is purely baekward looking, reaeting to exehange rate 
changes is always desirable. Once again, the marginal benefits from poliey reaeting to 
exehange rate changes are greater th an for the money growth targeting poliey mIes. 
T able 1.5: Variability of Relevant T arget Variables and T otal Loss-D emand Sh k oc 
Demand shock 
A. Inflation targeting Inflation Output gap Output growth gap Interest rate Loss 
Our estimated rule without asset priees 3.20 1.04 --- 0.38 1.78 
Our estimated rule with as set priees 3.38 1.05 --- 0.38 1.85 
Taylor rule without asset priees 3.24 1.14 --- 0.14 1.78 
Taylor rule with asset priees 3.09 1.12 --- 0.14 1.72 
B. Money growth targeting 
Our estimated rule without asset prices 7.39 --- 1.32 0.06 3.50 
Our estimated rule with asset priees 3.06 --- 1.34 0.06 1.77 
Orphanides rule without asset prices 6.60 --- 1.27 0.04 3.16 
Orphanides rule with asset priees 2.72 --- 1.44 0.36 1.66 
1.6 Conclusion 
Adopting the appropriate monetary poliey framework to promote maeroeeonomie 
stability is an art that every central bank seeks to master. As a result, the conduet of 
monetary poliey has ehanged over the years, as central banks learn and attempt to 
adapt to the ehanging eeonomie environment. Monetary poliey objectives have 
evolved from the era of the pursuit of multiplieity of goals to the pursuit of a single 
goal of price stability. Even within the framework of pursuing price stability, there 
have been debates on the relative performance of monetary targeting and inflation 
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targeting regimes. Of equal importance is the debate on the role asset prices should 
play in the conduct of monetary policy when asset price changes have significant 
direct effect on output and inflation. 
This paper has used a small empirical open economy model of the Canadian 
economy to address these two issues. It also demonstrates the importance of using 
the right estimated poliey rules for the purpose of comparing the performance of 
different policy regimes. Estimates of the policy rules provide evidence of reaction to 
asset price changes in both regimes. These results do not suggest an independent role 
of asset prices in the conduct of monetary policy. They rather reflect the significant 
effect asset price changes have on output and inflation, as demonstrated by the 
estimated coefficients for both the output and the Phillips curve equations. In 
addition, the estimated policy rules for monetary targeting and inflation-targeting 
regimes demonstratethe importance of using relevant policy rules to describe policy 
actions over a particular regime. 
The simulation experiments undertaken in trus paper have important 
implications for empirical research that evaluate the performance of different policy 
rules, and whether asset prices belong to monetary policy rules. First, contrary to the 
convention al wisdom, a counterfactual experiment of the model economy reveals 
that, irrespective of the stochastic changes in money demand, the great inflation era 
of the 1970s and early 1980s could have been avoided if the Bank of Canada, 
following its monetary targeting policy rule, had responded more strongly to inflation 
and the growth in demand. AIso, there is no evidence that the economy would have 
performed better if the Bank of Canada had implemented its current inflation 
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targeting poliey framework during the 1970s and 1980s. This demonstrates that 
sometimes the poor performance of a monetary poliey framework may be due to the 
laek of commitment on the part of poliey makers when faced with ehallenging 
eeonomie conditions. Second, the deterministie and stoehastie simulations 
experiments, to de termine the desirability and optimality of reaeting to asset price 
changes provided insightful results. Reaeting to stock price bubbles is always 
desirable in terms of insulating the economy from the inflationary pressure generated 
by the bubbles. The experiments also show that it is always optimal to respond to 
exehange rate changes irrespeetive of the nature of shoeks to the eeonomy. For both 
experiments, the monetary targeting poliey rules are more efficient in terms of 
variability in the poliey instrument and the target variables, than the inflation 
targeting poliey rules. 
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AppendixAl 
Derivation of the Optimal Potiey Rule for the Inflation Targeting Regime 
The central bank in each period (i) is assumed to maximize a loss function of the 
form: 
(ALi) 
subject to 
7[t+i = ao + al7[t + a?)!t+i + a3fi (Al.2) 
where F = -_! E [f (/ L .], andfi = Llet are taken as given. 2 t i=2 1+1 
Consider the Lagrangian corresponding to stage one: 
(A 1. 3) 
where the variable lJI is the Lagrange multiplier of the inflation constraint at time t 
(the shadow cost of inflation). Taking the derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to 
7[t+1 andYt+1 (that is, i=l) gives the following first order conditions (FOCs) as: 
- 7[t+ 1 - lJI = 0 (Al.4) 
- ÀYt+] + (J,2'P= 0 (Al.5) 
These FOCs together with the constraint constitute the optimal solution as follows: 
Substituting equation (Al.4) into equation (Al.S) yields; 
a2 
YI+1 = -- 7[1+1 Â (A 1. 6) 
We can use equation (A1.6) to rewrite equation (1.2) as, 
a2ao a2al a2a3 A 
Yt+1 = - - 7[t - ?.Jet Â+a2a2 Â+a2a2 Â+a2a2 (A 1. 7) 
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Equation (AL 7) is substituted into equation (1.1) to determine the optimal value of 
the policy instrument, which is: 
_ f30 a2CXo (f32Â+f32a2a2+a2J (f3 I} (f33J lit - - + + Nt + - t + - qt f32 f32Â + f32a2a2 f32Â + f32a2a2 f32 f32 
( a2a3 J (f34J + ~~+ - ~~ f32Â + f32a2a2 f32 
Estimation 
1. Bubble Process 
qt = -0.21 + 0.78 qt-l 
(0.68) (0.06) 
(J'v= 6.87 
2. Exchange rate 
et = 0.02 + 0.96 el-] - 0.002 Rt-l 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.001) 
(J'x = 0.02 
DW= 1.60 
DW= 1.40 
(AL 8) 
(A1.9) 
Adjusted-R2= 0.61 
(ALlO) 
Adjusted-R2 = 0.98 
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AppendixA2 
Figure- Al.i: Stability Test for the Phillips Curve 
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Money Growth Targeting 
Figure A2.3: Aetual and Fitted Values of the Bank Rate (With Asset Priees) 
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Chapter 2 
CONSUMPTION SMOOTHING, CAPITAL CONTROLS, AND 
THE CURRENT ACCOUNT: EVIDENCE FROM GHANA 
2.1 Introduction 
The Ghanaian economy has evolved through various trade and payment regimes 
since independence in 1957. Bhagwati (1978) and Kmeger (1978) have identified two 
main cycles of trade and payments regimes. Each cycle has been defined to consist of 
the five phases of trade regimes (introduction to the control regime, breakdown of 
the control system, attempted liberalization, import liberalization, and liberal trade 
regime). The first cycle started in 1950 and ended in 1971, while the second cycle 
mns from 1972 to the present. These regimes have been characterized by large 
current account deficits. In particular, current account deficits have occurred every 
year since the early 1980s. These current account deficits are among the usual 
suspects referenced for the economic problems of the country. This paper seeks to 
capture factors important in the determination of Ghana's current account balances 
over both the controiled and liberalized regimes. 
One of the approaches to the determination of the current account of the 
balance of payments is the intertemporal one, derived from the permanent income 
hypothesis of consumption extended to the open economy. The usual version of this 
approach is the Present Value Model of the Current Account (PVMCA), which 
maintains that the current account of a country serves as a buffer for smoothing 
national consumption against shocks to its net output, defined as gross domestic 
product less investment and government expenditure: arise (fail) in net output above 
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(below) its expected permanent value will induce individuals to accumulate (decrease) 
interest-yielding foreign as sets as a way of smoothing consumption over future 
periods. Correspondingly, a country's current account surplus should be equal to the 
present value of the expected future decline in net output. Conditional on the 
household information set, a vector autoregression involving current account and net 
output can be used to derive this present value. In deriving these results, the PVMCA 
combines the assumptions of high capital mobility and the permanent income theory. 
Sheffrin and Woo (1990), Otto and Voss (1995) and Ghosh (1995), have used the 
present value tests originally developed by Campbell (1987) and Campbell and Shiller 
(1987), and data on developed countries to test wh ether the current account sequence 
conforms to what the theory requires. Results have been mixed at best. Bergin and 
Sheffrin (2000) have used data on small open developed countries to show that the 
basic intertemporal model extended to indude changes in the world interest rate and 
the expected exchange rate yield optimal current account series that dosely track the 
actual series. This result shows that allowing both for a variable world interest rate 
and exchange rate can improve the fit of the model for a small open economy. 
Notable empirical studies on the Ghanaian current account and balance of 
payments problems are Jebuni et al, (1994), Ghartey (1987), Harrigan and Oduro 
(1997), and Ghosh and Ostry (1995). Among these, Ghosh and Ostry stand out as 
the only study which indudes an application of the PVMCA to Ghana. Their findings 
rejected the basic model by conduding that capital flows in Ghana had not been 
sufficient to en able agents to fully smooth consumption, given the magnitude of the 
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shocks that occurred.29 In our opinion, their model did not perform weIl because 
they did not pay special attention to different trade and payment regimes, especiaIly, 
the control regime. For instance, in order to apply the model to various payment 
regimes, they claimed that the evidence shows that in developing countries with 
extensive capital control s, domestic interest rate have tended to move quite closely 
with international interest rates adjusted for expected exchange rate changes. 
Other studies have applied an extended version of the model to developing 
nations. Adedeji et al (2005), and Darku and Handa (2005) have applied an extended 
model (to include changes in world interest rate, real exchange rate, and terms of 
trade) to data on Nigeria and Ghana. They concluded that the extended model that 
includes changes in the world interest rate and the real exchange rates better exp Iain 
the current account data of the two countries. Once again the drawback of these 
studies is that attention is not paid to the various trade and payment regimes, which 
may have averaged out regime specific dynamics. This paper therefore differs from 
these studies by applying the model separately to different trade and payment 
regimes. It also extends the data through 2002 to enable us to consider our extended 
model over a period that saw considerable trade and financial deregulation and 
liberalization, as weIl as large current account deficits. 
Against the backdrop of continuous current account deficits in Ghana since 
the 1960s, this paper pursues four objectives. First, it seeks to determine if the 
current account deficits experienced by Ghana between 1960 and 2002 are consistent 
with optimizing behaviour and intertemporal consumption smoothing. Second, this 
29 Similar results were found for most of the developing countries they studied. 
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chapter uses the extension of the PVMCA proposed by Ghosh and Ostry (1995), 
Bergin and Sheffrin (2000), and Adedeji et al (2005), to incorporate into the basic 
model the impact of changes in the interest rates and the real exchange rates. This 
extension enables us to capture channels through which external shocks may 
influence the current account of a typical developing country which relies heavily on 
exports of a few commodities and on external funds for development projects. Third, 
this chapter uses a still further extension of the PVMCA to accommodate possible 
asymmetric access to the international fmancial markets. Fourth, we attempt to show 
empirically that the determinants of the current account differ between the controlled 
regime and the liberalized regime. 
Our main results are summarized as follows. Fust, we find that irrespective of 
the degree of capital control, the basic model of the intertemporal approach to 
current account fails to predict the dynamics of the current account balances in 
Ghana. This fin ding is consistent across a battery of formaI and informaI tests. 
Second, we find that extending the benchmark model to capture variations in interest 
rates and ex change rates better explains the path of the aètual current account 
balances during the post-ERP period when there was a considerable deregulation of 
capital con troIs and the exchange rate system. Third, when the model was adjusted to 
allow for asymmetry in capital flows, there was sorne support for the proposition that 
the presence of capital controls prevented economic agents in Ghana from 
smoothing their consumption path during the period prior to the implementation of 
the Economic Recovery Program in 1983. 
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In terms of the literature, these results may imply that for a typical open 
deve!oping economy, the basic PVMCA extended to capture external shocks 
improves the ability of the mode! to explain historic episodes of the current account. 
AIso, for studies on deve!oping economies that covers a significant period of capital 
control, the PVMCA could capture the dynamics in the current account if the basic 
mode! is extended to capture the possible asymmetry in access to international 
fin an cial market that these countries face. 
The rest of the paper is organized as foilows. Section 2.2 presents an overview 
of the macroeconomic policies and trade regimes pursued by Ghana since 
independence in 1957. Section 2.3 discusses in detail the theoretical mode! of the 
intertemporal approach to current account. The basic mode! is deve!oped first and is 
then extended to incorporate changes in interest rates and exchange rates, as weil as 
the existence of asymmetry in capital flows. Section 2.4 conducts the empirical tests. 
It starts with the basic mode!, then precedes to discuss the results when the mode! is 
extended to incorporate changes in the interest and ex change rates. It also presents 
the results of a huther extension of the mode! to account for possible asymmetry in 
the access to the international financial sector. Section 2.5 concludes the paper. 
2.2 An overview of the Ghanaian Economy 
This section presents an overview of the performance of the Ghanaian economy 
along with deve!opments in the external sector, and the macroeconomic policies 
pursued since Ghana's independence in 1957. The entire period is divided into two 
sub-periods; the pre-Economic Recovery Program (ERP) and Structural Adjustment 
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period (1957-1982); and the post-ERP and Structural Adjustment period (1983-
2002). This separation is justified on the grounds that macroeconomic policies and 
trade and payments regimes in the two sub-periods are distinctively different and that 
economic developments, particularly, the current account balances, showed a 
different pattern as weil. Section 2.2.1, therefore, discusses the association between 
macroeconomic policies and the performances of both the domestic and the external 
sectors of the Ghanaian economy during the period leading up to the implementation 
of the ERP. It also examines the performances of the external sector of the Ghanaian 
economy and the different trade and payments regimes foilowed during this period. 
Section 2.2.2 does the same for the period after the implementation of the ERP. 
2.2.1 Economie Policies: Pre-ERP Period (1957-1982) 
The period from independence in 1957 till the implementation of the ERP in 1983 
was marked by political instability, with its associated swings in macroeconomic 
policy stance and trade and payment regimes. The immediate post colonial 
government maintained the conservative monetary and fiscal policies of the colonial 
government for a few years before shifting to a more nationalistic approach to 
development. The five-year-post independence development plan in 1959 focused on 
accelerated industrialization (import substitution industrialization) that required 
greater state participation. This led to massive increases in government expenditures. 
Though the plan was abandoned in 1961, it had already created increasing budget 
deficits and balance of payment deficits that produced a sharp decline in foreign 
ex change reserves. In an attempt to solve these problems, the government resorted 
68 
to a series of measures,prominent among which were austerity budgets, including 
both cutbacks in expenditures and tax increases. However, increased government 
capital expenditures led to an overall budget deficit of 7% of GDP in 1961 (see 
Appendix B, Table B.l). The deficit increased to 9.4% in 1962 and huther to 9.9% in 
1963. The seven-year development plan in 1963/64 continued with the general 
philosophy of import substitution industrialization with further increases in 
government expenditures. As a result, total government expenditure increased by 
36% between 1963 and 1965. The budget deficit as a percentage of GDP also 
increased to 10.9 percent in 1965. 
There was evidence of monetary accommodation of fiscal deficits. Between 
1960 and 1964, borrowing from the Bank of Ghana and other commercial banks 
financed a considerable proportion of the budget deficit. Government credit as a 
percentage of total bank credit increased from a low. of 6 % in 1960 to 49% in 1965. 
This led to a large increase in money supply, which more than doubled between 1960 
and 1965, with the highest growth rate of 39.5% occurring in 1964. 
The National Liberation Council (NLC) government came to power ln 
February 1966 and pursued more liberal economic policies. Its main economic and 
socio-political agenda was to create an economy led by private sector growth. To 
achieve this, it experimented with trade liberalization and implemented an 
IMF /World Bank-supported-stabilization program that required fiscal consolidation 
and prudent monetary policies. In an attempt to reduce the tax burden, various taxes 
were either reduced or completely abolished. The government also attempted to 
reduce its expenditures by downsizing the public sector by 5% and taking initiatives 
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to eut down on development expenditure through a 16% reduction in government 
capital expenditures in 1969. As reported in the Appendix Table B.l budget deficits 
as a pereentage of GDP improved between 1966 and 1969 when compared to the 
preeeding three years. The aim of monetary policy throughout the years 1966 with 
1969 was to contribute towards priee stability without neglecting specific needs of 
particular sectors. At the start of each year, specific credit eeilings were prescribed for 
both the private and government sectors. This was done with the view to reducing 
growth in the money supply. However, the growth in the money supply was initially 
controlled, it increased by 12 % in 1969. As an important adjunct to stabilization 
measures, as well as a means of solving the deterioration in the balance of payments, 
the currency was devalued by 43% in 1967. The government also introduced price 
controls. 
The civilian government, which had come to power in 1969, initially returned 
to the earlier nationalistic approach to development but shifted to liberalization 
policies in 1971. The 1970 budget introduced massive public capital projects, which 
led to increase in the government capital expenditures of almost 50% between 1969 
and 1970. Current expenditures also increased; hence, there was a large increase in 
overall government expenditures. However, since tax revenues increased substantially 
due to overall growth in the economy, the overall budget deficit from 1969 to 1971 
was much improved. The budget deficit as a percentage of GDP was 3.3% in 1969, 
and then fell to 2.2% in 1970, before increasing again to 3.5%. These figures are by 
far the lowest the country had seen since its independence in 1957. In spite of the 
fiscal achievements, the achievements on the monetary front were less impressive. 
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There was no effective credit control polie)'; as a result, bank credit to the private 
sector increased by 55% in 1970, even though the money supply only increased by 
5.6% in 1970 and 4.9% in 1971. 
On the 13th of J anuary 1972, there was a military coup and the administration 
of the economy changed hands once again from a civilian government to a military 
one. For the next three years the government embarked on emergency operations 
without any long-term effort to put the economy on the path of growth and 
development. The government returned to the controlled regune and increased 
participation of the state in economic activities. Among the first actions taken by the 
government was debt repudiation. The coverage of price controls was extended to 
include additional commodities, such as motor vehicle components. A new Price and 
Income Board was created to impose stricter rules on price increases. The 
government also initiated expansionary fiscal and monetary policy measures. For 
instance, the expansionary fiscal policy adopted in the 1975 budget at the time when 
there was a shortfall in government revenue resulted in the government once again 
resorting to the banking system for the financing of its expenditures, which led to 
increases in the money supply by 44.6% in 1975. To contain aggregate demand, the 
bank rate was raised from 6% to 8.5%. However, the average annual increase in the 
money supply between 1976 and 1978 was weIl over 50%. 
A new framework of economic policy was initiated in the form of a Five-Year 
Development Plan (1975-1980) to formalise and exp and the various emergency 
measures taken by the government since it had taken power. It was another two years 
before the plan was formally launched. As a result, the budget deficit as a percentage 
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of GDP was higher on average between 1975 and 1978 than under the previous two 
governments. It increased from 7.6% in 1975 to 11.3% irl 1976. It fell to 9.5% in 
1977 and further to 9% in 1978. However, the growth in the money supply increased 
throughout the period, peaking at 72.4% in 1978. To deal with the increasing balance 
of payment problems, the government in 1978 devalued the Cedi by over 100%. 
The political climate between 1978 and 1981 was chao tic with three different 
governments taking turns to power (two military regimes, and one civilian). The 
macroeconomic environment was equally unstable. All three governments continued 
the control regime. By the early 1980s, the economic environment was dominated by 
a generallack of confidence in the economy domestically and internationally. Its main 
causes were the maintenance of fixed ana highly overvalued exchange rates that 
discouraged exports and encouraged imports, expansionary monetary and fiscal 
policies that led to inflationary pressures and further distorted the real exchange rate, 
and the imposition in 1971 of price con troIs on all commodities that discouraged 
production while providing excessive profits to the unregulated small-scale trading 
sector. 
2.2.1.1 Trade and Payments Regimes 
At independence, Ghana inherited a liberal trade regime, huge external reserves, and 
a fixed exchange rate system. After experiencing balance of payments problems 
almost immediately after independence, the government ushered in a controlled 
regime by introducing exchange controls as a policy package to control and conserve 
foreign exchange. With the government's refusaI in 1961 to accept the IMF/World 
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Bank stabilization package that involved currency devaluation, the ex change controls 
were extended and an import licence scheme was introduced to solve the increasing 
balance of payments problems. Throughout the period up to 1966, when a new 
government took over power, the exchange rate was not adjusted even in the face of 
sizeable balance of payments deficits. The break-down of the control system soon 
became obvious, especially during 1963 and 1966. 
The military government (NLC) that took power in 1966 and the civilian 
government they handed over power to pursued more liberal trade policies. As 
mentioned earlier, the military government put in place an IMF /World Bank-
supported stabilization program, which required more restrictive fiscal and monetary 
policies and removed sorne of the existing trade controls in an attempt to liberalize 
the trade regime. In addition, as part of the policies to deal with the increasing 
balance of payments problems, the government devalued the domestic currency by 
43% in 1967. The succeeding civilian government implemented further liberalization 
policies and also devalued the currency by another 44% in 1971 to deal with the same 
balance of payments problems. 
The military government that took power in 1972 returned the economy to a 
control regime by imposing stiffer imports and payments con troIs. These con troIs 
were further stiffened in subsequent years so as to reduce the economy's dependence 
on external resources. The Cedi was revalued by 42% so that the extent of the 
massive devaluation of the Cedi in 1971 was reduced from 44% to 26%. The 
manufacturing sector of the economy suffered considerably from the import 
controls. Manufacturing output declined by 5.69% in 1974, then increased by 9.25% 
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in 1975, only to faH by 4.52% in 1976. In response, the government tried to liberalize 
the economy between 1978 and 1980. These efforts were half-hearted and proved to 
be unsuccessful since the government hesitated to completely remove the controls, 
citing balance of payments implications as a reason. In addition, the government 
refused to devalue the currency. The manufacturing sector output continued to faH 
by 3.51% and 16.84% in 1978 and 1979 respectively. Further declines of 19.2 and 
20.47 occurred in 1981 and 1982 respectively. Though the decline in the 
manufacturing sector output between 1974 and 1982 signalled the breakdown of the 
control regime, the policies continued till early 1983. Unfortunately, the two military 
coups that led to change in government in 1979 and 1981 on the promise of 
addressing the economic ills of the country could not restore growth in the 
manufacturing sector. The nominal exchange rate was kept stable even though the 
exchange rate was clearly overvalued and eroded the competitiveness of the export 
sector and even the import substituting one. 
2.2.1.2 Performance of the External Sector (1957-1982) 
As a result of the changes in the trade and payments regimes, discussed above, the 
external sector of the economy witnessed large swings over the pre-ERP era. As the 
Appendix Table B.2 and Figure B.l show, on average, the current account balance as 
a percentage of GDP was negative. This was particularly due to substantial negative 
balances on the services account, which more than offset any positive trade balance. 
However, there were sorne remarkable differences in the current account and balance 
of payments across various trade and payment regimes. During the controHed regime 
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period of 1961-1966, both the trade balance and current account were on average in 
deficit, with the current account deficit as a percentage of GDP ranging frorn -5% to 
-15%. The overail balance of payrnents was also in deficit for about half of the 
period. The liberalized regime that foilowed registered positive trade balances frorn 
1967 to 1970, but in 1971 the trade balance becarne negative. But the current account 
deficits carried beyond the control regime up until 1970 when the first current 
account surplus in more than a decade was achieved. The overail balance of 
payrnents also after registering deficits since 1966, first recorded a surplus in 1970 
and continued with surpluses till the governrnent was overthrown in 1972. 
During the next control regirne of 1972-1982, a current account surplus was 
achieved in five out of eleven years, with the last eight years registering relatively 
srnail current account deficits or surpluses as a percentage of GDP. The services 
account during this period was always in deficit, with the size of the deficit in it 
increasing almost continuously throughout the period. On average, the overail 
balance of payrnents was in deficit; however, there were sorne improvernents when 
cornpared with the previous regimes. The terrns of trade, in general, improved until 
1978. The oil price escalation and the decline in the world price of cocoa led to a 
decline in the terrns of trade. By 1982, Ghana had suffered a fail of 59% in her terrns 
of trade relative to 1970. 
The general trend in the current account and the overail balance of payrnents 
led to sorne large swings in the external reserve position, with decreases in the 
external debt in sorne of the years between 1972 and 1982. Appendix Table B.3 
surnrnarises the external financial position during the pre-ERP period. Total 
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international reserves decreased almost continuously from 277.9 million dollars in 
1960 to 43.1 million dollars in 1971, before increasing again till 1978. The flowof 
foreign direct investment (FDI) reflected the economic ideology of the period and 
the confidence the international community had in the country. For instance during 
the imports substitution industrialization era of the 1960s capital inflow increased 
substantially to take advantage of the incentives offered to domestic production of 
manufactured good. From as low as 9.9 million dollars in 1962, foreign direct 
investment increased to 56.1 million dollars in with 314.3 million dollars in 1982. The 
increases in the international reserves between1972 and 1982 were due to the 
improvements in the overall balance of payments surpluses, discussed earlier. In 
terms of total amount, the external debt increased from as low as 571.4 million 
dollars in 1970 to 1484.2 million dollars in 1982. However, as shown in Figure B.2, 
the external debt to GDP ratio decreased almost continuously between 1971 (39.6%) 
and 1982 (4.7%). Due to the military coup in 1966 and its associated uncertainties, 
FDI decreased continuously for the next three years to reach as low 10.2 million 
dollars in 1969. With a democratically elected government in power FDI increased 
again to 67.8 million dollars in 1970, then fell again to 11.5 million dollars in 1972 
when another military government came into power by a military coup. This pattern 
continued till the end of 1982. Net foreign Assets (NF A) decreased precipitously 
between 1960 and 1964 and became negative till the end of 1971. This item then 
became positive in 1972, fluctuated over the next eight years, before becoming 
negative once again in 1981 and 1982. 
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2.2.2 Economie Policies: Post-ERP period (1983-2002) 
In response to the economic problems facing the economy, the government 
introduced in April 1983 an austerity budget that contained a program of reforms 
known as the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) aimed at stabilizing the economy. 
Fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies were the main components of the 
program, which was designed to stimulate domestic aggregate supply by realigning 
relative prices in favour of the productive sectors. We discuss below the 
macroeconomic policies adopted in the reform program and their effects on both the 
domestic and external fronts. 
The macroeconomic policies adopted during 1983-2002 to stimulate 
ecoriomic recovery can be divided into two distinct sub-periods. The first sub-period, 
1983-1991, had a greater commitment to economic stabilization. Inflation was 
stabilized and the fiscal account registered surplus es continuously for six years. The 
second period, 1992-2002, with a weakened commitment to stabilization, is 
associated with extended periods of high and variable inflation, increasing fiscal 
deficits, excessive growth in the money supply, frequent intense depreciation of the 
Cedi, falling foreign exchange reserves and excessive foreign debt overhang. 
During the first sub-period (1983-1991), the government of Ghana 
introduced a series of fiscal reforms to stimulate economic recovery. The reforms 
focused on controlling the rate of growth of government expenditures, increasing 
government revenues and reducing the size of the deficit on current accounts, 
thereby r,educing government recourse to the banking system to finance deficit. Tax 
revenue as a percentage of GDP increased from a low level of 5.6% in 1983 to 14.4% 
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in 1986 and further increased to 15.2% by 1991. These increases were mainly due to 
the new measures adopted to improve the tax collection machinery and 
administration, as well as general improvement in the economy. Due to the 
confidence engendered by the ERP, foreign grants became an important part of 
government revenue .. A vailable figures show a rising trend of foreign grants as a 
percentage of total government revenue from 4.01 % in 1985 to 9.94% in 1989. 
Sorne discipline was also introduced into government expenditures. While 
government total expenditures as a percentage of GDP increased from 8.2 % in 1983 
to 14% in 1985, they remained almost constant from 1986 to 1991. 
The overall budget deficit/ surplus as a percentage of GDP improved from a 
deficit of 2.7% in 1983 to surpluses of 0.54% in 1987, 0.73% in 1989 and then to 
1.6% by 1991. Consequently, the government's recourse to the banking sector to 
finance its budget deficits was substantially reduced (refer to Appendix Figure B.3 for 
the evolutionof the budget deficit/surplus to the GDP ratio). The government also 
replaced a fixed exchange rate regime with that of flexible determination of the 
ex change rate. In the process to applying a flexible exchange rate regime, there were a 
series of devaluation between 1983-86, the introduction of a foreign exchange 
auction in 1986, the introduction of foreign exchange bureau in 1988, and the 
establishment in 1992 of an interbank market. Due to the expansion of credit to the 
private sector, growth in the money supply accelerated between 1983 and 1989, with 
an average rate of 49%. Though there were sorne con troIs on credit to the private 
sector, there were still sorne substantial increases of credit to that sector. In 
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percentages, the annual increase in total bank credit to the private sector rose from 
15.5% in 1986 to 34.4% in 1990. 
Economic policies took a sharp turn in 1992. Related to national elections to 
usher in a civilian government in 1992, there were substantial increases in 
government expenditures. The fiscal budget registered a deficit of 5.2 % of GDP in 
1992. With the exception of sorne improvements in 1994 and 1995, when the budget 
registered surpluses of 2.1 % and 0.9 % of GDP respectively, ail other years after 
1992 recorded deficits in the government budget. Growth in the money supply 
touched an ail cime high of 66% in 1992 and stayed relatively high till the end of 
2000, when it was reduced to 38.2%. This was associated with the appreciation of the 
real exchange rate, with adverse consequences for exports. 
2.2.2.1 Trade and Payment Regimes 
The post-ERP period has seen three different trade and payments regimes in Ghana. 
These are the attempted liberalization regime of 1983-86; the import liberalization 
regime of 1987-89; and the liberal trade regime of 1990-2002. The changes in the 
exchange rate policies were among the most important measures adopted during the 
three trade regimes. The attempted liberalization regime saw four nominal 
devaluations of the Ghanaian Cedi (see Appendix Table B.4) and represented the 
transition from the fixed exchange rate system to a liberalized exchange rate one. To 
begin with, the government in April 1983 introduced a scheme of surcharges and 
bonuses that effectively created a multiple ex change rate system. In the same year, the 
government initiated an import liberalization process as part of its broad 
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macroeconomic program; the objective of the liberalization was to eliminate the 
negative effects of the preceding extremely restrictive control regime. However, the 
import licensing system that the government inherited from the preceding 
government was maintained until 1986. A foreign exchange retail auction was 
introduced in September 1986, which eventuaily culminated in the official 
introduction of a two-tier system under which imports and exports of selected goods 
were subject to the official exchange rate while ail other transactions were subject to 
the weekly auction rate. The structure of taxes on foreign trade virtuaily remained the 
same between 1983 and 1985. However, in 1986, an escalating tariff structure was 
established with raw materials and capital goods imports facing a lower import tariff 
rate than consumer finished goods imports. 
In 1987, the government began the elimination of the import licensing system 
by replacing quotas and other restrictions with tariffs. The fixed exchange rate system 
was also brought to a conclusion and a new era of flexible exchange rates was 
ushered in. The tax schedules on foreign trade were also adjusted upwards in 1987 
but were eventuaily reduced in 1988 to levels lower than what they were in 1986. 
However, the escalating tariff structure was maintained. There was also significant 
relaxation of the ex change control regulations. The two-tier exchange rate system 
between 1986 and 1988 could not eliminate the considerable and growing spread 
between the paraUel and official exchange rates. In February 1988, the paraUel 
market was legalized with the establishment of the foreign exchange bureaux. As a 
result of the liberalization of the trade and payment regimes, the spread of about 40% 
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between the foreign bureaux buying rates and the Bank of Ghana auction rate at the 
beginning of 1989 was narrowed to less than 10% within the year. 
In January 1989, since the liberalization of the foreign exchange market no 
longer supported the import licensing system, the import licensing system was 
completely removed. The tax schedules on foreign trade were continuously reduced 
till the end of 2000. Among further efforts to liberalize the exchange rate system, the 
government introduced the wholesale auction system in 1990. This was later replaced 
by the interbank exchange market system in 1992. This system continued to 2000. 
The evolution of the real exchange rate over the post-ERP period is shown in 
the Appendix Figure BA. The real exchange rate depreçiated almost continuously 
throughout the post-ERP period, with the steepest depreciation occurring between 
1998 and 2000. These depreciations were mostly caused by the rapid depreciation of 
the nominal exchange rate. For example, the steep real depreciation of the Ghanaian 
Cedi between 1998 and 2000 was mainly caused by a 203% nominal depreciation 
over the same period. 
2.2.2.2 Performance of the External Sector 
The current account balance during the entire post-ERP period has been in deficit. 
This is mainly due to the liberalization process, including the graduaI elimination of 
import restrictions as the economy moved towards a more liberal trade regime. 
Another important cause of the deficit is the almost continuous decline in the terms 
of trade after 1984, so that the trade balance deficits were mainly due to increases in 
imports values and decline in export values. The fall in the price of cocoa by almost 
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50% between 1987 and 1989 led to a loss of cocoa revenue of US$200 million in 
1989, though cocoa exports nearly doubled in volume. The Appendix Table B.S and 
Figure B.S show the developments in the balance of payments during the period. The 
current account was in deficit for the whole period. As a percentage of GDP, the 
current account deteriorated continuously from a low of 4% in 1983 to 22.7% in 
1993, just a year after the commitment to the economic recovery program took a 
sharp turn. Thereafter, it varied around an average of 13% and closed the period with 
10%. The overall balance of payments performed very well due to the increased 
confidence the international financial community had in the recovery program, 
thereby leading to increases in capital inflows. These inflows overshadowed the 
worsening current account, allowing significant balance of payments surpluses. For 
instance, between 1987 and 1998 (except in 1992 and 1996), tJ:e balance of payments 
recorded surpluses. It is no surprise that these balance of payments deficits occurred 
in election years when the trade and current account deficits increased significantly, at 
the time when the international financial community were pessimistic about the 
direction of the economy. 
Beside the improvements in the balance of payments, the Appendix Table B.6 
shows that total international reserves continued to experience large swings during 
the post-ERP period. In millions of US dollars, they increased from 291.3 in 1983 to 
624 in 1986, decreased to 310.3 in 1988 and then increased again to 930.3 by 1996. 
They finally fell to 308.9 million dollars in 2000. The movements in foreign direct 
investment indicate that foreign investors were initially cautiously optimistic about 
the success of the economic recovery program. For almost four years after the 
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implementation of the stabilization programme, foreign direct investments only 
increased from 2.4 million dollars in 1984 to 4.7 million dollars in 1987. Once they 
were confident about the direction of the economy, foreign direct investment 
increased substantially, reaching 233 million dollars in 1994. By 2000, foreign direct 
investment was about 166 million dollars. 
In addition to encouraging inflows of loans from official sources and foreign 
direct investment, the stabilization and liberalization programs also encouraged the 
inflow of private transfers by Ghanaians resident abroad. Between 1983 and 1987, 
private transfers increased by more than 30 rimes (from $US 4.02 million in 1983 to 
$US 122.4 million in 1987). The increases continued up to 2000. Due to increases in 
official and bilateral capital inflows, total external debt increased continuously from 
1983 to 1999, before decreasing marginally in 2000. As shown in the Appendix 
Figure B.6, total external debt as a percentage of GDP trended upwards from a low 
of 27% in 1983 to 172% in 2000. 
2.3 Theoretical Framework of the Present Value Model of Current Account 
The previous section, discussed the political environment, its associated economic 
policy regimes and the effects on the external sector of the Ghanaian economy. 
There appears to be a distinct association between traderegimes and the current 
account balances. In general, current account balances as a percentage of GDP tend 
to improve during the control regime and deteriorated during the liberalized regime. 
This section presents the theoretical framework of the PVMCA that will be used to 
conduct the empirical analysis in the next section. 
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The theoretical model we adopt is the Sachs (1982) and Hall (1988) model, 
which has also been used by Sheffrin and Woo (1990), Ghosh (1995), Ghosh and 
Ostry (1995) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) in their applications to the inter-
temporal approach to current account. We assume a small open economy populated 
by a single, infinitely lived, representative agent who maximizes quadratic utility 
subject to an intertemporal budget consttaint. The representative agent maximizes 
the expected sum of discounted future utility given by: 
where p is the subjective discount factor; E is the expectation operator; U(.) 
represents the period or temporal utility function; and Ct represents the consumption 
of the single good in period t and ET U is the expected utility. The economy follows a 
simple national budget consttaint: 
(2.2) 
where Bt is net foreign assets, Yt is gross domestic product, Ct and Gt are respectively 
private and government expenditures, It is the sum of private and government 
investment, and CAt is the current account balance, in period t. Consttaint (2.2) holds 
as an equality based on the assumption of non-satiation. Recursive iteration of (2.2) 
and imposing a 'solvency condition' (transversaliry condition or no Pon~ game mndition) to 
rule out the possibility of bubbles, generates 
30 Rewrite (2.2) as: 
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Maximization of quadratic utility in (2.1) subject to (2.3), and using the Hall (1978) 
condition that the expected value of Ct+I, conditional on ail available information is 
Ct, enable us to generate31 
(2.4) 
From (2.4), the permanent income consumption function for the economy can be 
specified by: 
* [ co ( 1 ) t-, ] C* =_r_ (l+r*)B +" -- E (y -G -1 ) 
t 1+ * ' L...J 1+ * ,t t t r ~,r 
(2.5) 
where C* is the optimal consumption level. In each period, the current account 
balance CA of the economy's balance of payments will equal the economy's output 
plus what it receives in real interest payments from abroad less its domestic usage of 
commodities for consumption, investment and government expenditures.32 That is: 
(2.6) 
Substituting (2.5) into (2.6) produces the optimal current account balance CA * ln 
period Tas: 
{1+r*)Bt=C +Gt+1t- Y +Bt 
t t 
By shifting the last equation forward by one period and dividing through by (1 +r*), we have: 
C t+1 +G t+1 +1t+1 -Yt+1 Bt+2 
Bt+1 = +--
l+r* l+r* 
The equation above can now be used to eliminate Bt+1: 
C t +1 +G t+1 +1t+1- Yt+1 B t+2 (1+r*)Bt =C t +G t +1t -Yt + +t +--
l+r* l+r* 
As in the two-period case, Bt+T+1 = O. Also, Lim (1/1+r)TBt+T+1 = O. 
t ..... co 
By following this iterative substitution, successive values ofBt+i can be eliminated. This would yield the 
intertemporal budget constraint as (2.3). 
31 Notingthat,foranyt>T,E,C t =E,C t_1 =E,C t_2 = ..... =E'C'+l =C, 
32 1t will also equal Bt+1 - Bt. 
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CA* =Y +r*B -{~[(l+r*)B + ~(_l_)t-"E (y -1 -G )]}-1 -G 
"" '1+ * " L... 1+ * "t t ! " " r !=" r 
(2.7) 
1\ 
The relationship between the permanent value33 Z of a variable and its current value 
2 is: 
OC) ( 1 ) t-" ~ OC) ( 1 ) !-" 2:- 2=2:- 2 
!=" 1 + r * T t=" 1 + r * t 
(2.8) 
Hence, 
( )
t-" ~ r* OC) 1 
2 =--2: -- 2 
" 1 + r * !=" 1 + r * t 
Therefore, (2.7) can be rewritten as: 
CA * = (y - E Y )- (1 - E Î )- (G - E G ) 
t t t 1" t Tt t t t (2.9) 
Equation (2.9) provides the basis of the intertemporal model of the current 
account: for the open economy with perfect capital mobility, the current account acts 
as a buffer through which private agents smooth consumption over rime in response 
to temporary disturbances to output, investment and government expenditures. This 
equation also implies that an increase (decrease) in current output above (below) its 
expected permanent level causes an improvement in the current, account (a 
deterioration) as a result of consumption smoothing, which, in turn, allows the 
economy to accumulate (deplete) interest-bearing foreign assets. Note that, in this 
model, a tempotary increase in government expenrutures has the same effect as a 
33 See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) p.74, for this definition of a permanent variable. 
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temporary negative productivity shock: the impact of such a shock in any particular 
period is spread over the entire future in the interests of consumption smoothing. 
Defining net output Q as gross domestic output less gross investment and 
government expenditures, i.e., Q t == YI - l t - G t, (2.9) becomes: 
~ 
where the permanent value of net output QI is: 
Substituting (2.11) into (2.10) yields: 
1 
Let -- = ~. (2.12) becomes, 
l+r 
00 
CA *, = Qt -(l-~)L~t-'E,QI 
(2.10) 
(2.11) 
(2.12) 
(2.13) 
Hence, temporary changes in net output cause changes in the current account and a 
country will run a current account surplus (deficit) only if it expects a temporary fall 
(rise) in the future net output. As a corollary, a temporary increase in government 
expenditures or in investment, or a decline in productivity, will cause a current 
account deficit. 
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Assuming that consumers' forecast of the change in net output (~Qt) for t > 
't is based on a p-order vector autoregression (VAR) model, the above PVMCA can 
be stated as: 
[ LlQt] =[~11 CAt ~21 (2.14) 
where Vit and V2t are errors with a conditional mean of zero and ~Qt and CAt are 
deviations from unconditional means [see Campbell (1987), Campbell and Shiller 
(1987), Otto (1992), and Ghosh (1995)]. This may easily be generalized for higher 
orders of VAR by writing a pth order VAR in first order form. To forecast the 
expected value of ~Qt in (2.13), we use the expectation of (2.14). Since 
Et [Xt+j] = qJjX, E (Vlt) = E (V2t) = 0, and tp = matrix ['1' ij], we have: 
(2.15) 
Pre-multiplying (2.15) by the 1 x2 vector [1 0] yields: 
(2.16) 
Let 1 be a 2x2 identity matrix. Substituting (2.16) into (2.13) yields: 
(2.17)34 
34 The expression in (2.17) is valid as long as the infinite SUffi in (2.1.2) converges, which it will if the 
variables in the VAR are stationary. 
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Equation (2.17) is the predicted or optimal current account for comparison with the 
actual current account. To evaluate the model statistically, we test the restriction that 
[<1> AQ <1> CA ] = [0 1] in (2.17). This necessitates the use of the delta method to 
calculate a y} statistic for the hypothesis that k = [<Dt.Q <DCA] = [0 1]. Let g represent 
the difference between the actual k and the hypothesized value. Then, 
9'((8k18\v)V(8k/8\v)'r1g will be distributed chi-squared with two degrees of freedom, 
where V is the variance-covariance matrix of the VAR parameters, and (8k18\v) is the 
matrix of derivatives of the k vector with respect to these parameters. 
There are four more other testable implications of the basic model. First, the 
variables included in the VAR are stationary. This is true because the infinite sum in 
equation (2.13) converges only when the variables in the VAR are stationary. Second, 
the optimal cùrrent account is stationary. If the change in net output ((~Q) is 
stationary (that is 1(0)), then, by equation (2.13), the optimal current account CA * 
must also be stationary in levels since it is a linear combination of 1(0) variables. AIso, 
given the null of equality between the actual and optimal current account, the actual 
current account must be stationary. Third, the variance of the actual current account 
and the optimal current account are equal. If the actual current account is less volatile 
than the optimal current acc6unt, then capital mobility may be less than perfecto 
Conversely, if the actual current account is more volatile than the optimal current 
account, then speculative factors may be important in driving capital flows. Fourth, 
by equation (2.17), the actual current account and the optimal current account must 
be equal. 
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2.3.1 Extending the Basic Model to Include External Shocks 
The basic model discussed above assumes a one trad able good economy and a 
constant world interest rates. In their work on thePVMCA Bergin and Sheffrin 
(2000) have demonstrated that extending the basic model to allow for variations in 
the interest rate and exchange rate could improve the ability of the model to explain 
historic episodes of current account imbalanees. This extension, therefore, allows the 
current account of economies to not exclusively respond to shocks to domestic net 
output but also respond to external shocks that may come from changes in the 
interest rate or exchange rate. As individuals adjust consumption and saving in 
response to changes in the real interest rates, countries also adjust their current 
account in response to movements in the world real interest rate. 
The extension of the model in this direction also allows us to relax the 
assumption of one tradable good by introducing tradable and non trad able goods to 
the model. This creates a mechanism through which exchange rate movements can 
make an impact upon the current account. As Dornbusch (1983) has demonstrated, 
an anticipated rise in the relative priee of trad able goods can raise the co st of 
borrowing from abroad when interest is paid in units of these goods. Therefore, 
movements in the real exchange rate (defined as the relative priee of nontraded 
goods) can impact upon the intertemporal allocation of consumption, with a 
consequent impact on the current account position, similar to the effect of changes in 
the interest rate. Given that our data span across a considerable period when there 
was increasing financial and trade liberalization in Ghana, the extended model is 
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particularly worthwhile for the analysis of the determination of the current account 
balances. 
2.3.1.1 The Extended Mode! 
In this section, we adopt the Bergin and Sheffrin (2000) extended model. This model 
is based on the combination of appropriate Euler equation and log-linearisation of 
the intertemporal budget constraint fust developed by Campbell and Mankiw (1989) 
and Huang and Lin (1993). Consider a small open economy that can lend and borrow 
at a variable real world interest rate, r*. The economy produces both tradable and 
nontradable goods. The infinitely lived household maximizes the lifetime utility: 
(2.19) 
0>0,0#1, ü<()«1 
Consumpti6n of the trad able good is denoted as CT, while CNT is the consumption of 
nontradable goods. Ali other variables are as defined in the basic model, except that 
they are here measured in terms of traded goods. Pt is the relative price of 
nontradable goods in terms of tradable goods. The temporal utility function above is 
isoelastic and the allocation of expenditure between tradables and nontradables is in 
the form of a Cobb-Douglas function. If we further define an index of total 
consumption expenditure in terms of traded goods as Ct * = C~tC~;t' then the 
dynamic budget constraint in (2.19) can be written as: 
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(2.20) 
Define also the consumption-based priee index, P t *, as the minimum amount of 
consumption expenditure C = C Tt + PtC NTt su ch that C* = 1. We can now rewrite 
the period utility function as: 
(2.21) 
Equation (2.21) has suceessfully transformed the problem of choosing tradable and 
nontradable goods intertemporally in (2.18) into one of choosing the composite 
consumption index/C*. Solving for C* from (2.20) and substituting into (2.18) yields: 
! 
(2.22) 
We use the same proeedure as in the basic model in section 2.3 to derive an 
intertemporal Euler equation of the form: 
(2.23) 
We next transform (2.23) in terms of consumption expenditure and the relative priee 
of nontradable goods to ensure empirical implementation. To achieve this, we re-
express (2.23) as: 
(2.24) 
Which could further be rewritten as: 
(2.25) 
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Assume joint log normality, constant variances and covariances for the gross real 
world interest rate (1 +r*t+l), consumption growth rate (Lkt+l = log Ct+l - log Ct), and 
for the percentage change in the relative price of nontradable goods (~pt+l = log 
Pt+l-Log Pt)35. Based on the assumption of lognormal distribution, (2.25) may be 
rewritten in a log-linearised form as36 : 
Et~Ct+l = YE{ r * t+l + 1 ~ Y (1- ()()~Pt+l ] 
+.!.[a~ +y2a~ +(1_y)2(1_C()2a~ +2YYc,r J (2.26) 
2 + 2(1 - y) (1 - C()a c,p + 2y( 1 - y) (1 - C()a r,p 
where y = 1/ cr is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. 
Equation (2.26) assumes the approximation otlog (1 +r*t+l) as r*t+l. The first 
bracket on the right hand side of the equation specifies the consumption-based real 
interest rate (~), which is different from the world real rate of interest when there is 
an expected change in the real exchange rate. This consumption-based interest rate is 
affected by changes in the world interest rate and the expected changes in the real 
exchange rate. Since the second and third terms on the right hand are constants, the 
evolution of the optimal consumption profùe written in logs is given by: 
(2.27) 
35 See Campbell et al (1997): 306-307, for the properties of a random variable that is conditionally 
lognormal distributed. 
36Given the condition that the empirical implementation of the model will be based on de-meaned 
variables, the preference parame ter, a constant, is dropped from equation (2.26). 
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l-y 
where, ft =r*+--(l-C()~Pt+l + constant 37 
y 
In the basic model developed in section 2.3, the expected change in consumption is 
zero since the representative consumer always tries to smooth consumption over 
rime by borrowing and lending. When the consumption-based real interest rate is 
aUowed to change over rime, as shown in equation (2.27), the representative 
consumer is aUowed to increase or decrease consumption in sorne periods because of 
changes in the world interest rate (rt) and the expected change in real ex change rate. 
A decrease in the world interest rate (rt *) makes current consumption cheaper in 
terms of future consumption. This induces substitution towards the present with 
elasticity y. A change in the relative price of nontradable goods can have similar 
intertemporal effects. For instance, if the price of nontradable goods is temporarily 
high and expected to faU, then the future repayment of a loan contracted in the 
current period in traded goods has a higher cost in terms of the consumption bundle 
than in terms oftradable goods alone. As a result, the consumption-based interest 
rate rt rises above the convention al interest rate r*. This induces a faU in the current 
total consumption expenditure by elasticity y(1-a). 
To complete the optimisation problem of the representative agent, we next 
proceed to derive the log-linearised intertemporal budget constraint. The dynamic 
budget constraint in (2.19) can be re-written as: 
The constant term at the end of the expression will dropout of the empirical model when we later de-mean 
theconsumption based interest rate using (2.27). 
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where Qt =Yt-It-Gt , and Ct={CTt+PtCNTt)' Define Rr,t* as the market 
discount factor for date T consumption, so that, 
1 R *=-----
t,t t 
rr(1 +r *J 
(2.29) 
j=r+1 
We sum over all periods of the infinite horizon, and impose the no pon~ game 
constraint as in section 2.3. We may now write the intertemporal budget constraint 
(equation 2.28) as: 
0() 00 
IEo{R *t CJ= IEo{R \ QJ+Bo (2.30) 
t=o t=o 
Which could be written as: 
la = Xo + Ba 
We log linearise (2.30) following the Huang and Li (1993) and Campbell and Mankiw 
(1989) procedure. First, we log-linearise the present value of net output defined as 
0() 
r 0 = l Eo (R * t Qt) to obtain: 
t=O 
0() 
qo -CPo = l (/ (rt * -b.qJ+ 'YI (2.31) 
t=1 
where qo = ln Qo, <po = ln 1 0, ~qt = qt-qt-l; and 11 is a constant; p is a constant, 
slightly less than one and can be interpreted as the average value of 1-Q/l. Similarly, 
we log-linearise the present value of current and future consumption defined as 
0() 
X o = l Eo (Rt * CJ to obtain: 
t=O 
0() 
Co -xo = Iet{rt *-b.cJ+'YI (2.32) 
t=1 
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where Co = ln Co; Xo = ln Xo; ~Ct = Ct - Ct-l; 11 is a constant; p is constant, slighrly less 
than one, and can be interpreted as the average value of (1 - C/X). Based on the 
same log-linearisation procedures, the intertemporal budget constraint r 0 = Xo + Bo 
implies: 
(2.33) 
where bo = ln Bo; n is constant, at (slighrly) less than one, and can be interpreted as 
the average value of 1 - BIX. k is a constant. 
Substituting for ([Jo and xo respectively from (2.31) and (2.32) into (2.33), 
produces the following log-linearised intertemporal budget constraint for the 
representative agent for t::: O. 
Loo ( {1 Q-l] 1 Q-l ~ nt ~q --~C ---r * =q --c +--b t=l ~ t Q t Q t 0 Q 0 Q 0 (2.34) 
Taking the expectation of (2.34), and using the optimal consumption profùe in (2.27), 
equation (2.34) may be written as: 
~ i( ) Y ~ Q-l 1 Q-l -Et..L.i~ ~qt+i --rt+1 ---rt *=qt --Ct +--bt i=l Q Q Q Q (2.35) 
The right-hand side of (2.35) is similar to the definition of the current account in 
(2.28), except that its components are in log terms. We will refer to the transformed 
representation of the current account as CA**. Following the convention of choosing 
the steady state around which we linearise to be the one in which net foreign assets 
are zero, thereby n = 1, equation (2.35) becomes: 
CAt * * = -E, f~H (~qt -yrtA ) (2.36) 
t=,+l 
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This condition shows how the current account is affected by both domestic 
and externalshocks. It states that an expected decrease in net output would produce 
a current account surplus as the consumption smoothing representative agent saves 
abroad for the rainy season. With respect to external shocks, equation (2.36) also 
implies that a rise in the consumption-based Ïllterest rate willlead to an improvement 
in the current account position by inducing the representative household to decrease 
consumption below its smoothed level. Equation (2.36) augments equation (2.13) for 
the basic PVMCA in section 2.3 by the addition al variable r t. Therefore, the 
restrictions implied by (2.36) can be tested using the framework described in section 
2.3 but augmented with the additional variable r t. This produces: 
(2.37) 
We need to determine the expected values of LlQt+i and rt+i' To arrive at (2.37), we 
[ Ijf ij]. Therefore, 
00 
hZt = - L~t-t (gl - ygz)W H Zt (2.38) 
t=t+l 
where Zt, = (~Qt CAt rt)', gl = [1 00], g2 =[00 1], andh = [0 1 0]. For a given Zt, the 
right hand side of equation (2.38) can be expressed as: 
(2.39) 
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Equation (2.39) provides the model's prediction for the current account, consistent 
with the VAR and the restrictions of the intertemporal theory. 
To evaluate the model, we have to test the hypothesis that k = [0 1 0] in 
(4.59), so that CA * * 1 = CAl' by using the delta method to calculate a X2 statistic. Let 
k* be the difference between the actual k and the hypothesized value. Then, 
k*'((8k/8\lf)V(8k/8\lf)'r\* will be distributed chi-squared with 3 degrees of 
freedom, where V is the variance-covariance matrix of the VAR parameters and 
(8k/8l1J) is the matrix of derivatives of the k vector with resI?ect to these parameters. 
As in the case of the basic model, there are four testable implications of the 
extended model. First, the variables included in the VAR are stationary. This is true 
because the infinite sum in equation (2.36) converges only when the variables in the 
VAR are stationary. Second, the optimal current account is stationary. If the change 
in net output (~Q) is stationary (that is 1(0)), then by equation (2.36) the optimal 
current account CA * must also be stationary in levels since it is a linear combination 
of 1(0) variables. AIso, given the null of equality between the actual and optimal 
current account, the actual current account must be stationary. Third, the variance of 
the actual current account and the optimal current account are equal. If the actual 
current account is less volatile than the optimal current account, then capital mobility 
may be less than perfect. Conversely, if the actual current account is more volatile 
than the optimal current account, then speculative factors may be important in 
driving capital flows. Fourth, by equation (2.39), the actual current account and the 
optimal current account must be equal. 
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2.3.1.2 Asymmetry in Access to the International Financial Markets 
One of the main assumptions of the intertemporal model of current account 
determination is perfect capital mobility. However, in many economies, especially the 
developing ones, economic policies and political environment do not permit free 
flow of capital. Somecimes even when capital could find its way out of an economy, 
the international community may not feel confident to lend to that economy. This 
generates an asymmetry in access to the international financial market. 
In the Ghanaian context, there are two possible source of asymmetry access 
to the international financial market. First, the government of Ghana has from cime 
to cime attempted to manage the international mobility of capital with measures of 
capital con troIs as part of the overall trade regime. The period prior to 1983 (with the 
exception of the period 1969 to 1972) had various forms of exchange controls to 
complement the overall control regime followed by various governments. These 
restrictions prevented economic agents in the Ghanaian economy from having full 
access to the international financial markets. Second, the political and 
macroecononuc sources of instability in the Ghanaian economy prior to 1983 
reduced the growth potential of the economy and the ability of private agents to pay 
back fundsborrowed on the international financial markets. In such a context, the 
international financial markets are likely to be reluctant to lend to Ghanaians who 
want to smooth their consumption, even though the Ghanaians often seem to have 
managed to find ways to send their excess funds abroad. This suggests that there may 
have been asymmetrical access to the international financial market during the period 
prior to 1983. 
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We follow Kent (1997), and Callen and Cashin (1999) in allowing for 
asymmetric behaviour on the part of economic agents in their responses to 
temporary shocks to net output. That is, the representative agent is constrained from 
responding to a temporary expected increase in net output (the agent is not able to 
access external finance to smooth consumption), but is able to respond to a 
temporary expected reduction in net output (no restriction on capital outflow). To 
implement the constrained model, the actual current account CAt is divided into 
two main components as follows: 
h h h {1 if CA t > 0 } CAt =Dt CAt whereDt =. < o if CAt _ 0 (2.40) 
1 1 1 {1 if CA t < 0 } CA t = Dt CA t where Dt =. > . 
o if CAt _ 0 
(2.41) 
where CA~ (CA\) equals CAt when CAt is positive (negative); CA~ (CA\) is zero 
otherwise. The variables ~Qth and ~Qtl are defined similarly as: 
(2.42) 
(2.43) 
The relationship between the net cash flow and current account takes two 
forms when agents are faced with asymmetry access to the international financial 
market. While CA~ will Granger-cause future changes in net output, as defmed by 
boQ \, CA\ will not Granger-cause boQ ~ . 
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To conduct the formaI test of the constrained consumption-smoothing 
model, we estimate a five-variable VAR of current and lagged changes in net output 
h 1 Ah (!1Qt and !1Qt), current and lagged values of the actual current account (CAt and 
CÀ:), and the consumption-based interest rate of the form: 
!1q ~11 ~12 ~13 ~14 ~15 ~q-l . V;t 
~q ~21 ~22 ~23 ~24 ~25 ~q-l Yzt 
C~ = ~31 ~32 ~33 ~34 ~35 C~_l + V;t (2.44) 
C~ ~41 ~42 ~43 ~44 ~45 C~_l V4t 
A ~51 ~52 ~53 ~54 ~55 A Yst ~ ~-l 
From (2.44), the restrictions on the optimal current account (with asymmetry in 
access to the international financial market) are given by: 
00 
hZt =- L~H(gl -ygJw'-'Zt (2.45) 
t;Hl 
where Zt= (~Q~ ~Q: CA~ CA: rt)', gl = [11000], gz = [00001], and h = [00 
1 1 0]. (This can also be generalized for a larger number of lags). These restrictions 
are consistent with the joint null hypotheses of consumption smoothing and the 
absence of credit constraints. This restriction implies that movements of the actual 
current account reflect those of the optimal current account. The alternative 
hypothesis is that asymmetry in access to the international financial markets is 
binding, so that the restrictions captured in h are not valid. For a given Zt, the right 
hand side of (2.45) can be expressed as: 
CAt * ** =kzt (2.46) 
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where k = -(gj - ygz )~qf(I - ~qft. CAt * * * is the optimal current account balance 
in the presence of asymmetry in access to the internationalfinancial markets. 
2.4 Estimation and Results 
This section reports the econometric analysis of Ghana's current account based on 
the present value model of the current account (PVMCA) developed in the previous 
section. As earlier mentioned, we seek to answer the foilowing questions. First, are 
the current account deficits experienced by Ghana between 1960 and 2002 consistent 
with the optimizing behaviour and intertemporal consumption smoothing? Second, 
has the current account in Ghana responded to external shocks in the form of 
movements in the world interest rates and the exchange rate? Third, has the presence 
of capital controls prevented economic agents in Ghana to smooth their 
consumption path? Fourth, does the determinants of the current account differ 
between the control and the liberalized regimes as foilowed by various governments 
of Ghana? Therefore, we start by testing the basic and the extended models; then, the 
model that explicidy incorporates asymmetric access to the international capital 
market is tested. Ail the tests are conducted for the pre-ERP era and the post-ERP 
era, as weil as for the overail period. 
2.4.1 Data and Parameter Values 
The PVMCA is tested using annual data from the International Financial Statistics 
(IFS) for Ghana for the period 1960-2002. The data on private consumption, 
government spending, investment and gross domestic product (GDP) are converted 
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to real per capita by dividing the nominal variables by the GDP deflator (1995=100) 
and population. The net output variable (QI) is constructed by subtracting investment 
and government spending from GDP. The series for the current account (cat) of the 
balance of payments is constructed by subtracting the sum of consumption, 
investment and government spending from GDP. To ob tain the change in the net 
output series (Q!::"t) , we take the log and first difference of the net output series. 
Following the method of Barro and Sala i Martin (1990), we calculated the world real 
interest rate as follows. We collected short-term nominal interest rates (Treasury bill 
rates or its equivalent) on the G-7 countries. To obtain the ex-ante real interest rate, 
we adjust the nominal interest rate by the expected inflation, which is forecasted 
using a five-annual autoregression. An average real interest rate is computed using 
time-varying weights for each country based on its share of real GDP in the G-7 
data. 
Given that the available real ex change rate data for Ghana from the IFS starts 
from 1975, we compute a proxy series in the following manner. We first compute the 
bilateral exchange rates between Ghana and its six largest trading partners (United 
Kingdom, Germany, USA, ]apan, France and the Netherlands). Then, using the 
calculated nominal exchange rates and the consumer price indices for Ghana and the 
relevant trading partner (1995=100), we construct the weighted real exchange rate 
index for each country. The weight assigned to a trading partner is based on the 
extent of trade flows between Ghana and the relevant trading partner. The ex 
ante/ expected change in the exchange rate is computed using a three-year 
autoregression. To compute the consumption-based interest rates, r, we adjusted the 
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world interest rate for the expected change in the exchange rate. The procedure for 
the adjustment was specified in section 2.3. 
The test for the optimal current account derived from the PVMCA requires 
the use of otherparameters such as the intertemporal substitution variable y, the 
share of tradable/importable goods in the total consumption <x, and the preference 
parameter ~. Following Ostry and Reinhart (1992), we use 0.45 for the intertemporal 
substitution variable y and 0.85 for the share a of trad able goods in total 
consumption. U sing the sample mean of our series on G-7 real interest rates, we 
calculate the preference parameter ~ to be 0.96. 
2.4.2 Results 
In order to use the VAR setup, we need the variables CA, (~Q) and r to be 
stationary. Therefore, we start by testing for the order of integration of all three 
variables. We implement two commonly suggested tests for stationarity, namely the 
Augmented-Dickey Fuller (ADF) test and the Phillips-Perron (PP) test. Table 2.1 
summarizes the results of the ADF and PP tests for the controlled, liberalized and 
overall periods respectively. These tests did not include a constant and a time trend 
because the variables are expressed as deviations from their means. Ali reported test 
statistics are greater than the critical value of 1.95 for both tests. These indicate that 
all variables entering the VAR are stationary. According to the theory, the optimal 
current account must also be stationary since it must be the same as the actual 
current account. The ADF and the PP tests indicate that with the exception of the 
liberalized and overall periods for the benchmark model, the optimal current account 
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is also stationary at the 5 percent significance level. Hence the theoretical expectation 
of stationarity of the optimal current account asserted by the PVMCA is confirmed 
for only the extended model. 
Table 2.1: Unit Root Tests 
Controlled Liberalized Overall 
~1960-1982L ~1983-2002L ~1960-2002L 
Variables ADF pp ADF pp ADF pp 
Change in net output -3.54 -4.01 -3.89 -3.02 -5.18 -5.21 
Actual current account -3.91 -5.25 -4.21 -4.43 -5.83 -3.91 
Optimal current account (basic) -2.89 -2.64 -1.34 -1.01 -1.93 -1.65 
Optimal current account (extended) -2.96 --2.54 -3.05 -5.59 -3.32 -2.58 
ConsumEtion-based Interest rate -2.61 -3.27 2.72 -3.32 -3.25 -4.71 
Test of the basic PVMCA Model 
Beside the stationarity requirement of the variables entering the VAR, the testable 
implications of equations (2.17) are as fol1ows: that [<DilQ <DCA] = [0 1] and the 
variance of the actual current account and the optimal! predicted current account are 
equal. In order to test for the [<DilQ <DCA] = [0 1] restriction, we need to estimate a 
VAR in LlQ and CA. Appendix Table B 7 reports the VAR equations estimated by 
OLS. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwartz Criterion (SC) were 
used to select the optimallag, which proved to be one. 
The test results for the benchmark model are presented in Table 2.2. The 
estimated values of [<DilQ <DCA] are [-1.439 1.087], [-0.263 -0.124], [-0.247 0.574] for 
the pre-ERP, post-ERP and the overall period respectively. The coefficients on both 
the current account and net output for al1 the periods are not significantly different 
from zero, so that the benchmark PVMCA is rejected by the data. The Z2 of the Wald 
105 
test of the parameter restrictions on the VAR also rejects the model with a p-value of 
zero. Finally, the ratio of the variances of the optimal current accounts to that of the 
actual current accounts also indicates that the variance of the optimal current account 
is significantly different from that of the actual. Consistent with the results from the 
Wald test, Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 show that the benchmark PVMCA model does not 
provide a satisfactory fit for the actual current account data. This is especially worse 
during the post-ERP period where the model fail to capture the increasing current 
account deficits. The results so far are consistent with those of Ghosh and Ostry 
(1995). 
Table 2.2: Test of the Benchmark PVMCA 
k-vector 
Pre-ERP 
-1.439 
(0.957) 
1.087 
(1.328) 
x2-statistic 156.41 
p-value 0.000 
var (CA *) /var(CA) 2.64 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Post-ERP 
-0.263 
(0.583) 
-0.124 
(0.371) 
162.78 
0.000 
0.15 
Overall 
-0.247 
(0.453) 
0.574 
(0.726) 
328.91 
0.000 
0.33 
The rejection of the benchmark PVMCA model seems to indicate that it fails 
to capture factors important to the determination of Ghana's current account in 
particular, shifts in the trade and exchange regimes in Ghana over our sample period 
are likely to have been instrumental in determining the general direction of the 
current account. It is also likely that the assumption of free capital flows may not be 
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Figure 2.1 
Actual and Optimal Current Account Balances (Basic Model: Overall) 
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Figure 2.2 
Actual and Optimal Current Account Balances (Basic Model: Pre-ERP) 
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Figure 2.3 
Actual and Optimal Current Account Balances (Basic Mode!: Post-ERP) 
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appropriate in the case of Ghana where capital controls have been an integral part of 
the overall external policies, especially during the pre-ERP era. We next attempt to 
capture these effects by extending the benchmark PVMCA to include other 
important variables, namely changes in the world interest rate and exchange rate. We 
also adjust the model to allow for credit constraints. 
Test 0/ the extended PVMCA Model 
Bergin and Sheffrin (2000) and Adedeji (2001, 2002) concluded that the exclusion of 
external shocks from the benchmark PVMCA could explain why the benchmark 
PVMCA is often rejected by studies that use data from small open economies. We 
seek to determine if their findings apply to Ghana. It is our belief that the extended 
model can exp Iain the increasing current account deficits in Ghana, especially after 
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the government liberalized trade and eliminated capital controls in the early 1980s, 
thereby making it easier for agents to borrow from abroad. To obtain the 
consumption-based interest rate as defined in equation (2.27), we used 0.45 for the 
intertemporal elasticity and 0.85 for the share of trad able goods. Again, the results 
from Table 2.1 show that the variables (~Qt CAt ft) entering the VAR, are aU 
stationary at the 5% significant level. According to the PVMCA, the optimal account 
must also be stationary if the change in net output and the actual current account are 
stationary. This is confirmed for the Ghanaian data by the ADF and the pp tests, 
which indicate that the optimal current account is, in fact, stationary at the 5% 
significance level. 
The VAR parameters used in calculating the optimal current account are 
reported in Appendix Table B8. On the basis of the AIC and the Schwartz Criterion, 
we chose one lag length. The present value test results are reported in Table 2.3. For 
the overall period, the estimates of the k-vector are [-0.27 0.92 -0.01], which is close 
to the theoreticaUy expected value [0 1 0] and show a significant improvement over 
the corresponding result for the basic PVMCA. The coefficient on the current 
account variable is significantly different from zero and not significantly different 
from the theoretical value of unity. AIl other coefficients are not significantly 
different from zero. With the p-value of 0.18, the present value test is far from 
rejection. Finally, the variability in the predicted current account is 91 % of the actual 
data. Figure 2.4 shows the actual current account and the predicted current account 
derived from the model that includes variations in interest rates and exchange rates, 
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over the entire period (1960-2002). It shows that the model does weil in predicting 
the general direction of the actual current account balances. 
This result must be interpreted with caution. As discussed in section 2.2, as an 
integral part of the overail external policies, the exchange rate was fixed for a 
considerable period during the pre-ERP period. Therefore, the exchange rates could 
not have been an important determinant of the current account balances during that 
period. Aiso the existence of capital con troIs over the same period prevented 
economic agents from using the international capital market (by borrowing and 
lending) to smooth consumption. If these daims are true, then the factors 
determining the dynamics of the current account will differ between the controiled 
and liberalized regimes. To explicitly investigate this proposition, we estimated the 
extended model separately for the pre-ERP and post-ERP periods. 
Table 2.3: Test ofthe extended PVMCA 
Pre-ERP Post-ERP Overall 
k-vector 
.ôQt -0.213 -0.501 -0.275 
(0.294) (0.765) (0.376) 
CAt 0.194 1.039 0.923 
(0.751) (0.481) (0.328) 
~ 
rt 0.008 0.270 -0.012 
(0.937) (0.416) (0.416) 
x2-statistic 78.513 2.94 3.617 
p-value 0.000 0.135 0.184 
var (CA *)jvar(CA) 0.07 0.98 0.91 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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The present value test results for the two sub-periods are also reported in 
Table 2.3. The estimated values of the k-vector for the pre-ERP period are [-0.21 
0.19 0.01]. The coefficients on ail the variables are not significantly different from 
zero, so that the extended model is rejected by the data. The X2 of the Wald test of 
the parameter restrictions on the VAR also rejects the model with a p-value of zero. 
The ratio of the variance of the optimal current account to that of the actual current 
account also indicates that the variance of the optimal current account is only 7% of 
the actual current account. This indicates that interest rates and exchange rates 
changes may not explain the current account balances. However conditions that 
influenced the current account during the period still remain to be captured. 
Consistent with the results from the Wald test, Figure 2.5 shows that the extended 
model does not provide a satisfactory fit for the actual current account data. 
On the other hand, the result for the post-ERP period imply that with the 
introduction of changes in the world interest rate and the exchange rate, the extended 
PVMCA's prediction is fairly consistent with the the ory. The estimated values of the 
k-vector for the pre-ERP period are [-0.50 1.04 0.27]. The coefficient on the change 
in net output (-0.50) is greater than its theoretical value of zero, though it is not 
significantly different from zero. The coefficients on the current account and the 
consumption-based interest rate are close to their theoretical values. The reported X2 
statistics and its p-value indicate that the model extended to include changes in the 
consumption-based interest rate cannot be rejected for the post-ERP period. This 
should not come as a surprise. During the ERP period, the government of Ghana 
embarked on increasing liberalization of the capital account of the balance of 
111 
Figure 2.4 
Actual and Optimal Current Account Balances (Extended Model: Ove raIl) 
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Figure 2.5 
Actual and Optimal Current Account Balances (Extended Model: Pre-ERP) 
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Figure 2.6 
Actual and Optimal Current Account Balances (Extended Madel: Post-ERP) 
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payments and changed the exchange rate system from a fixed to a free floating one. 
Hence changes in the exchange rates and the world interest rates affected the current 
account balances. The volatility of the optimal current account is almost the same as 
the variability in the actual current account, implying the absence of speculative 
factors and other conditions that will make the variances differ. Figure 2.6 shows that 
the extended model does provide a satisfactory fit for the actual current account data. 
It is able to capture the increasing current account deficits from the late 1980s until 
the end of the period. 
Test of Arymmetry in Capital Flows 
The government of Ghana has from time to time attempted to manage the 
international mobility of capital with measures of capital controls as part of the 
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overail trade regime. As mentioned earlier the existence of such capital controls could 
le ad to asymmetric access to the international credit market. In this section, we 
explicitly impose asymmetric access to the international credit market on the 
PVMCA and test for its effect on consumption smoothing. By doing so, we are 
conducting the foilowing tests. For the pre-ERP period, we are testing if the capital 
controls were binding and whether the optimal current account with credit constraint 
closely tracks the actual current account balances. For the post-ERP period, we test 
for the effectiveness of liberalization of the capital account of the balance of payment 
since the implementation of the Economic Recovery Program in 1983. 
As discussed earlier in section 2.3, asymmetrical access to the international 
financial market modifies the testable PVMCA equation to: 
CI) 
hZt = - L ~ t-T (gl _g2)t-T Zt 
t=T+! 
where, as discussed in section 2.3 Zt= (I1Q"t, I1Q/t, CA"t, CA/t, r )', gl = [1 1 000], g2 = 
[00001], h = [001 1 0]. Rewrite the ab ove equation as, 
CAt** = k Zt 
where k = - (gl -g2)~~ (1 - ~~)-1. 
A test of asymmetry in access to the financial market entails the estimation of the k 
vector and its comparison with the expected theoretical value of [0 0 1 1 0]. 
We conducted the test by imposing asymmetric access on theextended model 
for ail three periods (overail, pre-ERP and post-ERP). The estimated values of the k 
vector are reported in Table 2.4. For the overail period, the estimate [0.16 -0.12 1.17 
1.09 -0.01], is not quite different from the expected theoretical values. The X2 of the 
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Wald test of the parameter restrictions is 2.16 and its p-value of 0.13 implies an 
acceptance of the PVMCA extended to incorporate asymmetric access to 
international financial market. The acceptance of the extended model suggests that 
the capital con troIs associated with the control regimes and the political and 
macroeconomic sources of instability in the Ghanaian economy prevented private 
economic agents from using the international financial market to smooth 
consumption. However, the volatility of the optimal current account is 11 percent 
higher than of the actual current account. Figure 2.7 below graphs the actual current 
account and the optimal one under asymmetric access to international financial 
markets. The predicted current account is relatively close to the actual current 
account, though not as close as that of the extended model without the imposition of 
asymmetric access. From Table 2.4, the model with asymmetric access is weakly 
accepted for the pre-ERP period but rejected for the post-ERP period with p-values 
of 0.11 and 0.00 respectively. The variability of the optimal current account is much 
lower than that of the actual current account for the pre-ERP period. However the 
volatility of the optimal current account is 22 percent higher than of the actual 
current account for the post-ERP period. 
It must be recalled that, in the previous test, the extended model was rejected 
for the pre-ERP period. This may imply that the excessive capital and exchange 
con troIs that occurred during the period did not permit agents to respond to changes 
in the world interest rate nor allow sufficient variations in the exchange rate. As a 
result we further tested for asymmetric access over the pre-ERP period using the 
benchmark model that does not include variations in interest rates and exchange 
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rates. The results are much better than the one with variations in interest rates and 
ex change rates. The estimated values of the k vector are [0.27 -0.13 0.950.97], which 
is not quite different from the expected theoretical values of [0 0 1 1]. The X2 of the 
Wald test of the parameter restrictions is 1.67 and its p-value of 0.28 implies an 
acceptance of the benchmark PVMCA extended to incorporate asymmetric access to 
international financial market. Figure 2.10 shows that the optimal current account 
closely tracks the dynamics of the actual current account. This result suggests that the 
capital controls associated with the control regimes not only prevented changes in 
Table 2.4: Test of Asymmetry in Capital Flows 
Pre-ERP Post-ERP Overall 
k-vector 
I1fZ't 0.206 -0.425 0.167 
(0.641) (0.826) (0.246) 
I1Q't 0.185 -1.148 -0.119 
(0.463) (0.638) (0.539) 
CAh t 1.18 1.445 1.17 
(0.563) (0.513) (0.478) 
CA' t 1.252 1.076 1.09 
(0.524) (1.024) (0.501) 
rI 
-0.261 0.141 -0.012 
(0.245) (0.484) (0.416) 
x2-statistic 355 92.75 2.16 
p-va1ue 0.08 0.000 0.133 
var(CA*)jvar(CA) 0.63 1.22 1.11 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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interest rates and exchange rates to affect the current account but they also prevented 
private economic agents in Ghana from using the international [mancial market to 
smooth consumption. 
Figure 2.7 
Actual and Optimal Current Account Balances (Asymmetric Access: Overall) 
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Figure 2.8 
Actual and Optimal Current Account Balances (Asymmetric Access: Pre-ERP) 
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Figure 2.9 
Actual and Optimal Current Account Balances (Asymmetric Access: Post-ERP) 
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Figure 2.10 
Actual and Optimal Current Account Balances 
(Asymmetric Access with Basic Model: Pre-ERP) 
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According to the intertemporal models of the current account, an expected 
rise in future in come over that of current income leads to an increase in current 
consumption and a reduction in saving, so that if investment do es not change, the 
current account must deteriorate. With asymmetric access to the international market, 
the relationship between the expected rise in output and the deterioration in the 
current account weakens. Conversely, if private agents expect a decline in future 
income from that in the current period, they will reduce current consumption, so 
that, with present income unchanged, saving will increase. If investment remains 
constant, domestic agents williend part of this saving abroad, which will improve the 
current account. If the assumption of asymmetric access is binding, then CAht will 
Granger-cause /j.Q/t, but CA/t will not Granger-cause /j.Qht. To test for this effect, we 
estimated a one lag, five-variable VAR induding /j.Qht, /j.Q/t, CAht, CA/t, and r 
variables for the overall and the post-ERP periods. Our estimations show that for the 
overall period, the null hypothesis of no Granger-causality between CAht and /j.Q/t is 
rejected at the 5 percent significance level. The F-statistic is 3.26 and the p-value is 
0.02. Further, the null hypothesis of no Granger-causality between CA/t and /j.Q"t is 
not rejected at the 5 percent significance level, with an F-statistic of 0.77 and a p-
value of 0.57. Once again, these results confirm the existence of asymmetric access to 
the international financial markets. Correspondingly, the null hypothesis of no 
Granger-causality between CAht and /j.Q/t is not rejected at the 5 percent significance 
level for the post-ERP period. The F-statistic is 0.55 and the p-value is 0.65. Further, 
the null hypothesis of no Granger-causality between CA/t and /j.Q"t is rejected at the 
10 percent significance level with an F-statistic of 2.73 and a p-value of 0.08. Hence, 
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there is no asymmetry in capital flows during the post-ERP period: The financial 
liberalization and the growth prospects of the country during the post-ERP period 
instilled confidence in the participants of the international financial market, who were 
willing to lend to Ghanaians in the same fashion as Ghanaians were willing to lend to 
the rest of the world. 
Consistent with our results from the test of asymmetry in capital flows, we 
estimated a one lag, four-variable VAR including ~Qht, ~Qlt, CAht, and CAlt, for the 
Pre-ERP period. The nul1 hypothesis of no Granger-causality between CAht and ~Qlt 
is rejected at the 5 percent significance level for the pre-ERP period with the F-
statistics equal to 3.44 and the p-value of 0.04. Further, the nul1 hypothesis of no 
Granger-causality between CAlt and ~Qht is not rejected at the 5 percent significance 
level, with an F-statistic of 0.11 and a p-value of 0.98. Once again, this result supports 
the proposition that the presence of capital controls prevented economic agents in 
Ghana from smoothing their consumption path during the period prior to the 
implementation of the Economic recovery program in 1983. 
2.5 Conclusions 
The intertemporal model of the current account, which maintains that the current 
account of a country serves as a buffer for smoothing national consumption against 
shocks to its net output, has increasingly been used to determine the current account 
balances in both developed and developing countries. However, in general, the 
results from the basic version of this model have not been encouraging. This paper 
argues that the failure of the basic model, especial1y in the case of developing 
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countries, should not be surpnsmg smce it does not take into account shocks 
emanating from the external sector. Given that these economles rely heavily on 
exports of a few commodities and external financial resources for development 
efforts, these economies are likely to be affected by external shocks in the form of 
changes in the world interest rate and the ex change rate. The intertemporal theory 
predicts that changes in the interest rate and a country's real exchange rate do affect 
the intertemporal profùe of consumption, savings and the current account. 
Another reason for the failure of the basic model for developing countries is 
that the key assumption of perfect capital mobility does not apply over a considerable 
periods during which these economies implemented capital con troIs as part of their 
overall external policies. These capital con troIs generated conditions of asymmetry in 
capital flows whereby domestic economic agents could sometimes easily lend abroad 
but could not easily borrow from abroad. This requires an explicit imposition of 
asymmetric access to the international capital market on the model in order to 
identify the true dynamics of the current account. To carefully account for these two 
main reasons for the failure of the model, we divided our entire data set into 
controlled and liberalized regime periods. 
We used both, the simple model of the Sachs-Hall variety, and another version 
that explicitly incorporates external shocks and asymmetry in capital flows and 
applied it to the national account data of Ghana. We show that the basic or 
benchmark model -- which does not allow changes in the interest rate, exchange rates 
and asymmetry in capital flows -- fails to explain satisfactorily movements in Ghana's 
current account over the period 1960 to 2002. The result is the same even when the 
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entire period is divided between controlled and liberalized regimes. Further, we find 
that for the liberalized trade and payment regime, the model is capable of explaining 
the dynamics of the actual current account provided that changes in the interest rate 
and the exchange rate are incorporated into the model. Finally, we find support for 
the proposition that there existed asymmetry in access to the international financial 
market during the controlled regime: the PVMCA incorporating su ch asymmetry 
performed better than without it. We interpret this as confirmation of the hypothesis 
that agents in Ghana had restricted access to the international financial markets 
during the period. However, when we incorporated asymmetry in access to the 
international financial market to the data over the liberalized regime period, the 
model was rejected. Hence, this study supports the belief that the elimination of 
capital con troIs as part of the overall economic recovery program has enabled agents 
in Ghana to smooth consumption. 
In terms of the literature, these results. may imply that for a typical open 
developing economy, the basic PVMCA extended to capture external shocks 
improves the ability of the ·model to explain historic episodes of the current account. 
AIso, for studies on developing economies that covers a significant period of capital 
control, the PVMCA could capture the dynamics in the current account if the basic 
model is extended to capture the possible asymmetry in access to international 
financial market that these countries face. 
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Appendix B 
Table B.l 
Macroeconomie Policy Inclicators-Pre-ERP 
Nominal 
Growth in mone~ Budget Deficit* Deficit to GDP ratio Exchange Rates 
1957 -10.6 2.9 0.4 0.714 
1958 4.8 -12.3 -1.7 0.714 
1959 12.5 -34.1 -4.2 0.714 
1960 17.7 -56.8 -6.5 0.714 
1961 9.3 -112.3 -7 0.714 
1962 12.6 -100.8 -9.4 0.714 
1963 4.7 -84.8 -9.9 0.714 
1964 39.5 -79.0 -8.4 0.714 
1965 -0.2 -94.1 -6.4 0.714 
1966 3.2 -76.6 -5.0 0.714 
1967 -2.9 -88.1 -5.9 1.020 
1968 7.3 -104.0 -6.1 1.020 
1969 12.0 -66.0 -3.3 1.020 
1970 . 5.6 -49.9 -2.2 1.020 
1971 4.9 -88.4 -3.5 1.818 
1972 44.1 -161.2 -5.7 1.280 
1973 21.9 -186.6 -5.3 1.150 
1974 23.7 -196.1 -4.2 1.150 
1975 44.6 -401.3 -7.6 1.150 
1976 41.4 -736.2 -11.3 1.150 
1977 67.9 -1056.8 -9.5 1.150 
1978 72.4 -1896.7 -9.0 2.750 
1979 13.4 -1800.0 -6.4 2.750 
1980 30.1 -1808.0 -4.2 2.750 
1981 54.7 -4706.8 -6.5 2.750 
1982 19.0 -4848.0 -5.6 2.750 
Source: IMF; International Financial Statistics. 
W orld Bank, W orld Development Indicators. 
*In millions of Ghanaian Cedis. 
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Table B.2 
Balance of Payments (Millions of US $)-Pre-ERP 
Export Value Import Value Trade Services (net) Current Overal1 
F.O.B F.O.B Balance Account Account 
1960 333.8 384.1 -14.3 n.a -47.9 25.7 
1961 332.5 348.7 -52.2 n.a -103.5 -21.8 
1962 319.9 310.1 9.8 n.a -33.7 4.1 
1963 307.0 336.6 -29.6 n.a -80.1 -40.8 
1964 321.4 321.5 -0.1 n.a -55.4 -4.2 
1965 321.2 439.4 -118.2 n.a -222.9 15.2 
1966 280.3 320.7 -40.4 n.a -127.8 -48.1 
1967 284.2 265.4 18.8 n.a -84.9 -72.3 
1968 304.4 264.4 39.8 n.a -56.1 -6.5 
1969 345.0 295.3 49.7 n.a -60.1 -26.9 
1970 427.0 375.1 51.9 n.a 67.7 2.5 
1971 334.6 368.2 -33.6 -112.5 -145.8 34.7 
1972 384.3 222.9 161.4 -66.5 108.2 33.1 
1973 585.0 3712.1 212.9 -98.7 126.3 109.1 
1974 679.0 708.2 -29.2 -166.4 -171.5 -142.0 
1975 801.0 650.5 150.5 -177.4 17.0 106.3 
1976 779.0 690.3 88.7 -189.7 -74.0 -137.3 
1977 889.6 860.2 29.4 -167.6 -79.7 -8.5 
1978 892.8 780.3 112.5 -189.1 -45.9 -62.3 
1979 1065.7 803.1 262.6 -219.4 122.0 69.8 
1980 1103.6 908.3 195.3 -245.7 29.2 -1.3 
1981 710.7 954.3 -243.6 -260.2 -402.8 -288.3 
1982 607.0 588.7 18.3 -209.4 -108.6 -17.9 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics 
World Bank, World Development Indicators 
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Figure B.1 
Current account and balance of payments-Pre ERP 
(as percent of GDP) 
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Table B.3 
International Financial Position-Pre ERP (Millions US$) 
External Net Foreign Foreign Direct 
Debt Reserves* Assets Investment 
1960 n.a 277.9 296.0 3.9 
1961 n.a 156.0 170.4 -11.3 
1962 n.a 181.7 153.4 9.9 
1963 n.a 209.3 99.0 7.4 
1964 n.a 125.5 73.9 14.5 
1965 n.a 132.5 -5.7 38.2 
1966 n.a 111.1 -33.5 56.1 
1967 n.a 82.7 -49.5 32.5 
1968 . n.a 97.0 -62.3 15.8 
1969 n.a 71.8 -80.5 10.2 
1970 571.4 42.6 -19.7 67.8 
1971 545.8 43.1 -0.6 30.6 
1972 604.4 104.0 99.7 11.5. 
1973 755.5 194.0 202.0 14.4 
1974 758.4 101.3 20.1 10.5 
1975 735 147.2 127.5 70.9 
1976 712.7 113.3 29.3 -18.3 
1977 1066.6 181.6 49.2 19.2 
1978 1278.6 326.7 105.4 9.7 
1979 1282.5 401.2 79.1 -2.8 
1980 1401.7 329.6 6.1 15.6 
1981 1538.8 268.4 -137.4 16.3 
1982 1484.2 314.3 -59.5 16.3 
*Includes gold. 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
World Bank, World Development Indicator. 
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Figure B.2 
Exteroal Debt to GDP Ratio-Pre ERP 
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Table BA 
Macroeconomie Policy Indicators-Post ERP 
Nominal 
Growth in money Budget Deficit* Deficit to GDP ratio Exchange Rates 
1983 49.2 -4933.3 -2.7 30.0 
1984 60.6 -4843 -1.8 50.0 
1985 42.7 -7579 -2.2 60.0 
1986 44.0 299 0.1 90.0 
1987 52.6 4059 0.5 176.1 
1988 45.0 3911 0.4 229.9 
1989 52.7 10300 0.7 303.0 
1990 10.8 3300 0.2 344.8 
1991 7.7 39000 1.6 390.6 
1992 53.0 -144400 -5.2 520.8 
1993 27.9 -97300 -2.5 819.7 
1994 50.3 111700 2.1 1052.6 
1995 33.4 70300 0.9 1449.3 
1996 31.7 -335500 -3.0 1754.4 
1997 46.0 -297600 -2.1 2272.7 
1998 20.9 -1048800 -6.5 2325.6 
1999 15.8 -1749271 -8.5 3535.1 
2000 38.2 -2633841 -9.7 7047.7 
2001 46.3 n.a. n.a. 7321.9 
2002 59.9 n.a. n.a 8438.8 
Source: IMF; International Financial Statistics. 
World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
*In millions of Ghanaian Cedis. 
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Figure B.3 
Fiscal Deficit to GDP Ratio 
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Figure B.4 
Real Exchange Rates (1987=100-Post ERP Period) 
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Table B.S 
Balance ofPayments-Post ERP (Millions of US $} 
Export Value Import Value Trade Services (net) Current Overall 
F.O.B F.O.B Balance Account Account 
1983 439.1 499.7 -60.6 -185.9 -174.1 -180.9 
1984 565.9 533.0 32.9 -234.0 -38.8 35.6 
1985 632.4 668.7 -36.3 -240.0 -134.2 14.1 
1986 773.4 712.5 60.9 -298.5 -43.0 -60.8 
1987 820.8 951.5 -130.7 -297.0 -96.9 140.2 
1988 881.0 993.4 -112.4 -322.0 -65.8 181.1 
1989 807.2 999.0 -191.8 -308.6 -97.5 155.6 
1990 896.8 1205.0 -308.2 -328.4 -223.1 27.6 
1991 997.7 1318.7 -321.0 -352.5 -251.6 151.2 
1992 986.3 1456.5 -470.2 -376.2 -376.2 -104.2 
1993 1063.6 1728.0 -664.4 -300.6 -558.8 33.8 
1994 1237.7 1579.9 -342.2 -273.3 -254.6 253.1 
1995 1431.2 1687.8 -256.6 -281.1 -143.8 182.7 
1996 1570.0 1950.6 -380.6 -268.0 -323.9 -25.0 
1997 1489.8 2143.7 -653.9 -303.8 -549.7 77.2 
1998 2090.8 2991.6 -900.8 -218.5 -521.7 27.6 
1999 2005.5 3279.9 -1274.4 -178.2 -964.5 -136.5 
2000 1936.3 2766.6 -830.3 -97.5 -386.4 -185.7 
2001 1867.1 2968.5 -1101.4 -74.4 -317.6 -l21.4 
2002 2015.2 2707.0 -691.8 -66.0 -30.5 124.6 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics 
World Bank, World Development Indicators 
Figure B.S 
Current Account and Balance of Payments (in percent of G DP) 
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Table B.6 
International Financial Position-Pre ERP (Millions US$) 
External Debt Reserves Net Foreign Asset* Foreign Direct Investment 
1983 1665.9 291.3 -244.4 2.4 
1984 1959.4 437.2 -404.8 2.0 
1985 2246.9 552.1 -598.7 5.6 
1986 2754.5 624.0 -660.2 4.3 
1987 3296.7 331.6 -773.1 4.7 
1988 3084.3 310.3 -754.2 5.0 
1989 3361.4 435.9 -787.7 15.0 
1990 3837.1 309.3 -681.5 14.8 
1991 4333.2 644.3 53.8 20.0 
1992 4460.1 411.6 -148.0 22.5 
1993 4833.6 517.0 -52.2 125.0 
1994 5415.9 689.3 206.3 233.0 
1995 5888 803.8 344.0 106.5 
1996 6402.2 930.3 419.7 120.0 
1997 6313.1 617.6 431.8 82.6 
1998 6933.1 456.7 459.6 167.4 
1999 6979.3 534.8 94.1 243.7 
2000 6624.9 308.9 -1.3 165.9 
2001 6734.5 375.9 199.5 89.3 
2002 7338.2 636.1 409.7 50.0 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics; 
World Bank, World Development Indicator. * Includes gold 
Figure B.6 
External Debt to GDP ratio-Post ERP 
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Table B.7 
VAR Estimates (The Benchmark Model) 
Period llQt-l CA-l 
Pre-ERP 
llQt 0.089 -0.075 
(0.225) (0.142) 
CA -0.136 0.786 
(0.142) (0.089) 
Post-ERP 
llQt 0.207 -0.021 
(0.252) (0.122) 
CA -0.207 1.028 
(0.256) (0.095) 
Overall 
llQt 0.158 0.016 
(0.161) (0.080) 
CAt -0.105 0.917 
(0.128) (0.064) 
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Table B.8 
VAR Estimates (The Extended Madel) 
A 
Period ~Qt-l CAt_1 ri - 1 
Pre-ERP 
~Qt 0.116 -0.073 -0.067 
(0.249) (0.145) (0.235) 
CAt -0.224 0.781 0.221 
(0.148) (0.086) (0.140) 
A 
ri 0.172 0.064 0.118 
(0.253) (0.147) (0.239) 
Post-ERP 
~Qt 0.162 0.054 -0.108 
(0.260) (0.097) (0.128) 
CAt -0.229 1.017 -0.053 
(0.268) (0.101) (0.133) 
A 
ri -0.799 -0.040 0.309 
(0.431) (0.162) (0.213) 
Overall 
~Qt 0.169 -0.001 -0.114 
(0.161) (0.082) (0.115) 
CAt -0.107 0.921 0.019 
(0.130) (0.066) (0.019) 
A 
ri -0.201 -0.042 0.338 
~0.2122 ~0.108) ~0.1522 
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CHAPTER3 
THE STRUCTURE AND DETERMINANTS OF 
TANZANIA'S BILATERAL TRADE 
3.1 Introduction 
Since independence in 1964, Tanzania has experimented with numerous trade 
regimes that have had varying impact on bilateral trade relationship with the rest of 
the world in general and its major trading partners in particular. After a brief 
continuation of the liberal regime inherited from the colonial era, an, import 
substitution strategy of development was pursued. This entailed the institution of 
restrictive measures governing trade and exchange to assist the import substitution 
industrialization efforts. Marketing and pricing of tradition al agriculture was also 
highly controlied. These policy options resulted in an anti-export regime that led to 
worsenmg of bilateral trade deficits with major trading partners, including its 
immediate neighbours (Kenya and Uganda). For instance, the trade deficit as a 
percentage of total trade with Kenya and Uganda combined increased from 54.2 
percent in 1967 to 82.2 percent in 2002. 
For the past two decades, development economists have recommended 
development strategies that cali for reduction of trade barriers by opening national 
economies to foreign competition. The World Bank, The International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the major don or countries have also required developing nations to 
embark on market-oriented reforms that include trade liberalization as a condition 
for receiving financial assistance. As a result, Tanzania started an Economic Recovery 
Program in the mid-1980s, which involved trade liberalization and elimination of 
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cost-price distortions in the exports sector. Furthermore, the government in early 
1990s embarked on far-reaching structural adjustment programs including the 
reorientation of the economy towards building a market-based economic structure. 
For the agricultural sector, the backbone of the economy, changes in macro-
economic management were formulated and implemented through an agricultural 
sector adjustment program. To complement initiatives in the policy reform front 
towards pursuing exports growth oriented development strategy, Tanzania has also 
embarked on other initiatives by integrating its economy, both globally and 
regionally, to increase competitiveness of exports in the global market place. The 
country is currently a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), Southern 
Africa Development Community (SADC), Cross Border Initiative (CBI), and the 
East African Community (EAC). These regional integration initiatives are intended to 
increase bilateral trade among members. Recently, there has been increasing 
importance of bilateral trading relationship with African countries, such as South 
Africa and Kenya, as well as Asian countries like India and ]apan. However, the 
results from these initiatives have not been encouraging. Trade deficits have persisted 
and the overall external sector performance has gone through periods of modest 
improvements to periods of intense deterioration. 
Against the background of the continuous reforms and the dismal 
performance of the external sector, this paper undertakes an analysis of the nature of 
Tanzania's bilateral trade relationship in order to unearth the opportunities that could 
be exploited to make the export led development strategy a reality. This will involve 
the analysis of Tanzania's trade intensities and structure with the rest of the world, in 
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general, and her major trading partners, in particular, over the 1980-2002 period. This 
paper also uses the gravity model to test the effect of regional trading blocks on 
bilateral trade. For this, we test for the effect of two regional integrations. The first, 
which is the EAC, is an integration that involves Tanzania and her immediate trading 
partners. The second, which is the EU, comprises sorne of Tanzania's major trading 
partners38• Finaily, we test for the openness of Tanzania's emerging significant trade 
partners, such as lndia and ]apan. 
This study differs from other studies that have used data on developing 
nations to analyze economic phenomena related to bilateral trade flows. First, sorne 
studies (Oguledo 1996, Holden 1996, and Hannik and Owusu 1998) use panel data 
on trade flows among many countries and the gravity model to test for the effect of 
trading blocks on bilateral trade. They interpret coefficients obtained from their 
regresslOns as averages for ail the countries involved. We diverge from this 
assumption by using panel data on bilateral trade flows between only Tanzania and 
its trading partners. Hence, our coefficients are specifie to Tanzania. Second, the 
above-mentioned studies use regional dummy variables to test for the significance of 
trading blocks. However, Polak (1996), Matyas (1997) and Egger (2000) demonstrate 
that this practice leads to model mis specification in econometric estimation. They, 
therefore, suggest the inclusion of local and target specifie parameters to cater for the 
trading block effects. We foilow their recommendation by including target specifie 
parameters in our econometric analysis to capture the effect of trading blocks on 
38 We included only EU members that have significant trade with Tanzania. 
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Tanzania's bilateral trade flOWS. 39 Third, beside the application of the gravity model, 
we also use complementary statistical measures to determine the variations in bilateral 
trade levels and sources of growth in trade in different product categories. 
Our main results are summarized as follows: We find, contrary to 
expectations, that Tanzania's trade involvement with the EAC members is highly 
remarkable40. We also identified a significant intra-trade relationship between 
Tanzania and its major trading partners in the manufacturing goods category. 
Estimated coefficients from the gravity model in terms of the propensities to import, 
export, and trade with respect to in come levels and distance conform to expectations. 
We further found that using country specific dummies to investigate the effect of 
regional integration provide better results when compared with the tradition al set up 
which just augments the basic gravity model with regional dummies. 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 3.2 uses trade intensity 
indices to measure the extent of Tanzania's trade dependence on its major trading 
partners over the period of the study. It also uses a measure of inter-and-intra-
industry trade relationships to determine Tanzania's trade structure and the sources 
of growth in total trade in major commodity categories. Section 3.3 uses the gravity 
model to estimate the determinants of trade variables such as imports, exports and 
total trade. It also checks for trading block effects. Section 3.4 provides the 
concluding remarks and some policy impliéations. 
39 This procedure is the same as estimating a flXed effects model when using panel data. 
40 Other members of the EAC are Kenya and Uganda. 
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3.2 An Overview ofTanzania's Trade Relations 
Tanzania's exports mainly to the developed economies are largely dominated by 
primary goods (agricultural products and mineraIs). This pattern has remained 
unchanged over the last two decades, despite the recent favourable performance of 
the non-tradition al export sector. Traditional agricultural exports constituted about 
60 percent of Tanzania's total exports between 1980-2002. Coffee, cashew nuts, 
cotton, tobacco, tea, and sisal are the major exports. Their main destination is the EU 
countries, India and ]apan. Tanzania's main impor'ts are machinery, transport 
equipment, building and construction equipment, petroleum and related products, 
textiles and clothing, and food and beverages. Most of Tanzania's merchandise 
imports originate from Germany, UK, ]apan, India, Italy, USA, and the Netherlands. 
However, ] apan became the second most important origin of imports with an 
average of 9 percent over the 22-year period. UK is the leading origin of imports 
accounting for 12.4 percent of total imports over the period. Tanzania's imports 
from the rest of Africa averaged only 10.8 percent of total imports over the period. 
3.2.1 Trade Dependence 
The volume, direction and composition of countries' trade depend on trade barriers 
(resistances) and trade promotion either by national trade policies or regional and 
global trade arrangements. The most prominent of the trade resistances are official 
trade barriers such as tariffs, quota, and voluntary export restraints. After the 
pioneering work by Brown (1949) and later developed and popularized by Kojima 
(1964), there have been many attempts in the international trade literature to use 
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various statistical measures of trade intensities to determine the variations in bilateral 
trade level that result from different levels of trade resistances. The most commonly 
used measures are those that use bilateral trade intensity indices to measure the 
pattern of trade and those that determine the extent of inter-trade and intra-trade 
relationship as a measure of the structure of trade. We use both measures to explain 
the variations of trade intensities and determine the changes of the structure of trade 
over rime and across bilateral trading partners. 
Exports Intensities 
An export intensity index measures the extent to which the proportion of a country 
ls export to another country j differs from the proportion of exports from the rest of 
the world to country j. The index is given as: 
(3.1) 
where EXij is the exports intensity index of country i with trading partner J~ Xv' is the 
exports of country i to trading partner J~ Xi is the total exports of country i , Xnj is the 
total world exports to country J~ and X w is the total world exports. The index 
therefore measures the extent to which country j is over or under-represented as 
country ls export market. The index will take a value of unity if the proportion of 
country ls exports to country j is the same as the proportion of the rest of the 
world's exports to country j. If the value exceeds unity, country j is said to be over-
represented as country t's exports market. A value less than unity imply relative 
under-representation. 
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Table 3.1 presents the exports intensity index for selected countries. Among 
her major developed nations trading partners, Tanzania's export dependence on EU 
members is on the average greater than that of her non-EU partners. Though UK 
was relatively over-represented as Tanzania's exports market in EU during the first 
half of the 22-year period, Netherlands maintained a commanding lead during the 
second half and closed with an export intensive index of 3.74 in 2002 compared to 
0.88 for UK and 1.04 for Germany. These shifts may indicate that despite the general 
EU external trade policies, other country specific factors may still remain significant 
in determining the intensity of bilateral trade between non-EU countries and 
individual EU members. The situation with the USA and ]apan is somewhat 
different. The index with respect to the USA remains consistently below 0.5. It is 
expected that Tanzania could increase its exports to the USA by taking advantage of 
the enhanced market access offered by the African Growth Opportunity Act 
(AGOA), legislated by the US Congress to replace the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) after October 1, 2000 .. Since 1992 (with the exception of 1997), 
the index with respect to ]apan has been greater than one, indicating that Tanzania 
took advantage of the growing] apanese market in the early 1990's and still holds on 
to it. The exports intensity indices between Tanzania and its developing nations 
major trading partners (especially the neighbouring nations) depict more erratic 
changes. The index with respect to Kenya increased from 0.30 in 1980 to 102.52 by 
2002, whereas that of Uganda fell from 165.36 in 1980 to 58.59 in 2002. An 
important caveat should be noted here. Trade is affected by factors such as 
geographical proximity, linguistic ties, market size, political and economic relations, 
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and factor endowment. Hence, the fact that Tanzania's exports intensity indices with 
Kenya and Uganda are the highest is more of a reflection of geographical proximity, 
linguistic ties, similarity of production activities, and regional trade arrangements than 
market size and factor endowments. The export intensity index with lndia also 
increased from 1.95 in 1980 to 34.85 in 2002. This pattern reflects the favourable 
conditions accorded to Tanzania's exports to lndia. 
Table 3.1: Export Intensity Indices 
Year Germany UK N etherlands USA ]apan Kenya Uganda India 
1980 1.22 2.05 1.13 0.25 0.36 0.30 165.36 1.95 
1981 1.82 2.72 1.33 0.24 0.37 0.51 99.70 8.77 
1982 1.56 1.92 1.66 0.29 0.82 2.58 8.82 2.07 
1983 2.05 2.41 2.21 0.17 0.61 2.49 49.07 2.55 
1984 2.41 2.27 1.54 0.15 0.56 12.60 56.13 5.88 
1985 2.18 2.25 1.38 0.07 0.43 3.55 34.70 1.60 
1986 2.71 2.19 1.58 0.15 0.85 7.74 nia 5.07 
1987 1.70 1.49 2.22 0.18 0.66 8.35 nia 5.11 
1988 1.74 1.36 2.28 0.25 0.59 nia nia 0.00 
1989 1.13 0.91 1.53 0.16 0.37 13.35 nia 5.54 
1990 1.27 1.62 1.47 0.45 0.57 47.46 nia 29.58 
1991 1.31 1.32 1.45 0.24 0.71 34.74 nia 10.58 
1992 0.96 1.28 1.25 0.17 1.06 38.34 nia 12.19 
1993 1.17 1.37 1.50 0.16 1.30 37.89 71.21 11.61 
1994 1.08 1.13 1.57 0.18 1.34 74.21 54.59 11.86 
1995 1.16 1.22 1.84 0.23 1.42 68.64 72.53 12.03 
1996 1.02 1.04 1.70 0.16 1.21 34.23 54.75 15.30 
1997 0.99 1.13 1.29 0.08 0.78 50.70 43.95 11.40 
1998 0.92 1.73 2.58 0.13 1.39 77.01 57.99 20.83 
1999 1.05 0.80 2.48 0.29 1.84 102.35 48.23 34.85 
2000 1.13 0.95 2.39 0.21 1.88 105.41 50.68 45.29 
2001 1.08 0.84 3.17 0.34 1.91 109.54 60.15 38.49 
2002 1.04 0.88 3.74 0.31 1.76 102.52 58.59 34.85 
Source: Authors' ca/culation using World Bank Data base and UN Comtrade. 
Import Intensities 
Similar to the analysis of exports, an import intensity index measures the extent of 
Tanzania's import dependence on its trading partners. This index is given as: 
(3.2) 
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where IMv' is the imports intensity index of country i with trading partner J: Mv' is the 
imports of country i to trading partner j, Mi is the total imports of country i, M1IJ' is 
the total world imports from country J: and Mw is the total world imports. 
The index is equal to one if Tanzania's impqrt from a particular country as a 
proportion of its total imports is the same as the proportion of the rest of the world's 
imports from that country. If Tanzania is over-dependent on a particular country for 
its import, then the ratio will be greater than one. On the other hand, if the ratio is 
less than one, then Tanzania is under-dependent on that country. The pattern of the 
indices in Table 3.2 shows that, among the EU trading partners, UI<. once again is the 
most imports dependent partner with an average index of 2.34, while Netherlands 
and Germany have average index values of 1.13 and 0.73, respectively. In addition, . 
the index with respect to Germany has been consistently below one since 1986 and 
that of Netherlands has mostly been below one. It could be concluded that, in terms 
of imports from EU, Tanzania has been consistently over-dependent on UI<. due 
more to colonial ties than any other factors. As expected, the index with respect to 
USA has consistently been below one, though the average exceeds the export 
intensity index. Therefore, it appears that Tanzania is relatively more dependent on 
USA as a source of imports than as an export market. The average of the index with 
respect to ] apan for the decade of the 1980' s exceeded that of the decade of the 
1990' s and the early 2000' s, indicating a reduction of dependence on ] apan as a 
source of imports. The implication is that the recent increase in trade with ]apan is 
more of an increase in exports rather than increase in imports. 
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Table 3.2: Import Intensity Indices 
Year Germany UK Netherlands USA ]apan Kenya Uganda India 
1980 0.97 2.68 1.72 0.54 1.28 11.33 0.54 7.34 
1981 1.31 3.05 1.89 0.54 1.68 19.97 0.73 8.02 
1982 1.36 2.47 1.96 0.35 1.32 24.35 4.36 5.23 
1983 1.23 2.48 1.27 0.30 1.21 19.66 23.08 3.53 
1984 1.35 2.67 1.57 0.37 1.25 21.63 79.32 3.38 
1985 1.21 3.13 1.26 0.41 1.28 49.65 13.46 3.72 
1986 0.62 2.07 1.02 0.46 1.20 74.18 nia 2.46 
1987 0.54 2.87 0.97 0.36 . 0.99 97.35 nia 2.02 
1988 0.56 2.98 1.01 0.26 0.99 nia nia 0.00 
1989 0.47 2.47 0.85 0.20 0.84 74.86 nia 2.54 
1990 0.77 2.41 0.87 0.11 0.70 46.07 nia 2.52 
1991 0.50 1.91 1.16 0.24 0.85 83.86 nia 7.39 
1992 0.74 2.05 0.73 0.23 0.91 96.86 nia 10.21 
1993 0.55 2.58 0.74 0.20 0.84 198.83 6.78 7.72 
1994 0.50 1.80 0.60 0.29 0.60 347.51 6.72 7.60 
1995 0.37 2.22 0.67 0.44 0.89 498.55 8.43 8.21 
1996 0.36 2.08 0.77 0.36 0.79 583.77 14.69 8.97 
1997 0.41 1.87 0.76 0.40 0.91 187.68 42.19 19.53 
1998 0.50 1.59 1.90 0.45 1.18 205.50 15.79 9.54 
1999 0.33 1.47 0.80 0.45 1.00 247.08 18.62 8.62 
2000 0.63 2.50 0.98 0.41 0.99 256.23 32.78 9.68 
2001 0.95 2.12 1.15 0.54 1.10 301.81 25.94 7.54 
2002 0.61 2.40 1.26 0.44 1.15 312.54 36.47 9.34 
Source: Authors' ca/culation using World Bank Data base and UN Comtrade. 
Though the import indices with respect to Kenya and Uganda are still the 
highest, the pattern differs a lot from the corresponding exports intensity indices. ·In 
the first place, Tanzania !has always been over-dependent on Kenya as the source of 
imports, either by the level of the index or in comparison to Uganda. Secondly, its 
trade dependence on Kenya is relatively more of a source of imports rather than a 
destination for exports, whereas its dependence on Uganda is relatively more of a 
destination for exports rather than a source of import. This should not come as a 
surprise given the relative size and strength of the three economies.' The pattern of 
changes in imports dependence on India is not different from that of exports, with 
increasing dependence during the decade of the 1990's. Relatively, Tanzania is more 
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dependent on India for exports than for imports. Like Japan, the recent increase in 
trade with India cornes more from increased access to the Indian market. 
The main message from the analysis above is that Tanzania is relatively more 
over-dependent on its major LDC trading partners than its developed countries 
trading partners. This interpretation does not translate into volumes of trade with the 
respective trading partners because the index is very sensitive to the extent to which 
the rest of the world trades with a particular country. For instance, since UK has a 
greater trade involvement with the rest of the world than Uganda, one should not be 
surprised to find relatively very low imports and exports intensity indices for UK 
compared to those for Uganda. Another finding is that, after 1990, Tanzania's trade 
dependence on its tradition al EU trading partners declined whereas its trade 
dependence on non-traditional trading partners increased. The results also indicate 
that Tanzania has been gaining more access to non-traditional markets, such as Japan 
and India. 
3.2.2 Structure of Bilateral Trade 
We have so far discussed the direction of Tanzania's trade with its major trading 
partner. This section investigates the indus trial structure of Tanzania's trade with the 
various major trading partners. Total trade (TOT) comprises both inter-industry 
trade (defined as import and export of products belonging to different industries), 
also known as the Heckscher-Ohlin trade (HOT), and intra-industry trade (lIT), 
broadly defined as simultaneous import and export of goods belonging to the same 
product group or industry. The Balassa (1965) net export index is used as the 
measure of inter-industry trade, and is given by: 
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(Xc-Uc) 
(Xc+Uc) (3.3) 
where Hù- is the Balassa net export index for country c with respect to industry i, Xc 
is country (s total export of products in industry i, and Uc is country (s total import 
of products in industry i. The value of the index is between zero and one. The greater 
the value of the index, the greater the degree of inter-industry trade. On the other 
hand, the most commonly used measure of Intra-industry trade is the Grubel-Lloyd 
(1975) index is 
given by: 
Gù· 1 -
(Xc-Uc) 
(Xc + Uc) (3.4) 
where Gù- is the Grubel-Lloyd index for country c with respect to industry i and, 
Xc and Xc are as previously defined. The index takes values from zero to one. The 
higher the index, the greater the degree of intra-industry trade. 
A cursory glance at Tanzania's overall international trade reveals considerable 
level of inter-industry trade in the sense that agricultural products constitute 62 
percent of total exports while manufactured goods and transports and equipment 
constitute 56.4 percent of total imports in 2002. However, the country by product 
group-specifie structure reveals a diverse trade structure that could be exploited for 
policy purposes. 
Table 3.3 contains information on average HOT and IIT by product group 
and trading partner. Surprisingly, Tanzania has a substantial level of intra-industry 
trade relationship with USA in the Food and Animal product group. The average 
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index of 0.69 is greater than the average index with respect to Kenya and India, the 
two major developing nation-trading partners. Trade with' Germany, UK, 
Netherlands and Japan in this product category is mainly inter-industry. The UK, one 
of the leading destinations of export and origin of import of manufactured products, 
has a low HOT compared to Germany, Netherlands, Japan Kenya and India. Again, 
there is a substantial IIT with USA in this product category. The high IIT for ail 
countries in the machinery and equipments product group seems to suggest that 
Tanzania is an almost complete importer in this category, exporting very little, if any. 
Table 3.3: Average HOT and lIT 
Food and Beverages Crude material Manufactured 
Country 
Live AnimaIs and Tobacco lnedible except fuel Goods 
HOT IIT HOT IIT HOT lIT HOT IIT 
Germany 0.86 0.14 0.94 0.06 0.21 0.79 0.68 0.32 
UK 0.75 0.25 0.76 0.24 0.35 0.65 0.44 0.56 
N etherlands 0.76 0.24 0.87 0.13 0.46 0.54 0.59 0.41 
USA 0.32 0.68 nia nia 0.52 0.48 0.38 0.52 
]apan 0.66 0.34 nia nia 0.49 0:51 0.85 0.15 
Kenya 0.66 0.34 nia nia 0.48 0.52 0.62 0.38 
lndia 0.60 0.40 nia nia 0.59 0.41 0.73 0.27 
Source: Author's calculatton USlOg World Bank Data base and UN Comtrade. 
Note: Values are averages if available data between 1981 and 2002. 
Decomposition if Total Trade growth 
Machinery and 
Transport 
Equipment 
HOT lIT 
0.99 0.01 
0.97 0.03 
0.96 0.04 
0.98 0.02 
1.00 0.00 
0.76 0.24 
nia nia 
Having identified both inter-and-intra-industry trade relationshipsbetween Tanzania 
and its major trading partners, we now identify the contribution of inter-and-intra-
industry trade to growth in total trade in each product category. Growth in trade 
could result from growth in either inter-industry trade or intra-industry trade, or 
bOth' Table 3.4 shows the percentage contribution of each type of trade to total 
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Table 3.4: Decomposition of Total Trade Growth 
Product Group Country 1982-85 1986-89 1998-02 
TOT HOT liT TOT HOT liT TOT HOT liT 
Develo(!ed 
Food and live animais Germany -2.2 2.9 -5.1 16.2 15.2 1.0 13.8 11.9 1.9 
(100.0) (-134) (234.0) (100) (93.8) (6.1) (100.0) (86.2) (13.7) 
SITC Code-O UK 29.6 21.9 7.7 -6.3 -7.2 0.9 17.0 21.0 -4.0 
(100.0) (73.9) (26.0) (100.0) (112.6) (-13.9) (100.0) (123.5) (-3.5) 
Netherlands 48.1 27.2 21.0 8.8 6.8 2.1 74.7 50.2 24.5 
(100) (56.5) (43.5) (100.0) (76.4) (23.6) (100.0) (67.2) (32.8) 
USA -11.6 -4.4 -7.3 122.0 94.7 27.3 77.6 66.5 11.1 
(100.0) (37.4) (62.6) (100.0) (77.6) (22.4) (100.0) (85.7) (14.3) 
Japan -134.3 -125.4 -8.8 39.1 -0.7 39.7 14.4 18.5 -4.1 
(100.0) (93.4) (6.6) (100.0) (-1.7) (101.7) (100.0) (128.7) (-28.7) 
Develo(!ing 
Kenya -287.2 -311.5 24.4 405.5 101.3 304.2 -500.1 -592.9 92.8 
(100.0) (108.5) (-8.5) (100.0) (25.0) (75.0) (100.0) (118.6) (-18.6) 
Beverages and tobacco QevelQ(!ed 
SITC Code-1 Germany 69.9 62.2 7.7 61.8 56.8 4.9 -15.3 -16.6 1.3 
(100.0) (88.9) (11.1) (100.0) (92.1) (7.9) (100.0) (108.7) (-8.7) 
UK 24.1 -5.6 29.7 18.8 -9.2 27.9 67.2 -14.2 81.4 
(100.0) (-23.2) (123.3) (100.0) (-48.9) (149.0) (100.0) (21.1) (121.1) 
Netherlands -14.1 -16.4 2.3 8.9 8.6 0.2 17.6 0.7 16.9 
(100.0) (116.0) (-16) (100.0) (97.3) (2.5) (100.0) (4.0) (96.0) 
Crude materials,inedible,except fuel Developed 
SITC Code-2 Germany 5.1 5.2 -0.1 116.7 47.1 69.6 25.1 -0.4 25.4 
(100.0) (101.3) (-1.3) (100.0) (40.4) (59.6) (100.0) (-1.39) (101.4) 
UK -3.4 -5.2 1.8 38.5 23.5 15.0 -19.5 -22.1 2.7 
(100.0) (153.4) (53.7) (100.0) (61.1) (38.9) (100.0) (113.7) (-13.7) 
Netherlands 84.0 -71.5 12.1 62.1 29.3 32.7 30.6 21.6 9.0 
(100.0) (85.1) (14.4) (100.0) (47.3) (52.7) (100.00) (70.65) (29.30) 
USA 194.7 16.3 178.4 419.4 402.1 17.2 19.2 31.4 -12.2 
(100.0) (8.4) (91.6) (100.0) (95.9) (4.5) (100.0) (163.3) (-63.3) 
Japan 1010.1 959.7 50.4 0.8 -5.7 6.5 -2.3 -5.3 3.0 
(100.0) (95.0) (5.0) (100.0) (-733) (833.3) (100.0) (-229.43) (129.0) 
Developina 
Kenya 25.2 25.4 -0.2 894.5 29.7 864.9 40.1 34.1 5.9 
(100.0) (100.7) (-0.79) (100.0) (3.3) (96.7) (100.00) (85.23) (14.77) 
India 33.6 2.7 30.9 -78.4 -12.1 -66.3 133.4 102.6 30.8 
(100.0) (8.1) (91.9) (100.0) (15.4) (84.6) (100.0) (76.9) (23.1) 
Manufactured goods classifled chief Developed 
SITC Code-6 Germany 94.8 -4.9 99.7 21.3 14.3 7.0 9.2 17.4 -8.2 
(100.0) (-5.2) (105.2) (100.0) (67.2) (33) (100.0) (189.8) (-89.8) 
UK 124.0 51.5 72.5 5.0 18.1 -13.0 28.1 6.0 22.1 
(100,0) (41.5) (58.5) (100.0) (358.4) (-258,4) (100.0) (21,4) (78.6) 
Netherlands 43.1 10.9 32.2 26.9 26.5 0.4 3736.2 2865.9 870.3 
(100.0) (25.2) (74.8) (100,0) (98.5) (1,5) (100.0) (76.7) (23.3) 
USA 50.2 22.9 27.4 76.7 79.7 -3.0 -68.3 -80.3 11.9 
(100.0) (45.5) (54.5) (100.0) (103.9) (-3.9) (100,0) (117.5) (17.5) 
Japan 4.0 4.1 -0.2 11.1 11.5 -0.4 31.9 21.2 7.9 
(100) (104,1) (-4.09) (100) (103,8) (-3.7) (100) (66,45) (24.7) 
Developing 
Kenya 8.3 -3.6 11.8 196.0 103.6 92.4 -5.0 -13.1 8.1 
(100,0) (-43,3) (143.3) (100.0) (52.9) (47.1) (100.0) (261.4) (161.4) 
Machinery and transport equipment Developed 
SITC Code-7 Germany -3.3 -4.5 1.2 1.9 -0.1 2.0 738.4 42.0 696.5 
(100,0) (135.4) (-35.4) (100.0) (-5,7) (105,7) (100.0) (5.7) (94,3) 
UK -45.6 -47.1 1.5 33.2 9.7 23.5 81.5 6.2 75.4 
(100.0) (103.3) (-3,3) (100.0) (29,2) (70,8) (100.0) (7.6) (92.4) 
Netherlands 6.5 0.7 5.8 22.7 23.0 -0.3 240.2 -240.9 -0.7 
(100.0) (10.1) (89.9) (100.0) (101.3) (-1.3) (100.0) (100.3) (-0.3) 
Develo(!ing 
Kenya -6.4 -6.4 0.0 1327.2 6.9 1320.3 341.8 9.2 332.6 
(100.0) (100.0) 0.0 (100.0) (0.5) (99,5) (100.0) (2.7) (97.3) 
Source: Authors' calculation using World Bank Data base and UN Comtrade. 
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trade growth in each product category (refer to Appendix C for the calculations) for 
the periods 1982-85, 1986-1989, and 1998-200241 respectively. For each product 
group, TOT, HOT, and IIT represent the growth in total trade, inter-industry trade 
and intra-industry trade respectively. The figures in parentheses are the percentage 
contribution to total trade growth. 
·With the exception ofJapan and USA, growth in trade in manufactured goods 
and machinery and equipments, over the years, is largely due to increases in intra-
industry trade. On the other hand, inter-industry trade growth is the main contributor 
to total trade growth in the food and live animal category among the EU countries. 
However, intra-industry trade has been the force behind trade with J apan in this 
product category over the years. An interesting pattern emerges from a comparison 
of growth in total trade with Kenya between the 1986-1989 and 1998-2002 periods. 
First, the growth rates in ail product groups are larger for the 1986-1989 period than 
for the1998-2002 period. Second, with the exception of growth performance for 
crude materials and inedible product group in 1998-2002, growth in intra-industry 
trade is largely responsible for total trade growth in the two periods (an evidence of 
Linder's hypothesis)42. Trade growth for UK and Germany in the manufactured 
goods and machinery and equipments has mainly been due to growth in intra-
industry trade. 
41 These periods were chosen due to data availability. 
42 Linder (1961) predicted that most trade in the world should occur between similarly endowed countries. 
In her demand side trade theory, Linder believes that the pattern of trade derives from "overlapping 
demand". That is, countries general1y produce goods for the domestic market and export the surplus to 
countries that have demand pattern similar to the exporting country. 
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3.3 The Gravit y Model Approach to Trade Analysis 
The intensity and structural approaches to bilateral trade discussed earlier 
acknowledge the interdependence of levels of bilateral trade on different trade routes. 
They provide the starting point of the analysis of the effect of trade barriers on trade 
pattern. However, they do not provide answers to questions about the effects of 
resistance to a country's total export or import levels or potential levels of trade. 
These questions are best answered within the framework of the gravity model of 
trade. 
Tinbergen's pioneering use of the gravity equation made bilateral trade levels 
a function of two important economic variables: trade en forcement variables, 
including a measure of national output of both importing and exporting countries; 
and trade resistance variables, including distance, a dummy variable for common 
membership of a preferential area, and a dummy variable for common border. 
Output of the exporting country represents the ability to supply and the output of 
the importing country represents the propensity to demand. Hence, trade flows are 
expected to be positively related to theexporting and importing countries output. 
After being popularized by Linneman (1966), the gravity equation has been applied in 
many diverse ways including testing for the effect of preferential trading 
arrangements on bilateral trade, and testing the validity of the Linder hypothesis. 
Aitkin (1973) also applied the model to regional arrangements when he considered 
the effects of EEC and EFTA membership on trade flows by estimating a gravity 
equation for bilateral trade flows and including dummy variables which equalled unity 
when both countries were members of one or other regional grouping. Among a few 
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of a more recent applications of the model in the same spirit as Aitkin are the 
Eichengreen and Irwin (1998) study, which used the model to investigate the 
historical path dependence of trade patterns, and the Frankel, et al (1998) study, 
which used the model to explore the effects of preferential trade agreements on trade 
flows. 
Other studies have focused on examining the nature of trade determinants 
both in the short- to medium-term and the long term. One of the early works of this 
type is Bryan (1974) who estimated parameters for a gravity model by examining the 
experience of Canada's bilateral trade relationship with various countries 
disaggregated by commodity type. He found that the relative importance of various 
trade en forcement and resistance variables varied considerably across commodities. 
His findings also indicated that transportation costs are more significant determinants 
of bilateral trade levels in some commodities than in others. His interesting 
conclusion is that international transport costs are generally more important 
determinants of bilateral trade flow than tariffs. Linneman (1966) was the first to 
introduce a variable representing complementarity of commodities between two 
trading partners. He used a scalar product of two vectors representing the 
commodity composition of the exporting country's total exports and the importing 
country's total imports, as a measure of his complementarity variable. One significant 
conclusion is that the effect of the distance variable in lowering trade levels may 
operate through factors other than transportation costs. Other studies have 
investigated the effect of some measure of prices on trade. However, results have not 
been uniform. Karemera et ai, (1999) augmented the traditional gravity model by 
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including export and import unit priees and real exchange rate variables. They found 
mixed results on imports and exports priee elasticities, though the real exchange 
variable had the required sign. Tongzon and Felmingham (1998), and Harris and 
Matyas (1998) had earlier found limited or no relationship between real exchange 
rates and trade. 
Despite its wide application in terms of number of countries, level of 
aggregation of data and rime period, the gravity equation has been criticized as being 
ad hoc, lacking any theoretical foundation. This is now not true. Several researchers 
have showed that a gravity-type equation can arise from a wide variety of trade 
models. These can be grouped into four main streams. First, the Helpman and 
Krugman (1985) general equilibrium model with simple monopolistic competition 
and economies of scale predicts that consumers in each country will wish to import 
differentiated products of ail other countries, so that trade volumes should be related 
to the size of both importing and exporting countries (intra-trade relationship). 
Second, Bergstrand (1985) and Anderson (1979) derive the gravity equation from 
models that assume that products are differentiated by country of ongm (the 
Armington assumption). Their derived gravity equations included eertain priee 
variables in addition to the tradition al variables. Third, Bergstrand (1989, 1990) 
assumes Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) monopolistic competition and therefore products 
differentiation among firms rather than among countries. The derived gravity 
equation is similar to his earlier one. Fourth, Deardorff (1995) model is similar to that 
of Anderson (1979) and Bergstrand (1985) exeept for the souree of product 
differentiation. He motivated the differentiation among products by the Heckscher-
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Ohlin (H-O) model's case of non-factor priee equalization and specialization rather 
than by the Armington assumption. 
Reeently, there has been some criticism on the econometric techniques used 
in estimating the gravity equation in terms of the inclusion of dummy variables to 
capture the regional integration effect, and the lack of attention paid to spatial 
econometrics. Polak (1996), Matyas (1997) and Egger (2000) have demonstrated that 
the inclusion of trading block dummies to determine the effect of trade blocks on 
trade leads to model misspecification from the econometric point of view. They, 
therefore, suggested that the inclusion of local, time and target specifie parameters 
should capture the trading block effect. With regard to spatial econometrics, Porojan 
(2000) has shown that the tradition al empirical work on the gravity equation of trade 
that does not take into consideration the role of location, fails to remain applicable in 
the spatial context. His empirical estimation showed that the traditional formulation 
overestimates the size of trade flows to and from island countries, while 
underestimating it for border countries. More significantly, he found that the large 
explanatory power of regional trading bloc membership dummy variables vanishes 
when spatial effects are included in the model specification. 
There has been limited application of the model to empirical examination of 
the determinants of trade or the trade benefit of economic integration of Sub-
Saharan African (SSA) nations. One significant study on the se countries is by Hannik 
and Owusu (1998), who investigate whether the formation of ECOWAS has 
promoted trade among its members. Using a trade intensity index as a dependent 
variable, they found that, though the total volume of trade within SSA is not large by 
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international standard, trade flows within ECOWAS are strong when considered on a 
relative basis. Oguledo (1996) also used a modified gravity model to investigate the 
effect of ECOW AS on trade flows. His results suggest that beside the positive 
ECOW AS integration effect, economic growth in the region is the strongest 
determinant of trade flows. Foroutan and Pritchett (1993) used the gravity model to 
investigate if the level of intra Sub-Saharan African (SSA) trade is below what one 
would expect. Their gravity model predicted very weil the low level of intra SSA 
trade. 
None of the studies on the developing countries used panel data exclusively 
for one country for their empirical analysis; hence, the coefficients obtained from 
their regressions are averages for ail the countries included in the study. We diverge 
from that approach by using panel data on bilateral trade between Tanzania and its 
trading partners. Hence, our coefficients are specifie to Tanzania. We believe this is 
the appropriate approach since we are interested in identifying the opportunities that 
could be exploited to make the export-Ied development strategy in Tanzania a reality. 
The empirical analysis we undertake is an attempt to fill the vacuum created by the 
current stock of empirical work on developing countries using the gravity model. Our 
approach is similar to that of Bryan (1974)43. 
43 Bryan (1974) estimated parameters for a gravity model by examining the experience of Canada's bilateral 
trade flows with various countries disaggregated by commodity type. However, we did not use 
disaggregated trade data. 
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3.3.1 Theoretical Framework of the Gravit y Model 
The traditional gravity equation contains three variables: economic factors affecting 
trade in the exporting country; economic factors affecting trade in the importing 
country; and other natural or artificial trade facilitating or trade restricting factors. 
The standard variables included in the basic gravity equation are income of both the 
importing and· exporting countries, and distance. Income of the importing country 
represents the purchasing power or its absorption capacity, while the Income for the 
exporting country represents the country's production and supply capacity. Distance 
is used as a proxy for transportation cost. The basic relationship is given as: 
where Tyt is trade variable between country i and country j at time t, ~t (Y;t) is a 
measure of income of country i (;) at rime t, [Ji (i = 1 ........ 3) are parameters of the 
equation, DIS'F;j is the distance between countries i and j and Uijt is a white noise 
disturbance term. AH variables are in logs. 
To derive equation (3.5) above, we foHow the Deardorff (1995, 1998) 
theoretical foundation of the gravity equation, which is explicitly derived from the H-
o model44 First, let us assume that there are barrier to trade, such as transportation 
44 The uniqueness of the mode! is its explicit connection with the H-O model and the realistic assumption 
of non-factor priee equalization. Most trade theorists believe that the gravity equation cannot be derived 
from the H-O model. For instance, Leamer (1974) used both the gravity equation and the H-O mode! as 
the basis for the explanatory variables in his regression analysis of trade flows, but did not integrate the 
two approaches theoretically. Helpman (1997) interpreted the close fit of his gravity equation as supportive 
evidence for the monopolistic competitive mode! he used. He then concluded that the gravity equation 
does not arise from other models. Feenstral et al (2001) have provided a more direct attack on the H-O 
mode!'s ability to derive the gravity equation. They claim that the H-O model of international trade is 
incapable of providing the foundation for the gravity equation. 
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co st and that there is non factor price equalization (non-FPE).45 The assumption of 
non-FPE is important because, if we ailow factor price equalization (FPE) with 
positive transportation cost, then for a given pair of countries neither country's 
producers could compete with domestic producers in the other's market, since the 
exporter will have to pay positive transportation cost and domestic producers will 
not. We further assume that there are many goods than there are factors of 
production and that transportation cost is fixed (It does not vary with the amount 
transported).46 With non-FPE, a case can be made that only a negligible subset of ail 
goods will be exported to a common market by any two countries.47 In such a 
situation consumers in a given country will more likely be buying each good from a 
single country's producers. This is very close to assuming that there will be a single 
exporter of each good in the world. We foilow Deardorff to make that assumption 
and even go further to assume that each good is produced in only one country.48 
Now, let transportation costs between countries i and j be such that the 
transportation factor (one plus the transportation cost) is tv". Bence, a fraction (tv". - 1) 
of the goods shipped from country i to country j is used up in transportation in 
country J Seilers in country i receive a single price Pi, for their product, but buyers in 
market j will pay tijPi since they must pay the transportation co st. To determine the 
pattern of trade, consumer preferences are assumed to be identical and Cobb-
45 In general the H-O model permits equilibria with both factor price equalization (FPE) and non-factor 
price equalization (non-FPE) among groups of countries. 
46 However, the transportation cost varies with distance. 
47 The only situation that will allow two countries to be exporting the same goods to a cornmon market is 
when the difference in factor cost between them is offset by an equal and opposite difference in 
transportation co st 
48 This source of country specifie differentiated goods is different from the Armington assurnption that 
national origin matters because there really are differentiated goods. 
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Douglas. That is, they spend a fixed proportion Pi of their incorne on the product of 
country i. Let Xi be the output of country i. Country i's incorne, Y; is: 
(3.6) 
where Y; ( ~) is the incorne of country i (the incorne of country ;), and y w is the 
incorne of the world. On a cost, insurance and freight (c.i.±) basis we get 
.j. YY T~' = f3 y = _'_J 
Ij i J yw (3.7) 
On a free on board (f.o.b) basis, where transportation cost plays a role, the value of 
exports frorn country i to country j (T'th) will be reduced by the arnount of 
transportation cost: 
YiYj 
T'th = {Ji ~. = w (3.8) 
tijY 
Sin ce the transportation cost is related to distance, equation (3.8) is similar to the 
standard gravity equation (3.5) which states that the value of trade between two 
countries depend positively on their respective incornes and negatively on the 
distance between thern. However, equation (3.8) does not explicidy show how 
bilateral expenditures on international trade decline with distance. This is due to the 
assurned Cobb-Douglas type of preferences. To explicidy ailow trade to decline with 
distance, we assume that preferences are instead Constant Elasticity Substitution 
(CES) type. Let consurners in country j rnaximize the foilowing CES utility function 
defined on the products of ail countries i. (indu ding their own): 
. ( (a-l)J(a~l) 
U J = "{JC. a L....i 1 Ij (3.9) 
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where cr > 0 is the common elasticity of substitution between any two countries' 
products. Their income from producing X j is 
(3.10) 
Facing the cost insuranee and freight (c.i.f) priees tij~ consumers in country j will 
maximize (3.9) subject to (3.10) and consume: 
( J
I-a 
_ 1 tij~ 
c--Y. -
Ij tP JJ1 pl 
Ij 1 J 
(3.11) 
Where P; is the pnee of product J~ Xi is the output of country J~ Cij is the 
consumption of product i in country j and p;I is a CES priee index of landed priees 
in country j expressed as: 
1 
pl = (" fJi-a p i - a JI-a) 
J \Li l!l 1 
Therefore the f.o. b value of exports from country i to country j is: 
( J
I-a 
. tP Tfob = ~ YfJ . .JI........!... 
U t J 1 pl 
U J 
(3.12) 
(3.13) 
In the CES case, the parameter ~i is no longer country t's share of world 
income, henee, equation (3.13) does not easily reduee to the standard gravity 
equation. We therefore need to make sorne adjustments. Let Bi be country t's share of 
wOrld income: 
(3.14) 
From equation (3.14) 
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1'; 1 
yw [J1-a 
" e. tijF; L...Jj J pl 
J 
Substituting (3.15) into (3.13) we get 
TM = 1';~ ~ 
Ij yw t 
Ij 
( J
I-a 
tu 
pl 
J 
" e (~J1_a 
L...Jh h p/ 
h 
(3.15) 
(3.16) 
It is not easy to interpret equation (3.16) in terms of the relationship between 
distance and the value of trade. To facilitate that, we first normalize each country's 
product price, F;, at unity. Then pi becomes a CES index of country;'s transport 
factors as an importer. This index also represents the average distance from suppliers 
and can be represented as; 
1 
OS (" f3 1-a ~ 
j = \Li /U j'-a (3.17) 
We further assume that what matters for the demand of a product along a particular 
route is the transport factor ti} relative to the average distance from suppliers, which is 
(3.18) 
With the notations in (3.17) and (3.18), the trade flow in (3.16) becomes 
(3.19) 
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Equation (3.19) is the final gravity equation. It says that if importing country j's 
relative distance from exporting country i is the same as an average of aIl other 
importers' relative distances from i, then exports from i to j will be the same as in the 
Cobb-Douglas case (equation 3.8). However, ifj's relative distance from i is greater 
than the average of aIl other importers' relative distance, then bila ter al trade between 
country j and country i will be less. 
Having discussed the theoretical foundation of the gravity model, we next 
proceed with the empirical analysis. It must be recalled that our goal is to determine 
the applicability of the gravity model to trade between a single developing country 
(Tanzania) and its major trading partners (a combination of developed and 
developing nations). We are also interested in appropriately determining if a 
particular country or a collection of countries (regional integration) account for a 
significant part of Tanzania's trade beyond the prediction of the tradition al gravity 
model. 
3.3.2 Data 
The data for this study compnses bilateral trade data between Tanzania and 24 
countries from 1980 to 2002 (refer to Appendix C.2 for a list of countries included). 
Not aIl countries were observed for every year due to missing values. In total there 
were 524 observations on annuaI bilateral trade flows. The sample includes developed 
countries, mostly European Union countries, and developing countries. Various 
sources of data were used. Trade data was obtained from the UN-COMTRADE 
database and data on GDP (which represents income in the gravity equation) was 
160 
obtained from World Bank database. The distance data, measured as air distance 
between Tanzania and capital cities of trading partners, was obtained from the 
University of Michigan Geographie Name Server and Supplementary database of 
world cities. 
3.3.3 Econometrie Issues and Estimation Results 
Before embarking on the empirieal estimation of the model, we discuss some 
econometric issues related to using the gravity equation to de termine the effect of 
trading blocks on trade flows. Traditional1y, trus is do ne by augmenting the standard 
gravity equation (3.5) with a regional dummy variable whieh takes the value "1" if a 
country belongs to the regional trade block of interest and "0" otherwise. This 
econometric technique has been criticized by Polak (1996), Matyas (1997) and Egger 
(2000). They have demonstrated and recommended that when testing for trading 
block effects in the gravity framework, individual country dummies should be 
included in the equation instead of regional dummies. 49 Hence, the correct 
econometric representation of the gravity equation with trading block effect takes the 
form: 
(3.19) 
where ai is the local country effect, i = 1 ..... ... N; Yj is the target country effect,j = 
1 ..... ... N + 1; 1;"1 is the income in country i at rime t, ~I is the income in country j at 
49 In addition to providing better results, the recommended procedure also allows the researcher to 
de termine other specifie country effects for countries in the sample that do not belong to the trading 
blocks of interest. 
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cime t, DISTij is the distance between countries i and j and Uijl is a white noise 
disturbance term. In matrix form the unrestricted equation (3.19) can be written as: 
(3.20) 
where Z is the matrix of observations of the traditional gravity explanatory variables 
DJ is (N2xT ~(Nx1) matrix of target dummy variables, and DNis (IN ®INT) matrix of 
local dummy variables. In a matrix form, the tradition al restricted way of testing for 
the trading block effects is: 
T = DB+Z[J+U (3.21) 
where 1 is a vector of ones, D is a vector of dummy variables representing 
membership of a regional trading block of interest, B is the parameter vector of the 
dummies in D , and Z is as previously defined. 
In a simple matrix algebra, it can be shown that the column vectors of D can 
be expressed as a linear combination of the column vectors of the matrices DN and 
DJ' Hence, if any of the parameters on DN and DJ (denoted as a*andy*) were 
significant in equation (3.20) then B is significant in equation (3.21) and vice versa. 
This is simply due to the misspecification of equation (3.21) which can lead to 
incorrect inference. This analysis shows that we should not use the significant of the 
parameters (B) to judge the effect of trading blocks. Hence, we intend to empirically 
show that the proper procedure is to escimate a gravity equation with specific country 
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dummies and use an appropriate weighting scheme. to calculate the overail trading 
block effects.50 
We began the empirical estimation of the model by performing two important 
diagnosis tests. First, some gravity model studies (Yamarik and Ghosh, 2005, Lee and 
Park, 2005, Tinbergen, 1962 and Poyonen, 1963) assume that the coefficients on the 
income of importing and exporting countries are the same, and impose the 
relationship rather than test for it. We proceeded by testing the hypothesis rather 
than imposing it. For ail of the results reported below, the Wald coefficient test 
overwhelmingly rejected the nuil hypothesis of equality of the income elasticities 
between source and target countries. Secondly, we tested for heteroscedasticity in ail 
regressions using the Breusch-Pagan test, and concluded that the error terms of each 
regression were correlated with the regressors. We, therefore, corrected the error 
term of ail regressions for heteroscedasticity using White's procedure. 51 
Table 3.5 shows the OLS estimates of the gravity model (equation 3.5) using 
ail countries in our sample. We estimated the model separately for imports and 
exports as weil as for total trade. This was motivated by the observation from our 
earlier discussion that the pattern of imports and exports differs significantly52. The 
first column contains the results for imports. Ail variables have the right signs and are 
significant. An increase in Tanzania's income leads to increase in purchasing power 
and, hence, to increases in imports. Likewise an increase in the exporting country's 
50 This method of estimating the gravity equation with specifie country dummies is the same as estimating 
a fixed effect model. In this case, the corresponding random effect mode! is the traditional gravity equation 
without any regional trading block dummies (equation 3.5). 
51 As Woodridge (2002) argued heteroscedastic robust procedures result in valid t and F statistics even 
with the presence of heteroscedasticity. 
52 By country specifie import and export intensity indices. 
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incorne leads to an increase in exports to Tanzania. The incorne elasticities are below 
0.5, indicating that Tanzania's imports are less sensitive to its incorne and that of its 
trading partners. The distance variable is significant at the 1 percent level. It is not 
surprising that Tanzania's imports are relatively more sensitive to distance than 
incorne levels: the increase in distance norrnaily leads to the increase in the cost of 
transportation and in the "tif' value of imports. With the continuous depreciation of 
the Tanzanian shilling over the 22-year period, retail prices of imports (in local 
currency), hence dernand becorne 
Table 3.5: The Basic Gravity Regression 
Variables Import Export Trade 
Constant -1.24 0.12 1.73 
(-0.47) (-0.05) (-0.89) 
GDPjt 0.33 0.14 0.23 
(7.26)*** (3.67)*** (6.90)*** 
GD Pit 0.47 0.27 0.32 
(1.97)** (1.21) (1.58) 
Distanceij -0.51 -0.25 -0.45 
(-3.06)*** (-1.93) (-4.00)*** 
Number of 
Observation 524 523 523 
Adjusted- R 2 0.14 0.12 0.22 
F-statistics 22.28 15.56 28.65 
Note: The figures in parenthesis are the absolute values of the t-statistics. **means 
significance at 5% level and *** means 1 % significance level. 
sensitive with distance. The second colurnn shows the results for exports. Though ail 
variables have the expected signs, Tanzania's GDF has no significant effect on the 
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flow of exports. The distance elasticity is also less than that of imports. This may 
indicate that Tanzania's trading partners are less likely to be sensitive to 
transportation costs since Tanzania's exports are largely dominated by primary goods, 
which command low prices on the international commodity market. The third 
column shows the result for total trade. If the model is correct and captures ail the 
variables that explain trade, then Tanzania's income level has no effect on its trade 
relationship with its trading partners. However, distance and the income of its trading 
partners are significant in determining the flow of trade. 
We next tested for the effect of regional trade groups on Tanzania's trade 
flows. Traditionaily, this is done by the introduction of a regional dummy which takes 
the value "1" if a country belongs to the regional trade group of interest and "0" 
otherwise. As already mentioned, this econometric technique has been criticized by 
Polak (1996), Matyas, (1997), Matyas et al, (1997), and Egger (2000). They show that 
the inclusion of regional integration dummies to determine the effect of trade blocks 
on trade leads to model mis specification econometric estimation., They suggest the 
inclusion of local and target specific parameters to cater for the trading block effect 
when using panel data. Since we are using panel data from only Tanzania's 
perspective, we cannot include the local variable. 
Table 3.6 shows results of the test of the significance of sub regional trade 
groups when the basic gravity model is augmented with regional dummies (the 
EUDUM and EACDUM for EU and EAC dummies respectively). Correspondingly, 
tables 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9 show the results for imports, exports and trade respectively, of 
the test of the significance of sub ~egional trade groups when the basic gravity model 
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is augmented with country specifie dummies. On the basis of the adjusted R-squared 
and F-statistics, the inclusion of the EU and EAC53 dummies did not significandy 
improve the explanatory power of the model. Ail variables in ail three regressions are 
significant at the 1 percent level, with the exception of the Tanzanian income 
variable, which is not significant in any regression but has the right sign. Both 
regional integration dummies carried a negative sign, implying that both EU and 
EAC have impacted negatively on trade between Tanzania and members of the two 
trade blocks. These results are at odds with 
Table 3.6: Gravity Model with Regional Dummies 
Variables Import Export Trade 
Constant 18.48 23.16 17.6 
(3.67)*** (6.66)*** (5.29)*** 
GDPjt 0.53 0.33 0.37 
(9.55)*** (7.79)*** (10.43)*** 
GDPit 0.44 0.41 0.27 
(1.75) (1.53) (1.37) 
Distanceij -2.8 -2.8 -2.33 
(-5.64)*** (-5.64)*** (-7.19)*** 
EUDUM -1.18 -0.92 -0.71 
(-6.01 )*** (-6.63)*** (-5.93)*** 
EACDUM -4.95 -5.96 -4.08 
(-4.35)*** (-7.93)*** (-5.93)*** 
Number of 
Observation 524 523 523 
Adjusted- R 2 0.17 0.14 0.24 
F-statistics 23.92 17.66 29.51 
Notes: The figures in parenthesis are the absolute values of the t~statistics. **means 
significance at 5% level and *** means 1 % significance level. EUDUM AND EACDUM 
represent regional trading block dummies for the European Union and the East Africa 
Community respectively. 
53 The EAC dummy also captures the border effect since Kenya and Uganda are the only 
countries in the sample that share common border with Tanzania. 
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our earlier conclusion of the analysis of imports and exports intensities. Hence, it is 
likely that this model is misspecified. The distance variable in ail three regression did 
not only increase in precision but also increased in size by almost five times for both 
imports and total trade regressions and eight times for the export regression. 
The second method (estimates reported in table 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9 for imports, 
exports and trade respectively) involves including a dummy variable for aIl trading 
partners54. AlI three regressions improved significandy in terms of the variation in the 
trade variables eXplained by the regressors. Hence, the variables included in the 
regression explain very weIl the movements in the trade variables. In terms of signs 
and significance, aIl the tradition al gravity variables had the right signs and, with the 
exception of the distance variable in the import equations, are significant at the 1 
percent level. Once again, the income elasticities were below unity and less than the 
distance elasticity. We can, therefore, confidendy infer that cost considerations are 
relatively more important than production and absorption capacity in Tanzania's 
trade relationship with her trading partners. 
The coefficients of the country specifie dummies could be interpreted as the 
extent of the openness of the trading partners (in terms of the exports regres sion) , 
the extent of Tanzania's openness to the partners (in terms of' the imports 
regres sion) , and [maily for the openness relationship between Tanzania and each 
partner (in terms of total trade regression). They could also be interpreted as a 
regional effect so long as the appropriate weighting scheme is used to take the 
weighted average of individual trading partners belonging to a particular trade block. 
54 We excluded one country dummy (Canada) in aIl regressions instead of restricting them to sum to unity 
as Matyas et al. (1997) did. 
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Table 3.7: Gravity Model With Country Dummies-Imports 
Variables Parameter Estimates t-Statistics 
Constant -3.65 (-0.68) 
GDPjt 0.65 (8.53)*** 
GDPit 0.38 (2.81)*** 
Distanceij -0.68 (1.98)** 
UKDUM 1.73 (6.06)*** 
GERDUM 0.88 (2.70)*** 
ITDUM 0.81 (2.16)** 
USADUM -0.31 (-1.00) 
]PNDUM 0.08 (0.21) 
CHNDUM 0.73 (3.36)*** 
NETHDUM 1.36 (5.24)*** 
INDDUM 4.44 (9.53)*** 
UGADUM -0.72 (-0.58) 
KENDUM 1.31 (2.35)** 
SWITDUM 0.07 (0.27) 
SWEDUM 1.21 (4.92)*** 
SPNDUM -1.55 (-5.25)*** 
GRCDUM -2.01 (-5.06)*** 
PRTDUM -1.87 (-6.84)*** 
DNKDUM 1.21 (4.75)*** 
FINDUM 0.61 (2.45)** 
FRNDUM -0.34 (-1.12) 
MALDUM -0.17 (-0.63) 
SGPDUM 1.61 (5.80)*** 
AUSDUM -0.42 (-1.85) 
HKGDUM 0.87 (3.87)*** 
Number of 
Observation 524 
Adjusted- R2 0.81 
F-statistics 91.15 
Notes: The figures in parenthesis are the absolute values of the t-statistics. **means significance at 5% 
level and *** means 1 % significance level. UKDUM, GERDUM, ITDUM, USADUM, ]PNDUM, 
CHNDUM, NETHDUM, INDDUM, UGADUM, KENDUM, SWITDUM, SWEDUM, SPNDUM, 
GRCDUM, PRTDUM, DNKDUM, FINDUM, FRNDUM, MALDUM, SGPDUM, AUSDUM, and 
HNKDUM represent country dummy variables for United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, USA, ]apan, China, 
The Netherlands, Inrua Uganda, Kenya, Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, and Hong Kong respectively. 
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Table 3.8: Gravity Model With Country Dummies-Exports 
Variables Parameter Estimates t-Statistics 
Constant 3.43 (6.93)*** 
GDPjt 0.31 (3.95)*** 
GDPit 0.29 (2.17)** 
Distanceij -4.31 (-7.78)*** 
UKDUM 1.18 (4.37)*** 
GERDUM 1.85 (3.80)*** 
ITDUM -0.91 (-2.57)*** 
USADUM 1.86 (6.11)*** 
JPNDUM 2.11 (8.06)*** 
CHNDUM -0.48 (-2.22)** 
NETHDUM 0.98 (4.11)*** 
INDDUM 1.53 (3.60)*** 
UGADUM -7.7 (-6.84)*** 
KENDUM 0.42 (-3.94)*** 
SWITDUM -1.05 (-4.01)*** 
SWEDUM -1.54 (-6.84)*** 
SPNDUM -1.36 (-4.98)*** 
GRCDUM -2.86 (-7.66)*** 
PRTDUM 0.43 (1.76) 
DNKDUM -0.75 (-3.23)*** 
FINDUM -0.32 (-1.42) 
FRNDUM -0.86 (-2.93)*** 
MALDUM -0.66 (-2.63)*** 
SGPDUM 0.64 (2.57)*** 
AUSDUM 0.07 (0.31) 
HKGDUM 1.11 (5.19)*** 
Number of 
Observation 523 
Adjusted- R2 0.72 
F-statistics 47.54 
Notes: The figures in parenthesis are the absolute values of the t-statistics. **means significance at 5% 
level and *** means 1 % significance level. UKDUM, GERDUM, ITDUM, USADUM, JPNDUM, 
CHNDUM, NETHDUM, INDDUM, UGADUM, KENDUM, SWITDUM, SWEDUM, SPNDUM, 
GRCDUM, PRTDUM, DNKDUM, FINDUM, FRNDUM, MALDUM, SGPDUM, AUSDUM, and 
HNKDUM represent country dummy variables for United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, USA, Japan, China, 
The Netherlands, India Uganda, Kenya, Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, and Hong Kong respectively. 
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Table 3.9: Gravity Mode1 With Country Dummies-Trade 
Variables Parameter Estimates t-Statistics 
Constant 5.44 (1.36) 
GDPjt 0.46 (7.56)*** 
GDPit 0.28 (2.61)*** 
Distanceij -1.19 (-2.69)*** 
UKDUM 1.71 (7.88)*** 
GERDUM 1.21 (4.84)*** 
ITDUM 0.61 (2.11)** 
USADUM 0.38 (1.73) 
JPNDUM 0.69 (3.34)*** 
CHNDUM 0.58 (3.36)*** 
NETHDUM 1.31 (6.77)*** 
INDDUM 3.36 (9.82)*** 
UGADUM -1.34 (-1.48) 
KENDUM 0.65 (2.24)** 
SWITDUM -0.11 (-0.49) 
SWEDUM 0.68 (3.77)*** 
SPNDUM -1.21 (-5.50)*** 
GRCDUM -1.72 (-5.75)*** 
PRTDUM 0.17 (0.86) 
DNKDUM 0.71 (3.77)*** 
FINDUM 0.29 (1.62) 
FRNDUM -0.27 (-1.16) 
MALDUM -0.21 (-1.05) 
SGPDUM 1.27 (6.31)*** 
AUSDUM -0.41 (-2.26)*** 
HKGDUM 0.93 (5.45)*** 
Numberof 
Observation 523 523 
Adjusted- R2 0.72 0.79 
F-statistics 47.54 56.57 
Notes: The figures in parenthesis are the absolute values of the t-statistics. **means significance at 5% 
level and *** means 1 % significance level. UKDUM, GERDUM, ITDUM, USADUM, JPNDUM, 
CHNDUM, NETHDUM, INDDUM, UGADUM, KENDUM, SWITDUM, SWEDUM, SPNDUM, 
GRCDUM, PRTDUM, DNKDUM, FINDUM, FRNDUM, MALDUM, SGPDUM, AUSDUM, and 
HNKDUM represent country dummy variables for United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, USA, Japan, China, 
The Netherlands, India Uganda, Kenya, Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, and Hong Kong respectively. 
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The dummy for Kenya is significant in the import, export, and trade regressions, 
confirming the significance of Kenya as Tanzania's tradingpartner, just as the import 
and export intensity indices showed. The dummy for Uganda is consistently negative 
in aIl three regressions, but only significant in the export equation. Using the average 
proportion of trade over the entire period as the weight for the EAC members, we 
obtained 0.284 as the effect of EAC on Tanzania trade. This suggests that the EAC 
has had a moderate positive effect on trade between Tanzania and the other 
members. The effect is relatively smaIl when compared with those of other 
developing nations, such as India and China (3.36 and 0.58 respectively). However, 
su ch results must be interpreted with caution since the volume of unofficial trade 
among the EAC members is large enough to affect on the results of any empirical 
study of trade relationship within the community. 
J apan appeared to be the most open economy to Tanzania, as it has the 
strongest propensity to export, foIlowed by USA, while Tanzania's propensity to 
import is the highest with India, foIlowed by UK. OveraIl trade propensity is also 
highest with India, with a coefficient almost twice as large as that of the next highest, 
which is UK. Other non-EU countries that have open trade relationships with 
Tanzania are China, Singapore and Hong Kong as their respective country dummies 
in the total trade regression are significant and have positive coefficients. However, 
China is relatively closed to Tanzania since the China dummy in the export regression 
is negative and significant. As a result, the importance of having an open trade 
relationship with China in both directions cannot be overemphasized. 
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Most of the EU countries' dummies are positive and significant. In the import 
regression, Tanzania is relatively less open to France, Portugal, Greece, and Spain. 
On the other hand, European economies such as, Finland, Denmark, Sweden and, 
surprisingly, Italy are relatively closed to Tanzania in terms of exports. Among the 
EU countries, UK, Germany and Netherlands are the most open economies to 
Tanzania in terms of providing markets for Tanzania's exports as weil as providing 
sources of Tanzania's imports. The overail EU effect on Tanzania's total trade, which 
is a weighted average of the individual dummy coefficient, is 0.2825.55 The results 
clearly demonstrate the superiority, in terms of model specification, of including 
country specifie variables in the gravity model when investigating the effect of 
regional integration on bilateral trade. 
3.4 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
The increasing desire of many developing nations to pursue an export growth 
development strategy has led to increased emphasize on regional integration among 
developing countries. Most of the countries have also pursued trade policies that are 
supposed to open national economies to foreign competition, and to grant them 
increased access to the ever-expanding international market. This has generated a lot 
of studies whose results are intended for policy analysis. For this purpose, we have 
demonstrated that it is important to use the right model specification for the 
econometric analysis, especiaily when testing for the effect of trading blocks on 
bilateral trade relationships. Hence, in this paper, we have carefuily used the gravity 
55 We used the respective EU shares of total trade as the weights for each country. 
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model to investigate the effect of trading blocks on Tanzania's bilateral trade. We 
have also used a comprehensive measure to determine the trend in the trade intensity 
and the structure of Tanzania's bilateral trade with its major trading partners. 
Contrary to a popular view on intra-African trade, Tanzania's trade with other 
EAC members shows a remarkable trade involvement, as depicted by the imports 
and exports intensities. Both intensities are higher for Kenya and Uganda 
(individually) than all other countries in the sample. This could also be a reflection of 
a combination of other factors such as proximity and linguistic ties. With the 
implementation of the next stage of the regional infrastructure program within the 
EAC, there is hope for further increases in bilateral trade relationships with the other 
EAC members. In manufactured goods, Tanzania has a, substantial intra-trade 
relationship with UK, the Netherlands, USA and Kenya. This is a cru de measure of 
Tanzania's international competitiveness in her non-traditional exports sectors. 
Similarly, though Tanzania's trade in machinery and transport equipment with her 
major EU partners is largely inter-trade, there has been a substantial growth in intra-
trade in this product category over the past two qecades. 
When investigating the effect of regional integration on trade using the gravity 
model the superiority of the inclusion of country specifie dummies to a regional 
dummy, has been demonstrated by the results of this study. While in the tradition al 
specification, both the EU and the EAC dummies are negative and significant in all 
three regressions, the model that included country dummies provides better results. 
The results clearly identified the openness of Tanzania and its trading partners. J apan 
appeared to be the most open economy to Tanzania. This is an indication that, as the 
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Japanese economy pick up momentum, Tanzania could take advantage of to gain 
increased market access especiaily since the trade deficit with J apan is the greatest and 
seems to drive Tanzania's overail trade deficit. The United States is also relatively 
open to Tanzania exports. It is expected that the enhanced trade opportunities 
offered by AGOA will le ad to increased trade flows with the United States, especiaily 
in the food and live animal product category, since there seems to be a substantial 
intra-trade relationship between Tanzania and the United States in this product 
category. Tanzania also has the opportunity to increase its market access to Asia 
given that its economy is relatively open to India, as weil as having a close trade 
relationship with India. 
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Appendix C 
Cl: Decomposition of Total Trade Growth 
where: 
HOTic = IXe - Miel (1) 
IITiC = (Xc + Mi) - IXie - Miel, 
TOT, HOT, IIT are total trade, inter-industry trade, and intra-industry trade, and i 
and c denote product group and country respectively. From equation (1) we can 
decompose total trade growth in each product group into HOT growth and IIT 
growth with the following equation: 
gTOTic = (l-Gic)gHOTic + (Gù)gIITic (2) 
where the g precerung each variable represents growth rate and Git which is the 
Grubel-Lloyd intra-industry index at the beginning of the period, is used as a weight. 
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C2: List of countries included in regression analysis. 
1. Australia 
2. Canada 
3. China 
4. Denmark 
5. Finland 
6. France 
7. Germany 
8. Greece 
9. HongKong 
10. India 
11: Italy 
12.]apan 
13. Kenya 
14. Malaysia 
15. Netherlands 
16. Portugal 
17. Singapore 
18. Spain 
19. Sweden 
20. Switzerland 
21. United Kingdom 
22. United States of America 
23. Uganda 
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